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Media's Superficial Critiques of NATO's War Ignore the Dangerous Precedent Set
Media Advisory June 11, 1999 As NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia neared its conclusion, the press began debating whether or not the war was a success. Many mainstream commentators and reporters were critical of NATO's tactics, but NATO's basic spin on the war--it was a just war waged against genocidal evil, and it has improved the region's chances for peace and democracy--went almost unchallenged. The idea that the war in Kosovo has proved that military force is an integral part of a humanitarian foreign policy appeared again and again in the pages of the New York Times and Washington Post. As Thomas Friedman put it (New York Times, 6/4/99), if Slobodan Milosevic really carries out his end of the deal, then NATO's action in Kosovo "will establish that an air war for limited humanitarian goals can be effective, albeit costly." A Washington Post editorial of the same day followed suit, praising "NATO's resolute pounding of Serbian forces," which allowed the West to show that "it would not stand for crimes against humanity." It was against this backdrop consensus that most of the press' criticism took place. The most common criticism of the war made by writers in the New York Times and the Washington Post was that it should have been conducted more aggressively, in order to topple Milosevic's government. For example, a New York Times article (6/5/99) cautioned that though the war has been won, military sources "say it is vital that the alliance not take away the wrong lessons from the air campaign." The right lessons are, according to the editorial, that NATO should be less worried about civilian casualties: "Instead of taking the war to downtown Belgrade during the opening hours of the war, NATO waited weeks before attacking targets in the Yugoslav capital, forfeiting the element of surprise and blunting the allies' ability to shock the enemy." NATO's professed reluctance to prepare ground troops was also often cited as a central strategic flaw. In one New York Times op-ed (6/5/99), William Odom, director of the National Security Agency under Reagan, says "President Clinton's failure to make the overthrow of Mr. Milosevic a war aim leaves the Serb leader free to destroy the pro-NATO regime in Montenegro, to repress the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and to cause trouble elsewhere." He concludes that Clinton's "bombing-only strategy, which reflected a fear of a ground war" has "undercut America's moral standing" and set the stage for the demise of NATO. In his New York Times column (6/7/99), William Safire sums up the media's prevailing arguments: "In Kosovo, the Western world is doing the right thing in the wrong way. The right thing was to place humanity's resistance to barbarism above national sovereignty.... Civilization is more civilized for having intervened to do the right thing." Among the mistakes Safire says NATO made were ruling out ground troops early on; not attacking with enough force ("We should have turned out the lights in Belgrade and destroyed telecommunications the first day"); and allowing Russia and the "weak sisters" of Germany, Italy and Greece too much say in NATO decisions ("Consensus should be sought, but no member of NATO should be able to veto the great majority's decision"). Safire goes on to identify Slobodan Milosevic as the primary threat to stability in the Balkans, arguing that "until sensible Serbs decide to hand the Milosevic gang over to the Hague tribunal," no aid or assistance should be given to Serbia. This sentiment was echoed by the Washington Post; one Post editorial (6/4/99) declares that "only when he [Milosevic] is in the dock in the Hague, after all, can the Balkans truly hope for peace and stability." Another states (6/6/99): "If Milosevic prevails, his brand of brutal nationalism will spread. If the Kosovo war marks the beginning of his demise, then other countries in transition will more likely see their future in democracy, fair treatment of minorities and peaceful neighborly relations." One op-ed that stepped outside the narrow range of debate was by D.G. Kousoulas (Washington Post, 6/8/99). He points out that it is illogical to try to "promote stability by encouraging separatist movements among minorities," and warns that "encouraging or tolerating a separatist movement such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) might set the stage for another Balkan war." In fact, recent events--largely unreported by the mainstream media--suggest that NATO's intervention in Kosovo is being seen as a legitimization of Albanian secessionist struggle, and has already encouraged separatist groups in eastern Europe. Long-simmering tensions over the status of ethnic Hungarian minorities in both Romania and the Serbian province of Vojvodina have been exacerbated by NATO's intervention in Kosovo. The situation in Vojvodina has gotten some press (though rarely with a suggestion that NATO bears any responsibility), but the furor that erupted in Romania over a paper signed by prominent ethnic Hungarian intellectuals has gone virtually unnoticed in the American media. Calling for dramatically increased autonomy for Romania's Transylvania region, the document puts forth an argument for devolution that "while framed in economic terms, has clear ethnic overtones as Transylvania is home to a large population of ethnic Hungarians," reports Global Intelligence Update (6/9/99), an online news service published by the consulting firm Stratfor. "Hungarian nationalists are keying off of NATO's actions on behalf of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and are calling for a broad revision of borders in the region." As Stratfor points out (Global Intelligence Update, 6/9/99), "with NATO seen as effectively sanctioning the devolution, if not independence, of an ethnically Albanian Kosovo from Serbia, keeping these other problems in check will be an increasingly difficult task.... There are a great number of maps of Europe waiting to be redrawn, and a host of groups eager to start drawing." This perspective--that NATO's intervention has weakened, not strengthened, stability in the region, and taking out Milosevic isn't a panacea for Europe's ethnic conflicts--was barely part of the debate in the leading U.S. dailies.
This media advisory was written by FAIR intern Rachel Coen. For more of FAIR's analysis of Balkans war coverage, visit our web site at: http://www.fair.org See also the other FAIR article, They Call This Victory?
© FAIR 1999 |
