Expansion of
NATO, Conflicts in the Balkans
and the Security of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia
By Dr. Zlatko
Isakovic
Center for Strategic Studies
Survey, Belgrade
November 1997
NATO enlargement - for
what?
The process of NATO enlargement has a great potential
to influence significantly the security and sovereignty of
Yugoslavia, and this trend will probably both continue and
intensify in the future. The members of NATO and the
Partnership for Peace program exercised a most significant
influences upon the conflicts in Yugoslavia and in some of
the neighboring countries; these conflicts, on the other
hand, effect the security and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia.
However, it seems that to the extent to which NATO armament
alone was not able to stop communism (without a parallel
activity of the civic society) on the European continent, it
is equally not capable (alone) of eliminating ethnic
conflicts (that determine the sovereignty and security of
not only Yugoslavia, but practically also of all other
states in the Balkans and in Central and Eastern Europe as
well) after the end of the Cold War.
Relatively large stocks of armaments and big armies do not
represent new phenomena in the Balkans. Some analyses show
that - when compared with the members of the Warsaw Pact, in
Eastern Europe, the European NATO members, developing
countries and developed countries - the Balkan countries
used to hold the first position in 1987 in regard to the
number of soldiers per 1000 inhabitants, and in 1990 they
held the second position. The economic burden of military
expenditure in an average Balkan country was in 1987 ranked
as third, and in 1990 as the first one.
For the years after 1990 there are only estimates. However,
available data show a rise of military expenditures in the
territory of the second Yugoslavia (especially in Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia). During the last few
years in a number of the former Yugoslav republics it became
obvious that it can happen that those who are trying to
preserve peace by preparing for war can achieve not what
they were aiming at, but what they were preparing for.
Not long after they began to produce the atomic weapons, the
Americans have made an unpleasant discovery - that such a
gigantic quantum of military force, did in itself not bring
lasting greater security. Since the Soviets managed to
achieve a rough military parity, the whole concept of
armament build-up entered an impasse. In other words, it can
be concluded that the increase in quality and quantity of
military force that is at a state's disposal does not
necessarily bring more security.
Ex-Yugoslavia: the futility of armed
security
The second Yugoslavia is an illustration to this
point: the Yugoslav People's Army was counted among the
strongest in Europe and yet, the conflict and war could not
have been avoided by the presence of military stocks.
Security- related studies show that the Balkans became an
even more dangerous area than before. This is accentuated by
a lack of continued communication and cooperation (but,
primarily of tolerance) between nations and states. Instead
of relying upon communication, patience and readiness for
cooperation, the Balkan states rely upon well equipped
armies; their populations seem to be ready to make great
sacrifices in order to achieve political aims that were
designed by the political elites of the respective
countries. Therefore, the question is whether NATO soldiers
and weapons can bring them more security.
The greatest dangers for peace is that states posses huge
military power which some leaders are tempted to use rather
than enter political dialogue; these dangers can also be
generated by systematic behavior that is in accordance with
a narrow understanding of an old Roman maxim, si vis pacem,
para bellum. However, this proverb does not say anything
about what preparations for war should look like. It seems
that a modern interpretation of the mentioned principle
should include a few more elements aimed towards a
non-violent preservation or establishment of peace:
peace-oriented diplomacy, peace-oriented politics and
communications, economy and - one would say, in the first
place - peace education.
Deterrence by military weakness and
creative strength
Deterrence by military weakness (and not strength)
is compatible with communications that do not aim at
demonizing one nation in the minds of the other; they tend
rather toward promoting mutual understanding and
particularly toward communications that contribute to the
transparency of the world in general.
In other words, deterrence by military weakness is in
accordance with the politics that does not lead countries
and nations into wars, but rather inhibits them in this
regard; it's compatible with diplomacy that does not use
military power as an 'argument' but relies much more upon
diplomatic skills, wisdom, creativity, ability, education
and inventiveness. Finally, deterrence by military weakness
is in favor of economic prosperity.
Weak states and strong ethnic
identity
The process during which many new states emerged
in Eastern and Southeastern Europe was from the very
beginning burdened by historical considerations,
frustrations and traumas. Therefore, the sovereignty of some
of these states remained disputable also after they achieved
independence and international recognition. Due to many
internal problems (primarily economic underdevelopment,
social, ethnic and religious fragmentation, weak or broken
state traditions and a lack of democratic ethos), these
states can be qualified as weak ones in the sense in which
this notion is elaborated by Barry Buzan and some other
authors. One of the crucial problems is that the power of
ethnic identification is strengthened by the lack of other
uniting forces in the society.
Comparison of ethnic complexity in Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe and in Western Europe led one author to the
conclusion that in Western Europe, too, there could be found
'all types of ethnic groups'. The difference is that the
majority of West European monarchies have possessed the
political, military, economic and cultural power to
subordinate different minority ethnic groups, assimilating
them in time. France represents an example for such a kind
of modernized and centralized monarchy, while neighboring
Spain - incapable of turning Basques and Catalans into
Spaniards - is facing some of the problems that exist in
Eastern Europe, and especially in the first and second
Yugoslavia. It is concluded that the 'key to the explanation
is resting with the political power, and in this respect the
East European countries were much weaker than their European
partners'.
Peaceful co-existence requires
something different
The impossibility to create (completely) 'pure'
national states in the territory of Central and Eastern
Europe, and it seems particularly in the Balkans, 'condemns'
the members of two or more ethnic groups to live in one
state, namely to share these states in a certain way.
Therefore, the most important task of the states in the
Balkan region is to acquire such knowledge that is necessary
for life in circumstances in which there exist ethnic
conflicts, and to face them without using violence. The
elimination of ethnic conflicts in the Balkans will probably
be a lasting process; the danger is the establishment of
undemocratic rule with the aim to maintain state sovereignty
at any cost.
The endeavor to increase security by expanding NATO deserves
attention primarily because membership in NATO is possible
only if the potential member had prior disengaged from
conflicts with the neighbors.
Conflicts in the territory of the second Yugoslavia could
not and can not be eliminated in the short run, neither by
using domestic armies, police and similar forces (even
during the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia), nor by
humanitarian activities of UNPROFOR units, nor by actions
for establishing peace by force. Peace cannot be restored
and secured by IFOR and SFOR units, and conflicts cannot be
prevented by the somewhat similar activities of UNPREDEP in
Macedonia.
The weak state fuels repression -
and becomes weaker...
The new states have undergone a process in which
they perpetuated their weaknesses, as illustrated by
tensions within the political system. By their consequences
- i.e. a general weakening of the respective societies and
states (except, maybe, in the military sense) - the wars in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia can be compared only with the
consequences of World War II in this region. They showed how
inadequate the military is when it comes to the solution of
the three key groups of problems of the Yugoslav state, and
her 'new' neighbors: ethnic conflicts, perpetuation of state
weaknesses (which is underlined by participation in
conflicts), as well as the problems which emerge due to
intensification of ethnic identification.
This conclusion can, at least partly, be drawn from the
analysis of the state schemes, as presented by Barry Buzan.
In the view of this author, namely, the first element of
this scheme is the very notion of state - when firmly
planted in the minds of the populations, it creates a firm
basis for the state as a whole, and if firmly planted in
other states, it creates a safe environment for the state in
question.
The second element is the institutional dimension of the
state, and its monopoly over the use of force. Nowadays,
there are two trends in this development: first, the rise in
number of institutions and, second, the field of their
activity becomes broader and broader.
It seems that, for a theoretical handling of the issues
pertaining to Yugoslavia and some neighboring countries (and
maybe some other states in Central and Eastern Europe), it
is significant to understand that the lack of social
consensus in regard to the state idea was frequently
compensated by a strengthening of the mentioned
institutional element.
However, one of the most significant characteristics of weak
states is exactly the fact that they most frequently make an
attempt to strengthen the institutional element by
strengthening the repressive and some other related segments
of their apparatus. On the other hand, stressing the
significance of the institutions that exercise repressive
and similar functions does rather weaken and not strengthen
the respective state. In such states, security related
discussions give priority to internal threats, and the lack
of legitimacy of the regime is 'solved' only by a temporary
alleviation of social conflicts, while the roots of the
problem are completely ignored.
Confict-resolution through new
institutions and the rule of law
The basic problem is that a weak state cannot be
strengthened by repression, so that the circle is being
closed: more repression brings more weakness and - this
weakness 'asks' for more repression... Therefore, none of
the states that fit the descriptions of weak states can
easily solve their problems that stem from ethnic conflicts
and identification, and from weaknesses in their sovereignty
and security; they cannot even be significantly alleviated
by (non)admission to membership of any military-political
alliance. What they need is the establishment of
stable and legitimate institutions.
Finally, one should mention that the institutionalization of
politics, establishing of the rules of the political 'game'
and establishing the rule of law (instead of rule of
parties, and even individuals) should remain the basic
mechanisms for solving or mitigating ethnic and other
conflicts. It is only in such a case that the state itself
also becomes a mechanism for limiting conflicts.
The cases of Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and some other
multi-ethnic states indicate that potentially it is
realistic to presume that - at least in the elementary sense
- it is possible to unite the societies in which ethnic and
political divisions had grown so high that they could lead
to a questioning of the very idea of the state, its
institutions and sovereignty, and thereby its very
existence.
Notes
& References
This article presents the concluding remarks within a
broader analysis by the author, "Sovereignty and Security of
Yugoslavia in the framework of NATO enlargement" from
the Institute of International Politics and Economics
(IIPE), Belgrade 1997.
For the discussion, analysis and critical remarks in regard
to the purpose, methodology and sources of data and
impartiality concerning the measurement of military
expenditure, consult: Hakan Wiberg, Measuring Military
Expenditures: Purposes, Methods, Sources, Cooperation
and Conflict , Vol. VIII, 1983, p. 161-177.
Compare also Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers - Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 , Fontana Press, London, 1989, p. 531.
One could also take into serious consideration the thesis
that the enormous - for the Soviet conditions - expenditures
during decades for military purposes has to a great extent
contributed also to the collapse of socialism and the
disintegration of USSR. If that is true, it could be said
that in this country the society served security, and not
that security served the society.
For more details, compare Zlatko Isakovic, Beleke o medijima
i medjunarodnoj bezbednost, Medjunarodni
problemi , No. 1-2, 1994; "Future Possible Media
Impacts on Security and Democracy", CSS Survey
, No. 9, September 1996; "Satellites, Media and Democratic
Security", Romanian Journal of International
Affairs , Vol. II, 1996.
More detailed in, Barry Buzan, People, States and
Fear , Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 96-112; Kalevi
J. Holsti, War, State and the State of War ,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp.
104-108.
More details in Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, "Looking
West: Civil-Military Relations in Macedonia" , paper
presented to the XVII world IPSA ongress, Seoul, August
17-21, 1997; Michael G. Roskin, The Rebirth of East Europe,
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1991, pp. 10-12; a
more detailed critical analyses of this standpoint is given
in: Zlatko Isakovic, "Macedonia and the Security in the
Balkans", CSS Survey , No. 5-6, May-June 1996,
p. 8.
A more detailed elaboration can be found in: Albert Reitere,
"Reducing Ethnic Conflicts - Contemporary Approaches
to Conflict Solution in Western Europe" , paper
presented to the scientific symposium New Dimensions of
Sustainable Security in the Post-Cold-War World, Vienna, 2-3
November, 1996; J. A. Laponce, "The Institutional Options of
the Multi-Ethnic State", Peace and the Sciences
, June 1996; Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, op.cit.
Reprinted from
Monthly Review of the Center for Strategic
Studies , No. 21
Belgrade 1997
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