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NATO Notes is a new publication of the Centre for European Security and Disarmament. NATO Notes will regularly report on and highlight timely NATO-related issues, gathering information from interviews and briefings in Brussels. CESD will also provide information to interrelated activities in other fora where possible. Information from NATO Notes may be used or reproduced, provided proper citation is given. Brussels, 5 October 1999 Written by Christopher Bollinghaus Annual Informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Toronto, 21-22 September, 1999
BRIEFING The informal Defence Ministerial in Toronto primarily served to indicate in which direction NATO is headed in the next few months. Most major decisions were taken at the Washington Summit in April and therefore few new policy initiatives were expected in Toronto, especially given the informal nature of the meeting. On the agenda, according to NATO officials, were the lessons to be learned from Kosovo, the emerging gap in European and US military capabilities in certain areas and progress of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), announced at the Washington Summit in April. The ongoing development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and a reassessment of NATO force structures in the Balkans also received attention. Discussions on nuclear policy and NATO-Russia relations were conspicuous by their absence. Following NATO's press conference of 16 September on the Kosovo strike assessment, officials agreed that the mission was fundamentally a success. They expressed their satisfaction at the decisive military result achieved in a relatively short time, at the cohesion of the 19 Alliance members and other partners and at the fact that there had been no casualties among NATO pilots. Some shortcomings of the campaign were also highlighted, although these centred primarily on the huge disparities in American and European force capability. Strategic lift, satellite reconnaissance and communications interoperability deficiencies in particular had major implications for the way in which the campaign was carried out. There was also a distinct lack of precision guided munitions. Even though European warplanes flew half of the total night bombing sorties, they had to rely on the US to supply them with the laser-guided bombs that were needed for precise striking of targets. US Secretary of Defence William Cohen recently summed up what he saw as the problem, 'NATO countries spend roughly 60 percent of what the United States does and they get about 10 percent of the capability. That has to change'. Ministers at the Toronto meeting therefore discussed progress on the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launched at NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in April, which aims at upgrading the capabilities of European forces. The DCI mentions that capabilities will need to be improved 'for the rapid deployment of significant forces outside national territory, or for extended sustainment of operations and protection of forces far from home bases'. It also refers to the need for improved 'command and control and information systems'. This includes improved strategic lift capability, fuelling arrangements, logistic command, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Yet US officials were quick to point out that all this did not simply mean European forces becoming more like American ones, 'We're not saying that they have to look like us, but we are saying we all have to be able to talk to each other…'.
DISCUSSION POINTS There is no single sheet of paper detailing the precise lessons which NATO members learned from Kosovo. Though presented by the Alliance as consensus, it is to be expected that each country will draw its own conclusions, both political and military, about many aspects of the conflict. However there does seem to be consensus about one lesson, that European forces have not sufficiently adapted to the rigours of a post-Cold War security environment. There is indeed a deep disparity in capabilities between the US and European NATO members. But exactly what new capabilities do Europeans need? It is reasonable to say that there is an interoperability problem among NATO forces at present. In addition, many welcome an initiative from European countries to update their capabilities for crisis management. Their aim is that peacekeepers should be able to be deployed rapidly and that allies should be able to communicate effectively using accurate information gathering mechanisms. To this end, NATO has been running its new Multi Joint Logistics Center (MJLC) for about six months in an effort to cope with the demands of logistics for missions involving troops from several nations. It would perhaps be pushing the envelope too far, however, to claim that the root of the problem is an overall 'technology gap' between US and European forces. There are areas in which European countries lack high technology capabilities, such as the instruments for long-range precision strike (LRPS) including cruise missiles and laser-guided bombs. Yet it is not clear that these areas are the most important ones for Europeans to consolidate. Some suspect that the momentum for such procurement is coming less from European policy-makers than from defence industries and US interests. A more equitable burden sharing arrangement has long been a priority for the US in NATO and the events in Kosovo seem to have given this idea new momentum for all member states. Yet there is cause for concern if this momentum is coming more from the military and bureaucratic elements of NATO than from its political representatives. This would be a dangerous tendency indeed. Above all, it is hoped that a clearer definition emerges of what precisely NATO and European needs are under the conveniently loose title 'crisis management'. One NATO diplomat suggested that this concept could be used as a catch-all phrase to include a wide range of military tasks that would not be acceptable under another guise. In this way, one should be very careful in holding up the military intervention over Kosovo as a typical example of crisis management operations of the future. Cost will also be a crucial element of the discussions about the DCI from now on. Whilst US estimates of what Europeans will need to spend are low, a note of caution is necessary. It remains to be seen what effect current European fiscal problems will have on the upgrading process. If the EU is to develop its own security capabilities, it is likely that they will target the areas for which NATO is not already adequately equipped. Even with European defence industry co-operation and consolidation, itself an unknown, this may prove a costly affair. Time will tell just how costly, although European NATO sources have expressed their hope that little new money will need to be found. A thorough re-assessment of funding allocations in respective countries, along with renewed co-operation, might suffice.
Theatre Missile Defence BRIEFING Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) has been the subject of discussion within NATO for some time now. This week, NATO allies are on the verge of agreeing on a new feasibility study for a TMD system, reports Defense News. Formal agreement is expected in November on a four-year feasibility study. NATO diplomats asserted that there was no other way to defend against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The system could be composed of 'battle management command and control, exo-atmospheric kill vehicles, early warning radar, space and missile tracking systems, ground-based radar and a host of various types of interceptors' reports Defense News. Until recently, the complex technology required for such a system had seemed out of reach for American researchers. Yet two successful tests of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system (after six consecutive failures) this summer have led to increased optimism about the feasibility of such a system. Whilst officials were eager to stress that this study did not necessarily lead to procurement of a system, this study does however set in motion a procurement process that is unlikely to be rejected in the end. But if the interceptors are acquired, Defense News reports that '…it would be the first time NATO purchased major weapons of any kind in its 50-year history'. Dissenting voices, however, are not hard to find. Officials have cautioned that European nations, with fiscal problems in abundance, have more immediate needs to address. Not least of these is the process for developing an EU capability for carrying out the 'Petersberg' tasks . In the US, the THAAD project has cost US$3.9 billion to date, an amount which could finance Petersberg tasks in Europe for several years to come. Meanwhile it seems that the debate over the long-term implications of a TMD system for NATO is only just beginning. At first glance, many would welcome a system which would protect peacekeeping troops from operating under the threat of WMD attack from a missile launched by a state or terrorist group. However, the implications for global stability could be very serious indeed if the most powerful military organisation in the world was able to intervene wherever it chose with relative impunity. The ability to shield one's forces from possible attack could prove a menacing bargaining chip. Both the Chinese and the Russians (if they are not brought into this plan, as some suggest) are known to oppose NATO's TMD project. Many countries view the programme as politically destabilising, with China particularly worried about the possibility of a similar system deployed to cover Taiwan, or even Japan. Although the debate over a TMD system for NATO is conceptually distinct from that of the United States' National Missile Defence system (NMD), it is likely that a similar debate about threat assessment will be needed. The Rumsfeld Commission's report in the US warned that the threat of attack from missiles tipped with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads is 'evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence community'. However many argue that such reports have overstated the real threat and that, in addition to the threat to global stability, the cost of developing what might be a flawed system is simply too great.
DISCUSSION POINTS The announcement of this feasibility study may prove to be the starting point for a more open debate about the implications of such a system. At this stage there are many uncertainties to be addressed by the study and which hopefully will prompt a more open debate about the implications of a TMD system for NATO. It is likely to play a large part in security discussions in the coming years. What does seem certain is that it will provide a new challenge for NATO's stalling relations with Russia. Several Russian military officials and diplomats have already made their displeasure known over US plans for NMD. Yet Russia is sure to be interested in playing a part in NATO's TMD plans if at all possible . Russia perceives a missile threat from the east, with neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, for example, as known missile proliferators. Yet Russian officials are also aware of the position they may be put in if NATO forces are virtually invulnerable to attack when deployed 'out-of-area'. Russia could be marginalised yet further if left out of such a system and may feel threatened with an expanded Alliance seemingly able to act out-of-area however and wherever it pleases. At this stage there is no Russian involvement, but the prospect of it may provide the impetus for renewed NATO-Russian dialogue and co-operation, in particular in fora such as the Permanent Joint Council.
Permanent Joint Council BRIEFING The last six months have strained NATO-Russia relations to the limit. Relations were initially soured by the Alliance's eastward expansion when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were admitted as full members to NATO early this year. Official NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) relations were formally severed when the Kosovo air strikes began. The latest meeting of the (PJC) on September 15th, the second since the end of the Kosovo campaign, was at least a step in the right direction. On the agenda, however, were only matters pertaining to the recent Kosovo air strikes and the peacekeeping operations on the ground. NATO and Russia commended the co-operative and professional relationship among NATO participating states and Russia within the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and discussed ways to further improve the security situation in Kosovo. They condemned all acts of violence and called for co-operation with the international security presence. They further stressed the importance of the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) and the need for its continued close scrutiny as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). However, there remains a certain disagreement about the status of Russian troops in Kosovo, which Russia would like to be equal partners with NATO troops on the ground. Other concerns such as tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear safety and de-alerting, which were on the agenda before Kosovo, were not given any time for discussion. However, brief mention was made of the Allies' concerns other than Kosovo under 'any other business' at the end of the agenda. It is hoped that some of these concerns may be addressed in forthcoming meetings, and that confidence can be rebuilt to allow for more substantive discussions in the PJC. There remains a disparity between NATO members' and Russia's perceptions of the role of the PJC. Several NATO diplomats asserted that Russia viewed the Council as a decision-making body, whereas the majority of NATO members refused to consider this even as a possibility, preferring to limit it to purely consultative tasks. It is not entirely clear, however, that Russia's interpretation is inconsistent with the original Founding Act. For example, an excerpt from the introduction to the Founding Act reads, 'This Act defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, co-operation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia' [emphasis added]. Thus, there is some disagreement as to the precise role of the PJC, which may take some time to resolve. Whilst little progress on major issues was made at the last meeting, members have not given up hope on possibilities in the PJC. Expectations of real progress on these issues remain relatively low and NATO diplomats recognise that they will have to start almost from the beginning again before substantive progress can be made. It is clear that confidence will take time to rebuild and that the PJC is nowhere near discussing the range of issues it had originally hoped. But it may be aided in its progress by more pragmatic necessities.
DISCUSSION POINTS The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is of crucial importance to both sides, but particularly Russia. If Russia is to maintain a voice in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and address pressing security concerns, which it surely must, then it needs this forum. A constructive PJC would confirm Russia's status as a 'special partner' of the Alliance, rather than one of many Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) members. The importance with which the PJC is viewed in Russia is backed up by its actions over the last six months. At the height of the Kosovo crisis, Russia's ambassador was recalled to Moscow, but only briefly. PJC relations were 'formally' severed, but, in reality, many continued informally. Throughout the crisis, normal bilateral relations were maintained by Russia and NATO member countries. Crucial negotiations such as those on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty continued relatively unhindered. The US conducted Y2K talks with Russia outside the official NATO framework. As it is important for the Allies to begin a rapprochement with Russia, it is even more imperative for Russia to rebuild its relations with NATO members &endash; not only for the sake of preserving its relative status, but also to address its own security concerns. This would be especially useful for the Russian military, who need advice and assistance for basic reform, which could possibly come from European countries who have been carrying out large structural changes on their own forces. Expectations are low at the moment, particularly with upcoming presidential elections in Russia and the US. But the vital political will still exists to maximise the opportunities for NATO-Russia relations in the PJC. The PJC remains the best forum for Russia to retain its special status among NATO partners. Thus it is hoped that, before too long, the PJC may begin to regain some of the ground lost this year. The next meeting of the PJC is scheduled for the 27th October.
Subscription to NATO Notes is free of charge. Dissemination is primarily via email, but there will be compilation hard copies available. Input into the publication is welcomed. To receive this free of charge to your mailbox, e-mail: cesd@cesd.org The Centre for European Security and Disarmament is an independent foundation-funded organisation that monitors security issues in the European Union, Western European Union and NATO. The Centre also reports on developments in the United Nations on nuclear matters. CESD provides policy advice on these questions and acts as an information resource for parliamentarians, officials, journalists and NGOs. Centre for European Security and Disarmament Centre de Sécurité Européenne et Désarmement 115 rue Stévin 1000 Brussels · Belgium Tel: +32 2 230.07.32, Fax: +32 2 230.24.67 Email: cesd@cesd.org, Website: www.cesd.org
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