Nato's
Claim of Ethnic Cleansing Challenged

By Michel
Chossudovsky
TFF adviser
Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and
author of The Globalization of Poverty, Impacts of IMF
and World Bank Reforms, Third World Network, Penang and
Zed Books, London, 1997. Member of the Canadian anti-war
movement.
Copyright Michel Chossudovsky, Ottawa, February
2000
NATO's two main justifications for bombing
Yugoslavia on humanitarian grounds have been refuted by
the Western alliance's own official figures and
documentary evidence. These justifications rest on two
central premises:
1) the alleged indiscriminate mass killings of Albanian
civilians (premise number one);
2) the implementation of a deliberate policy of mass
deportations or "ethnic cleansing" (premise number
two).
"Premise number one" has been invalidated by the FBI
and European forensic teams working under the auspices of
the Hague Tribunal (ICTY). The forensic and police
investigators have uncovered several hundred bodies in
grave sites in Kosovo as opposed to the 10,000 to 100,000
civilian massacres claimed by NATO and Western
governments as a pretext for waging the War. British
Prime Minister Tony Blair had announced that President
Milosevic was "set on a Hitler style genocide equivalent
to the extermination of the Jews during World war II".1
"We've now seen about 100,000 military-aged men
missing... They may have been murdered", echoed US
Defense Secretary William Cohen. 2 "Genocide is
starting," stated German Defense Minister Rudolf
Scharping.3...
The Hague Tribunal (ICTY) (while upholding the war
crimes indictment against members of the Yugoslav
government), has acknowledged the exhumation of 2,108
bodies in Kosovo from grave sites in Kosovo.4 This figure
includes the deaths of ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Romani
and other ethnic groups who died during the war (23 March
-9 June 1999) from all known causes (including
politically motivated executions and massacres of
civilians, NATO air strikes, the ground-war between the
KLA and the Yugoslav Armed Forces and natural
causes).
NO REMAINING LEG TO STAND ON
"The allegations of indiscriminate mass murder, rape
camps, crematoriums have not been borne out" by the
police investigations and forensic evidence. 5 In the
absence of "premise number one", the policy of mass
deportations directed against ethnic Albanians (premise
number two) is being upheld by NATO and the Western media
as "a sufficient justification" for launching the war. In
the words of Madeleine Albright "opposing ethnic
cleansing is central to our values... We are reaffirming
NATO's core purpose as a defender of democracy, stability
and human decency on European soil."6
Yet the recently released Report entitled "As Seen, As
Told: Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE
Kosovo Verification Mission" suggests that the allegation
of mass deportations is also a fabrication. 7 Although
heavily slanted in its main conclusions, OSCE figures
suggest that there were proportionately more Serbs (as a
percentage of population) fleeing Kosovo than ethnic
Albanians which puts an obvious question mark on NATO's
assertion that organized mass expulsions of ethnic
Albanians were taking place.
According to OSCE numbers and Kosovar Albanian sources
on population size and distribution, an estimated 45.7
percent of the Albanian population and 59.5 percent of
the Serb population had fled Kosovo during the bombings
(i.e. from 23 March to 9 June 1999).8
The OSCE report summarises the balance-sheet of ethnic
Albanian refugees as numbering 862,979. In a secluded
footnote at the bottom of the main table, the report
nonetheless acknowledges that: "In addition [to the
862,979 ethnic Albanian refugees], more than 100,000
Serb IDPs [Internally displaced persons] are
estimated to have left Kosovo and to have been registered
in Serbia and Montenegro". 9 Whereas ethnic Albanians
(including those who fled to Montenegro) are categorized
as "refugees", Serbs who fled Kosovo during the same
period are casually identified as "Internally Displaced
Persons". The figures for ethnic Albanians are very
precise in contrast to those indicated for the Serbs in
the footnote. The number of refugees belonging to other
ethnic groups who fled the province during the bombings
is not even acknowledged.
According to Kosovo Albanian sources, the Province had
a total population of 2.1 million of which 90 percent are
ethnic Albanians, 8 percent Serbs and 2 percent are other
ethnic groups.10 Based on these figures (which are
accepted both by NATO and the post-conflict KLA
provisional government) there were an estimated 1.89
million ethnic Albanians and 168,000 Serbs in
Kosovo.10
In accordance with the above population breakdown, the
exodus of Serbs (as a percentage of population) was
larger than that of the ethnic Albanian population.
According to OSCE numbers (from UNHCR sources), it is
estimated 45.7 percent of the Albanian population and
more than 59.5 percent of the Serb population fled Kosovo
during the bombings (i.e. from 23 March to 9 June
1999).
In other words, Serbs --who ostensibly were not the
target of "ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Serbs"--
had also fled the theatre of the war in Kosovo. If there
had been a deliberate and cohesive policy of ethnic
cleansing and massacres directed against ethnic
Albanians, the percentages would have been markedly
different and this is something which NATO was cautious
not to reveal to public opinion while the bombings were
ongoing.
The above estimates depend on the veracity of the
OSCE-UNHCR refugee figures as well as on the reliability
of the data on population size and distribution. In
estimating these percentages, we have accepted official
OSCE-UNHCR refugee numbers at face value, namely that the
OSCE Report had not artificially "inflated" the number of
ethnic Albanian refugees nor had it "deflated" the number
of Serbs who fled Kosovo during the bombings with a view
to vindicating NATO's claim of ethnic cleansing. We have
also taken Kosovar Albanian assumptions pertaining to
population size and distribution. In other words, the
percentages are derived from their numbers! Moreover, it
should be emphasised that the percentage of Serbs who
left Kosovo estimated at 59.5 percent is based on the
100,000 figure given by the OSCE. Yet the OSCE report
states that the number of Serbs who fled Kosovo during
the same period is "more than 100,000".
Accounting for biases in the OSCE-UNHCR figures and
margins of error in the data on population, the estimates
do not support NATO's allegation of a policy of mass
deportation directed against ethnic Albanians.
Ironically, the OSCE (also in a discrete footnote)
acknowledges the assumptions of Belgrade's 1991 Census
data which indicates the ethnic Albanian population at 82
percent of total population. Yet the Census was boycotted
by ethnic Albanians and the figures were never recognised
by the parallel provisional government of Kosovo. Why
does the OSCE acknowledge Belgrade's 1991 Census when
NATO and KLA statements repeatedly indicate that the
ethnic Albanian population is at 90 percent? Based on the
1991 Census figures, the estimated percentage of each
population group which fled Kosovo would be 53.7 percent
for the ethnic Albanians and more than 51.5 percent for
the Serbs.11 Yet even when applying the assumptions of
the 1991 Census, NATO's claim of mass deportations is not
borne out.
The refugee crisis, we were told repeatedly during the
War was limited to ethnic Albanians. According to the
Western media, Serb civilians had been protected by the
Serb police and Armed forces. The large scale exodus of
Serbs from Kosovo prior to June 9, 1999 (acknowledged by
the figures contained in the OSCE Report) was simply not
mentioned. To reveal the numbers would have discredited
NATO's main justification for launching its "humanitarian
war".
FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH
Other documentary evidence including an official
report of the German foreign ministry published prior to
the War, confirms that there was no evidence of "ethnic
cleansing" in Kosovo in the months immediately preceding
the bombings. Who is lying? German Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer had justified NATO's intervention
pointing to a "humanitarian catastrophe", yet the
internal documents of his own ministry stated exactly the
opposite:
"Even in Kosovo an explicit political persecution
linked to Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable. The East
of Kosovo is still not involved in armed conflict. Public
life in cities like Pristina, Urosevac, Gnjilan, etc.
has, in the entire conflict period, continued on a
relatively normal basis. The actions of the security
forces [were] not directed against the
Kosovo-Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but
against the military opponent [KLA] and its
actual or alleged supporters."...12
Moreover, a report of the United States Committee on
Refugees (USCR) confirms a significant reduction in the
number of refugees and internally displaced persons in
the period following the signing of the October 13
agreement between U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke
and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) President
Slobodan Milosevic. According to USCR, the overall
refugee situation had improved with the entry of the OSCE
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The USCR report also
confirms that "KLA ethnic cleansing of ethnic Serb
civilian population pockets intensified in December
[1999]" substantiating the results of the German
Foreign Office intelligence report. But we were told time
and again that the Serbs rather than the KLA had been
responsible for ethnic cleansing in the months leading up
to the War... 13
The OSCE-UNHCR figures on the number of refugees
rather than supporting NATO's main justification for
waging the war, suggest that more than half the Serb
population had also fled Kosovo during the war. This
tendency could be explained by the fact that the KLA had
been responsible for relaying intelligence to NATO
pertaining to potential targets in the bombing operation.
Moreover, a history of the war also suggests that the
massacres and atrocities directed against the Serbs by
the KLA Military Command (amply documented for the period
after June 9) had already commenced prior to the arrival
of KFOR forces in Kosovo.
NATO's two central postulates for waging the war
--respectively "indiscriminate mass killings" and "ethnic
cleansing"-- are not borne out by the relevant data. What
then was the justification for the humanitarian bombings?
What was the hidden agenda? Ultimately the truth must
prevail, public opinion must be informed and those who
are responsible for waging this criminal war must be
brought to trial.
NOTES
1. Quoted in Peter Gowan, Kosovo; the war and its
aftermath, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, no. 64, 1999,
p. 26.
2. CBS Face the Nation, 16 May 1999 quoted by Joyce
Howard Price in The Washington Times, May 17, 1999.
3. Quoted in Peter Gowan, op. cit.
4. Reuters, 10 November 1999.
5. Wall Street Journal, 31 December 1999.
6. Quoted in Time Magazine, May 17, 1999, p. 25-26.
7. OSCE, Kosovo/ Kosova, As Seen, As Told, An analysis of
the human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification
Mission, October 1998 to June 1999, Warsaw, 1999.
8. Ibid
9. Ibid.
10. Figures for 1993. See Albania Worldwide Web,
http://www.albanian.com/main/. See also Musa Limani, The
Geographic Position, Natural Riches, Demographic
Characteristics, and the Economical Development of
Kosova, Pristina, The Association of Lawyers of Kosova,
1992. Kosovar Albanian estimates place the population of
Kosovo at 2.3 million for 2000.
11. The Government of Yugoslavia 1991 Census data for
Kosovo identified a total population of 1,956,196 of
which 82.2 % are Albanians, 9.9 % Serbs and 7.9 % other
ethnic groups. The Census was boycotted by the ethnic
Albanian population. During the 1990s, the evidence
suggests that Kosovar Serbs left the Province in large
numbers.
1607993
12. Intelligence Report from the German Foreign Office,
January 12, 1999 to the Administrative Court of
Trier.
13. See USCR http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/europe/yugoslavia.htm
© Copyright by Michel
Chossudovsky, Ottawa, February 2000. All rights
reserved. Permission is granted to post this text on
non-commercial community internet sites, provided the
essay remains intact and the copyright note is
displayed. The text can also be photocopied for
non-commercial distribution. To publish this text in
printed and/or other forms contact the author at
chossudovsky@videotron.ca or fax:
1-514-4256224.

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