The
Arab World:
Waiting
for Bismarck
By
Nur Yalman
Harvard University, Cambridge USA
April 2, 2002
Are we going to have a "clash of civilizations" a la
Hollywood as predicted by Osama bin Laden and Samuel
Huntington? Is this going to be between Islam in general
and the West, or only between Arabs and the
Anglo-Americans? And who is going to lead it? Some
lieutenant of Osama and his Wahhabi warriors? Saddam
Hussein and his secular forces? Colonel Khaddafi
supported by his oil fortunes paid for by Europe? Or
perhaps will the forces of a militant Islam be led by
President Khamenei of Iran? Even the mere mention of such
names is likely to remind us of how preposterous these
paranoid speculations turn out to be. There is now in the
West a curious inchoate anxiety about a huge swath of
mankind who, it is thought, is somehow out to destroy
Western capitalist civilization. At least so writes, Paul
Kennedy, the celebrated Yale historian in his review of
the views of Bernard Lewis, the great scholar of Islam,
in the New York Times Book Review of 27 January. "The
unvarnished truth is that the tensions there are of a
different order of magnitude...a vast, sprawling area,
where a badly damaged though powerful and religiously
driven order is locked in battle with global trends more
penetrating and unsettling than could ever have been
imagined...What Lewis is writing about...concerns one of
the greatest cultural and political divides in modern
history." There has been nothing like this fear since the
days of the Berlin or Cuban crisis and the Iron Curtain.
We need to examine the basis for these exaggerated
worries.
What is amazing is that this vague fear of "terrorism"
is so much more acute in the US, with the most powerful
military/industrial complex in the world, than in Europe
which is home to many millions of Muslims. The constant
refrain of "terror" used on every occasion by the
administration has now pushed the US military budget to a
mind-boggling $478 billion dollars supposedly to protect
the country against the "axis of evil".
There is a general sense that the problem arises
mainly with the Arabs, but the wider world of Islam is
also drawn in as Huntington had prophesied. Osama bin
Laden in his Oct. 7 videotape spoke of the "more than
eighty years" of "humiliation and disgrace" suffered by
Muslim peoples at the hands of Westerners. Many in the
West wondered what he could have meant by that date,
though in the Middle East his listeners could relate
immediately to the cataclysmic events at the end of
W.W.I. In 1918, the last great Islamic state, the Ottoman
Empire of 600 years, was defeated and its provinces
divided up between fractious victorious powers who could
hardly agree among themselves to share the spoils. In
1924, the Turks who had provided the military shield for
the Islamic and Asian world, decided to cut their losses
and go their own way. They abolished the ancient
institution of the Caliphate in 1924 which had provided a
sense of unity to Islamic peoples. It has not been
revived since.
These catastrophic events were followed by much
further humiliation especially for the Arab speaking
peoples. The Turks rejected their defeat. They fought
back the allies, won back their liberty, and reorganized
themselves to form their secular republic. They have been
cultivating their love affair with the West in NATO, and
in the Council of Europe, since then. The Arabs on the
other hand were misled by their leaders, thoroughly
double crossed by the allies, led astray, broken up into
various so-called "protectorates" and finally totally
dominated by Britain and France between the two World
Wars. As it turned out, Britain took the useful parts
with the prospects for "oil" in Iraq and parts of Arabia.
France was consoled with Syria and Lebanon, the parts
with "cultural capital" but no oil. North Africa had
already been neatly divided up earlier.
As if these colonial disasters were not sufficient as
a severe punishment and a stern example to others in the
British Empire, such as India, who might have entertained
dangerous ideas of "independence", Britain also decided
to provide a "homeland for Jews" in Palestine, an ancient
land that was densely occupied by a rural population of
mainly Arabic speakers. There were Jews among them, and
Christians of various denominations. The majority were
Muslims.
Up to this point in the rich history of these lands no
one in this vast region had been conscious of belonging
to "nations". As far back as one could recall, all these
peoples had been subjects of the Sultan. It was the
Ottoman Sultan who had the duty to make sure that the
subjects of his domain were contended and at peace with
each other. And, indeed, a large degree of local autonomy
and a general peace had reigned over these lands ever
since the defeat of the Mameluk Turks of Egypt by the
Ottoman Turks of the north in 1517. The peace had been
punctuated, it is true, by local troubles from time to
time, but these had been manageable. They had not led to
large scale "national" movements of any kind. The Middle
East in this respect was unlike the troublesome Balkan
lands in the 19th century where "nationalist" passions
engendered by European ideological currents had been the
order of the day.
With the defeat of the Ottomans, the British and the
French proceeded with the effective policy of "divida et
impera". So, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi
Arabia and a multitude of small Sheikdoms on the
Persian/Arabian Gulf were created in the 1920's with
entirely artificial borders which are still in dispute.
The Kuwait affair in 1990 is part of this story. They
were controlled by colonial officers through indirect
rule. Egypt, occupied earlier, was constantly chafing
against British rule, and there were many uprisings in
Iraq, Syria, Palestine and elsewhere. This was not a
happy period for any of these peoples. Their troubles
read like a depressing history of intrigue and deception
between the colonial powers and the local
populations.
Come the second world war, the region was rife for
uprising. Rommel's Afrika Korps was expected in Cairo
with great anticipation. The Germans did not turn out to
be the saviors that the Arabs had hoped for to deliver
them out of the hands of the British and the French.
Enter America. American anti-colonial influence,
combined with the great oil discoveries in Saudi Arabia
eventually undermined British and French rule in the
Middle East. The Suez War of 1957 was the last direct
attempt by the old colonial powers to hold some military
outposts in the region. Meanwhile, with the arrival of
millions of Jews escaping from the racism and the
unspeakable outrages of Europe, the Israel problem came
to dominate Arab consciousness. The pitiful plight of the
Palestinians who had been chased out of their homes and
villages with the creation of the State of Israel in
1948, could not be evaded. The continuing tragedy in
Palestine began to haunt every Arab regime. It led to
hopeless wars with Israel in which many thousands lost
their lives.
Matters were greatly exacerbated during the cold war.
The Soviets cultivated socialist Arab regimes, which in
turn strengthened the US commitment to Israel. With
America standing firmly behind Israel, arming it, and
providing expertise and economic aid, the Arab peoples
became increasingly frustrated.
It is thus that we arrive at the present impasse of
the Arabs. The Arabic speaking peoples from Morocco to
Oman and Zanzibar do not have a unified history as a
"nation". Just like the German speaking people of the
18th century, there is a sense of local identity that is
much stronger than the overall identity of belonging to
an Arab nation.
After having chased out King Farouk and the Egyptian
royal family with Ottoman (and Albanian) roots in 1954,
Colonel Nasser had tried to foster a Pan-Arab "national"
identity, but he was no Bismarck. The attempted union
with Syria, announced with great fanfare in 1958, broke
down in only a couple of years. Relations with Jordan
were marked by suspicion because of the closeness of the
Jordanian ruling family to British interests. The Arab
Legion in Jordan, at the time the strongest military
force among Arab countries, was led by British Officers.
Egypt had had a very hard time getting rid of British
military bases in the canal zone. The present King of
Jordan too, who has been educated at Sandhurst, the
famous British military academy, is naturally regarded to
be in the pocket of the West from the point of view of
those who listen to Osama bin Laden.
Nasser's difficulties did not end with Syria and
Jordan. His "Arab socialism" went counter to highly
conservative Islamic circles within Egypt and elsewhere.
Islamic secret societies began to flourish. Nasser's
revolutionary program was quite unacceptable to the Saudi
royal family. Egypt became involved in a long drawn out
and debilitating civil war in Yemen.
All these incidents, and others, to mention only a few
of the difficulties that Nasser ran into, showed that the
time had not yet arrived to construct an Arab "nation"
out of the diverse elements on a vast geographical space.
Not only were the economic infrastructures lacking, the
conservative political structures hostile, but the
diverse populations were not sufficiently literate or
educated to be brought together through the effects of
modern schooling. The predominant loyalties remained
intensely local. So, in Syria, for example, the Sunni's
and the Alouites remain distinct, as do the Shiites and
the Sunnis in Iraq and Lebanon. Similar divisions
separate populations on the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia to
such an extent that a Muslim traveling in Saudi Arabia
needs internal visas to move from one region to another.
Oman is itself a distinct society. Egypt, with her
extraordinary ancient history, and her important
Christian minorities, remains ambivalent about her Arab
identity. The popular Islamic organizations are kept
under tight surveillance. The murder of Anwar Sadat is
not forgotten. Many are profoundly hostile to the Mubarak
regime. The matter is further complicated by the fact
that all these peoples are at the same time deeply
Islamic, which means that the very idea of "nationalism"
itself is questionable. In theory there should be only a
single community of Muslims, the great Umma of Islam. The
intensity of local ties is also the reason why the
Palestinians have not been assimilable as populations in
places where they have eked out a refugee existence. They
have had to remain distinct whether in Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.
Given this picture of lack of coherence and lack of
responsiveness in political structures, and the deep
social and economic frustration of large populations in
the major urban centers, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, it has
been difficult for a leader to emerge to capture the
imagination of the Arabic speaking peoples. Osama bin
Laden is one such figure whose message is being listened
to, but who has been rejected by all responsible Arab
institutions from Yemen to Morocco.
Nonetheless, it is the Israel/Palestine issue which
continues to fester. It provides a focal point for the
profound disillusionment of the masses. The Osama bin
Laden affair, and the fact that most of the individuals
involved in the September 11 attack were Saudi citizens,
clearly indicated that the anger surrounding this issue
has spread well into the rich oil realms in Arabia. The
recent eloquent warnings of Prince Abdul Aziz, the
director of the Saudi intelligence service, are quite
telling. The New York Times (Jan.27, '02) reports that
the Prince indicated that according to a Saudi
intelligence survey, "of educated Saudi's between the
ages of 25 and 41...95% of them supported Mr. bin Laden's
cause"..."even though they rejected the attacks in New
York and Washington". Arabs, and many others, in Iran, in
Pakistan, and elsewhere are angry. "All the governments,
the people of the region believe that America is
supporting Israel whether it is right or wrong, and now
if something happens to Yasir Arafat, the feeling against
American policy will be stronger." He also had something
quite pointed to say about American attitudes to the
region. "Some days you say you want to attack Iraq, some
days Somalia, some days Lebanon, some days Syria," he
said. "Who do you want to attack? All the Arab world? And
you want us to support that? It's impossible. It's
Impossible."
This puts the matter in a nutshell. As long as there
is no honorable peace for the Israeli's and the
Palestinians, there is likely to be serious trouble
against US interests. The right wing in the American
administration, profoundly misguided in its analysis of
the roots of "terror", does not seem to realize what
witches brew it is concocting. It was most unfortunate
for President Bush to speak of a great "crusade" after
September 11. Apologies to the Islamic world quickly
followed, but perhaps that regrettable term does express
the pent up frustration in the West with these
recalcitrant populations in the East which do refuse to
see the world their way.
With Bush speaking of an "axis of evil" in his State
of the Union address to the joint houses of Congress on
January 30th, the dangers of escalation in hostilities to
other parts of the Islamic world have increased. American
troops have already been dispatched to the Philippines to
help subdue a local Muslim uprising. Indonesia with its
vast population is restless and suspicious. Somalia and
Iraq are in the target zone. Iran is now also on notice.
Syria, the Sudan and Libya are often mentioned as part of
the conspiracy, but then so are Algerians and Yemenis. It
is to be regretted that all this will go a long way to
help the cause of extremists. What with the suspicion
over the motives of French in Serbia, and the behavior of
the Dutch in Srebrenitza and Bosnia, the slow reaction of
"the international community" to the outrages in the
Balkans, the insensitivity to the desperate plight of
Chechens in Russia, the Uygurs in China, not to speak of
Kashmir, the Islamic world was already on edge even
before the war in Afghanistan. The great tensions over
this issue will continue to feed the doubts of the
Islamic world about the ulterior motives of the Western
powers.
The sense of victimization and justified anger are
great catalysts of solidarity. The sense of outrage
against the insensitive policies of the US, combined with
the perceived impotence of their own rulers and
governments, is contributing mightily to creating the
consciousness of "nationhood" among the Arabs. The Osama
bin Laden phenomenon is a symptom deeper turmoil, as is
the lionization of Saddam and Qaddafi. If the malaise in
Palestine continues to fester we can expect many more
acts of dramatic desperation. They will be in the name of
national liberation. Only then perhaps some Arab Bismarck
will have his chance.
©
TFF and the
author
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