The
First Normative Global
Revolution?
The
Uncertain Political Future
of Globalization
By
Richard
Falk
Professor of International Law and Practise, Princeton
University
TFF
associate
February 5,
2002
I. The Sudden Advent of
Global War
The events of September 11 alter fundamental
calculations about the future of global governance, the
role of the state, and the policy agenda that is likely
to dominate debate in various national, regional, and
global arenas. Whether the impact of mega-terror attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon initiate a
civilizational war between the West and Islam is highly
uncertain at this time, but what seems beyond doubt is
that the substantive and symbolic harm inflicted on the
United States by Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaida network, a
non-state enemy with visionary goals, forever changes our
sense of historical context and of the nature of war and
power.
Before September 11 the preoccupations of the era
seemed captured by the terminology of globalization, and
the tensions produced by economistic emphasis on global
economic growth as the foundation of a new geopolitics,
possibly also providing a vehicle for a unified world
culture built on the pillars of secularism, market
economics, and constitutionalism at the level of national
governance. Security concerns were seen as matters of law
enforcement and peacekeeping rather than matters of war
and peace, with the major challenges increasingly being
associated with the rise of transnational criminality.
International terrorism was viewed as part of this
challenge, a matter of finding the perpetrators, although
the most virulent forms of terrorism seemed to be
associated with ethnic, religious, and national struggles
that were being waged to determine the destiny of a
particular state. There were during the late 1990s think
tanks in the United States and public officials warning
the public about bioterrorism and the danger of
terrorists acquiring nuclear weaponry, but such scenarios
were widely discounted as exaggerations or as efforts by
the government to identify new threats to justify high
defense budgets in the absence of any serious strategic
rivalry, and the widely shared general sense that war
among leading states was not likely to recur. The
American effort to build a defense shield was justified
against such a background as a check against the danger
of attack by "a rogue state," but not as a capability
that could be effective against a major adversary.
Since September 11 this understanding has been
radically revised, at least for now. The pursuit of
security is again in the domain of "war" rather than "law
enforcement." Global economic concerns no longer dominate
the policy scene, and even the emphasis on globalization
is temporarily in eclipse. What is more striking is the
degree to which the new global war has seemed to sideline
the normative preoccupations that appeared so important
during the 1990s: human rights, the accountability of
leaders, redress of historic grievances, and the
prospects for global democracy. My argument in this
chapter is that these initiatives of the 1990s taken
together were mounting the first normative (humane values
as expressions of ethics and law) revolution in world
history that was of global scope, and that these
developments were an outgrowth of modernity that could
not be reversed. The events of September 11 seem to
contest such an interpretation, but I believe that their
impact, while overwhelming in the short run, will be
temporary, delaying rather than terminating the overall
effort to establish the norms and institutions of humane
global governance as the foundation of world order in the
21st century.
Such a reading of the future may seem overly
optimistic, especially considering the possibility that
mishandling the response to September 11, either by under
or over reaction, could induce an inter-civilizational
war of long duration and savage intensity. I think the
danger of under-reaction is virtually non-existent, and
that the scale of reaction, while risking over-reaction,
will be moderated by prudence in the months and years
ahead. If such a line of anticipation is correct, then it
remains useful to comprehend the underlying trends that
gave rise to the speculative hypothesis that we were
witnessing the first ever normative revolution of global
proportions.
II. A Revolutionary
Prospect
Jacques Barzun warns us at the outset of From Dawn to
Decadence that "[w]e have gotten into the habit
of calling too many things revolutions," and so we have.
To claim, then, a revolutionary prospect on the horizon
of international political and cultural life is to accept
a heavy burden of persuasion. It is not only a matter of
not contributing further to the dilution of the idea of
revolution as entailing a fundamental transformation, but
also of countering a historical mood of post-utopian
skepticism about large jumps for the better in the human
condition. The disillusionment that accompanied the
failures of state socialism as reinforced by the defeat
of the cultural revolution that was at the core of the
turmoil of 1968, makes doubters of us all. This
anti-revolutionary mood extends even to the point of
admitting that seeking a promised land tends to make
modest ethical gains of an incremental character
unlikely, and certainly more difficult. This is due to a
conservative backlash that generally achieves strict
control of thought and action in the aftermath of failed
revolutionary projects. This pattern of hostility to
progressive social change whether domestic or
international, in the main, captures the spirit of the
times during the 1990s and the early 21st Century.
If revolutionary rhetoric survives at all during this
period as a positive prospect, it is with reference to a
set of materialist claims that market forces, integrating
via computer, satellite, and optic fiber, will generate
an era of abundance and health on a global scale.
Cumulatively, these radical technological innovations are
now, according to this view, in the process of
establishing an organic form of "globalization" that will
indeed diminish the role of the territorial state to the
point that it is no longer is satisfactory to consider
world order as constituted by sovereign territorial
states. Even these most extreme globalizers do not
foresee the disappearance of the state, but rather its
increasing virtuality, a redesigned role to facilitate
world trade and investment, providing security to the
extent that disruptive actors mount threats to the
established order. In the background of such dramatic
conceptions of the global integrative process underway is
the related idea that globalization carries with it a
cultural and normative code that homogenizes world
society in a coherent and beneficial manner. The global
media socializes people everywhere to a common
consumptive life style, and more ambitiously promises,
that in time, due to economic growth and technological
innovation, poverty will disappear and material wellbeing
will become attainable for everybody. Such developments
may over time even lead to a system of global law and
morality taking hold of the political imagination. There
is an irony that such a materialist vision of the future
has generated such mainstream enthusiasm at this stage of
world capitalism, despite its resemblance to Marxist
conceptions of human and societal fulfillment.
There is the dark flip side scenario that sees the
same forces of globalization moving toward
self-destructive catastrophe as energy use, pollution,
warming, and demographic pressure overwhelm the carrying
capacity of the global ecosystem. In this understanding,
the impotence of the state to stem such a globalizing
juggernaut is part of our collective inability as a
species to slow the human stagger toward the abyss. The
plaintive and shrill calls for help associated with
anti-globalization militancy, initiated in a vivid manner
in late 1999 during World Trade Organization meetings at
Seattle, and continued ever since, raise many questions
about the viability and legitimacy of globalization. This
movement from below has gained such strength that its
presence at any notable gathering of globalizers from
above dominates the occasion, making the encounter
overshadow the substantive issues and policy changes
under discussion in the official sessions. So far these
demonstrations against corporate globalization have
succeeded as media events but have yet to prove
themselves capable of qualifying as political events that
bring about change or even offer a confused public an
alternative. For the first time, in the wake of the
violent riots accompanying the July 2001 G-8 meetings of
heads of state, began to evaluate their approach to the
management of the world economy. The leaders assembled at
Genoa and their retinue of advisors seemed determined
that in view of the political turmoil generated, such
meetings should no longer be held, at least within the
setting of major urban centers.
There is another series of emergent innovations that
have been identified as possessed of revolutionary
potential, and these are associated with the frontiers of
science and technology. The advent of super-intelligent
machines, of really smart and versatile robots, and of
human cloning and breakthroughs in biogenetics challenges
our sense of the human condition and of species
survivability in profound ways. These prospects can give
rise to either the excitement of a cyberworld of
abundance and longevity or a bladerunner world of sheer
destructivity. I think we need as a matter of
civilizational urgency to assess with great care the
political, ethical, and spiritual impacts associated with
this radical technology, but I do not propose to do so in
this chapter.
My attempt here is to consider whether, despite the
manifest despair and complacency of the age, as well as
the disruptive and diversionary effects of September 11,
we are not embarked upon a relatively bloodless,
normative revolution of values, as well as legal
procedures and institutions, which is transforming above
all else our understanding of global justice. This
process is also profoundly affecting our sense of
political authority, accountability, and structure of
relations in fundamental respects. Such a hypothesis is
easy to fault, even to scorn as totally discredited by
the evidence of failed and flawed efforts to pull off
humanitarian interventions during the past decade or to
hold leaders of states consistently accountable for
crimes of state.
In a recent highly articulate repudiation of such
normative projects, James Mayall writes that
"[t]he revolutionary view of the future is the
least plausible." Mayall wants to argue that the
continuities of international society based on the
co-existence and cooperation of sovereign states,
although stretched in places, remains the best hope, and
only realistic prospect, for sustaining even the current
moderate world order that has the capacity to make modest
ethical advances. This view carries forward Hedley Bull's
rejection of those normative innovations that attempt,
prematurely and regressively in his view, to curtail the
sovereignty of states. Mayall's skepticism is explicitly
grounded in the thought of David Hume about the
international society of his time, with its primary
insistence that we not allow our moral expectations
exceed our experience of what is attainable in the world
as we know it. Of course, such Humean rhetoric is largely
question-begging as the issue as to what our experience
allows is a speculative matter that is constantly proving
our most august pundits unable to see the handwriting on
the wall. Consider, in this regard, how "experience"
failed to show that East Europe would be liberated
peacefully from Soviet control and domestic oppressive
rule in the 1980s, that South Africa would find a way to
overcome apartheid without enduring bloody civil strife,
and that the standards of international human rights
would emerge from their declaratory incubator to become
genuine levers of influence. To the extent that
experience in global affairs is demonstrative at all, it
is to confirm our inability to identify the boundaries of
the possible, or to give comfort to either optimistic or
pessimistic turns of mind. The non-anticipation of the
mega-terrorism of the sort manifested on September 11
suggests that our negative imagination is as deficient as
is our sense of what is possible in a more positive
sense. It also discloses the inadequacies of intelligence
gathering by the state, despite billions of dollars
devoted to identifying and preventing threats of a
terrorist character. We should in these respects
encourage receptivity to a wide range of hopeful and
dangerous future scenarios, acknowledging the inadequacy
of knowledge as a foundation for prediction. In effect,
we need to learn to trust the imagination and the
political will if we wish to be better prepared to
address the future, both its promise and its menace.
It is true that revolutionary processes rarely reveal
themselves in advance, and seem to unfold with such
rapidity that participants are taken by surprise. Only in
retrospect does a revolution disclose its efficient
causes and antecedent conditions. Barzun notes
"[h]ow a revolution erupts from a commonplace
event- tidal wave from a ripple- is cause for endless
astonishment."
I. Revolutionary Precursors
or Liberal Delusions?
If we look back on a century of efforts to achieve
global reforms, it is possible to reach quite opposite
conclusions. The Bull/Mayall view is that efforts at
reform are dysfunctional to the extent that they do not
respect the essential hierarchical character of an
international society dominated by sovereign states of
unequal size and influence. The view associated with
international liberalism has been more optimistic, a
confidence that small steps of an ethical and
institutional character can over time produce a more
peaceful and equitable world order. The view being mainly
explored here is whether such reformist steps, whether
implemented or not, reflect an intensifying revolutionary
impulse to reconstruct world order along more normative
and globalist lines that express its integrative
character. The conclusion reached is that at this point
such initiatives are inherently ambiguous, susceptible of
interpretation along any of the three lines. The
ambiguity is not likely to be removed for at least a few
decades as the fuller impact of globalization is
disclosed.
The path of such an interpretative effort leads
backwards to Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations,
founded without US participation after World War I, as a
tribute to Wilson's stature and popular following in the
aftermath of a senseless, cruel, and devastating
experience of prolonged warfare in Europe. Was not this
enactment of Wilson's vision a normative revolution of
global proportions? Perhaps, if only words count.
Grandiose claims were made at the time for its
transformative effects, especially its project to
supersede the balance of power diplomacy and war as the
arbiter of change through the institutionalization of
collective security. But was Wilson's vision ever enacted
in a form, with capabilities and constitutional processes
that might have had a reasonable chance of upholding its
claims? Is there any evidence that Wilson himself
understood or accepted the transfer of capabilities to
the international level implied by his proclaimed
commitment to end the war system? Did the political
elites of the leading states of the world, aside from
Wilson, believe that the old realist interplay of
dominant sovereign states, could be or should be put
aside? Not much energy has to be wasted responding to
such questions. A resounding "No" is all that is
necessary. At the same time, there is no doubt that the
League experience, as sustained by its more elaborate and
successful sequel, the United Nations, provide part of
the background that helps make the present argument for a
normative global revolution more plausible than it would
otherwise be. There has been over the course of the last
century a growing institutionalization of governance at
the international level, a process expressing the
increasing complexity of international life, especially
in economic domains, along with the search for the
security and stability of transactions across the borders
of sovereign states.
The same can be said about the Nuremberg and Tokyo war
crimes trials held after World War II. On one level these
events did put into question the idea that states were
the ultimate arbiters of legality and responsibility, as
well as the protective notion granting immunity from
prosecution to those individuals whom acted on behalf of
the state. But the one-sidedness of these inquiries into
criminality gave these proceedings an inevitably shaky
normative status. They were vulnerable to attacks as
"victors' justice" and pure hypocrisy, which could be
deflected by contending that a principled framework of
generalized accountability would soon follow, with codes
and tribunals applicable to all members of international
society. When there was no implementation of this
Nuremberg Promise, cynicism seemed justified, and the
experience of imposing accountability was limited to the
circumstances surrounding the outcome of World War
II.
As with Wilsonianism, so with the Nuremberg, a
normative idea with strong potential claims was validated
to a certain degree under special conditions, but not in
a manner that would induce durable and consistent change
in the behavioral practices of world order as conceived
along Westphalian lines of territorial sovereignty. As
such, these normative impulses, although capable of
arousing extremes of enthusiasm and opposition, were not
"revolutionary" in either intention or effect. The means
to reach the lofty goals proclaimed were not willed into
being. No suitable political project that might challenge
statist world order or hegemonic patterns took shape in a
credible form.
To suggest the possibility of a global normative
revolution is to be aware of this background of
disingenuous gestures that are made on an ad hoc basis
without an accompanying will and social forces to make
structural changes. Without relevant agency and the
structural changes, the rhetoric of revolution is hollow
sentimentality, or a politically irrelevant utopianism.
The structural changes responsive to a normative agenda,
challenges several aspects of political realism embedded
on a global scale in such ideas as sovereignty, statism,
hegemony, marginality of law and morality, and the
absence of a clear and agreed conception of global
justice.
My position is that this normative agenda of challenge
has emerged in the last decade or so, building on these
earlier impulses, but now reinforced by the global
setting in an unprecedented manner, making the idea of a
normative revolution more politically grounded than ever
before. Such grounding does not ensure its success, hence
the question mark in the title, and there are evident
significant contradictory tendencies. Yet for the first
time in human history a combination of social forces and
practical pressures is giving the current manifestation
of a project for normative revolution serious
credibility, if not yet robustness. This credibility
mainly arises because multi-dimensional forms of
resistance to market-driven globalization needs to be
neutralized by making the emergent order legitimate in
the eyes of the peoples of the world.
It remains to ask what is meant by "normative global
revolution." The idea of normative is associated with
justice, moral values, and legal order, while that of
global is connected with the scope of what is being
proposed, but in the manner of stacked Russian dolls.
Contextualizing such an outlook requires that we consider
the Westphalian framework of territorial sovereignty as
the established order against which the revolution is
being undertaken. As such it is not a modification of a
reformist sort that will enable that inherited and
resilient framework to adapt yet again to altered
conditions, but something that is so fundamental as to
revise our perception of the core features of "the real."
We will partly come to appreciate the transformative
character of this process by expressing the need for and
seeking out a new language of explication and appraisal
that conveys the new realities in more satisfactory
ways.
Barzun, quoted earlier, portrays the history of the
West as a sequence of revolutions, but carried on within
the boundaries of states taken as the stable elements of
an established order. As expressed, "[a]
revolutionary idea can succeed only if it can rally
strong 'irrelevant' interests, and only the military can
make it." My view explored here is that a revolutionary
idea under contemporary conditions needs to rally strong
support throughout global civil society, which can be
conceived from a statist perspective as a domain of the
internationally 'irrelevant,' but does not any longer
depend on violence for its success.
This possibility is a result of three mutually
reinforcing developments. The first of these, and the
most encompassing, is the evolution of international
human rights from a pious promise made in an unconvincing
and nominal form back in 1950, and even earlier, to a
serious claim directed against inconsistent behavior in
the early 21st Century. In this regard, I take seriously
as the second development the empirical spread and
universal endorsement accorded a democratizing ethos,
although I dissent from the view that "democracy" is
properly delimited in minimalist and statist terms of
electoral consent in this era of globalization. The third
development is the anti-globalization movement with its
implicit indictment of the illegitimate character of the
manner in which global policy is being formed and
implemented, as well as with the inequities alleged to
result from such processes, especially with regard to the
peoples of the South. This combination of international
human rights (including distinct womens', indigenous
peoples, and sexual identity movements), the democratic
ethos, and the anti-globalization movement is what gives
the normative global revolution its political shape and
relevance. It is predicated upon an underlying engagement
with the attainment of global justice, or alternatively
phrase, "humane global governance."
II. Imagining a Normative
Global Revolution: Some Activating
Conditions
The first set of normative impulses can be best
understood as a continuation of World War II by the
victorious coalition of states led by the United States.
This meant the war crimes trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo,
establishment of the United Nations, the Genocide
Convention, and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Partly, these initiatives represented efforts to
learn from the mistakes of the past, particularly they
reflected the failures of the punitive approach to
Germany embedded in the Versailles Treaty and the
non-participation of the United States in the League of
Nations. Partly, these initiative resulted from a belated
sense of shame about the failure of the liberal
democracies to oppose the genocidal politics of the Nazi
regime in Germany or even to proffer aid to the victims
in their quest for places of refuge- that is,
criminalizing genocide and internationalizing human
rights were symbolic steps in the direction of imposing
limits on sovereignty as exercised within territorial
limits. But in the main these initiatives taken between
1945 and 1950 were problematic, being tainted by the
victors insistence on exempting their own behavior from
legal scrutiny, failing to transfer any peacemaking
capabilities to the United Nations, and through the
intense adherence to notions of sovereign rights as
modified by geopolitical prerogatives (most notably the
vet power of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council). 1945 was still very much of a
Westphalian world, its statist logic accentuated by
Soviet concerns associated with their plausible anxiety
about being outmaneuvered and outvoted in any consensual
procedure established at the global level. It is also the
case that the main learning experience arising from the
World War II experience was that idealistic approaches to
international order do not succeed in providing either
security or peace. The paradoxical conclusion is that the
best prospects for peace result from the maintenance of
deterrent strength rather than by way of demilitarizing
disarmament, which tempts aggression. The so-called
"lesson of Munich" was formative for Western leaders in
this period, creating anxiety about placing any serious
reliance on the UN as possibly diverting resources and
energies from the need to rest world peace in the future
on a balance of power logic. Neither legal nor moral
norms of constraint, but only countervailing power could
induce moderation based on assumptions that leaders of
states are generally guided by rational assessments of
gains and losses associated with recourse to force and by
a prudent approach to risk-taking.
The two most radical innovations in world order that
were launched in this period were not widely perceived as
such at the time, and perhaps for this reason were able
to develop beyond most expectations of what seemed
realistic. The first of these innovations was to overcome
some of the weaknesses in world economic coordination
that were thought to have contributed to the Great
Depression of the 1930s, especially currency volatility.
A complementary institutional innovation was designed to
ensure that there would be ways to assist poorer
countries of Asia and Africa in meeting their needs for
foreign capital so to overcome their backwardness while
respecting their political independence, and without
appearing to be constructing new variants of economic
imperialism. The IMF and World Bank, the so-called
Bretton Woods institutions, as much later complemented by
the World Trade Organization, designed to
institutionalize periodic moves toward freer
international trade and exchange rate stability, evolved
into a powerful institutional triumvirate. Unlike the UN,
global economic governance, was seen as a capitalist
enterprise, and was controlled by the Western liberal
democracies from its inception. These institutional
actors, along with the leading capitalist governments,
provide a measure of global economic governance that has
evolved over the decades in response to changing
conditions, and recently functioned quite explicitly to
disseminate neoliberal ideas and practices about
state/society policy. This includes facilitating the
adoption of market-oriented priorities of corporate
globalization by countries in the South such as
privatization, fiscal austerity, and the free
transnational flow of capital.
The second radical innovation with enduring
implications for global governance was the establishment
of a regional approach to Western European recovery and
reconstruction that began modestly with cooperation in
relation to iron and steel production and trade among a
small number of Western European countries. By the year
2001 European regionalism has matured into a
quasi-confederal European Union that will launch a common
currency in 2002, impressively upholds human rights of
Europeans even against abuses by their own national
government, contemplates a European constitution, and may
in the years ahead incorporate much of Eastern Europe
into an enlarged "Europe." Whether to view international
financial and trade institutions and European regionalism
as normative initiatives are themselves complicated and
controversial matters that required extended and nuanced
analysis. Certainly both initiatives have important
normative implications, especially in relation to two
crucial concerns: the character of global governance, the
role of the state, and a concept of justice that is not
limited to state/society relations. Their relevance will
be assessed in the concluding section.
Undoubtedly, the great normative achievement of the
cold war era involved the delegitimation of colonial
rule, and the emergence of almost universal support for
the right of self-determination. Of course, this
achievement was rendered more difficult and remarkable
because it cut against the grain of geopolitical
alignments, placing the colonial powers, particularly
Britain and France, as pariahs of the old order, and
putting the United States in an ambivalent position. The
extent of this ambivalence became evident in the setting
of the Indochina Wars in which the United States
supplanted France in a sustained and futile effort to
prevent indigenous nationalism from strengthening the
Communist bloc.
The bipolar split of the cold war era (1945-89),
combined with a realist turn in the diplomacy of major
states, kept other normative developments of an
inter-governmental character at a minimum: a consensus in
support of the modernizing quest of the developing world
and an ethos of co-existence flourished from time to time
that encouraged formulating an overarching framework of
shared normative ideas. The adherence of the United
States to a realist understanding of global security was
particularly influential, especially as the United States
had traditionally challenged the European geopolitical
orientation as war-prone premised on shifting alliances
and the balance of power. This turn encouraged the
substitution of "arms control" for "disarmament," in
effect, seeking to reduce risks associated with
unintended behavior without challenging the essential
role of power in sustaining peace and stability within
"the anarchical society" of states. This managerial
diplomacy of prudence mainly focused on the distinctive
problems of managing rival arsenals of nuclear weaponry,
especially the dual role of this weaponry in relation to
deterrence and to a resolve to forego actual use. Hence,
the fascination with the acronym MAD, mutual assured
destruction, but as well the crazed condition of
threatening a course of action that would also lead to
catastrophic self-destruction. MAD was complemented by an
anti-proliferation approach to nuclear weaponry, in
effect, trying to prevent additional states joining the
nuclear club rather than seeking to abolish the club
altogether. The prevalence of nuclearism tended to
marginalize normative efforts in the security domain,
especially given the implicit adoption of omnicidal
prerogatives in the name of the security of state or
ideological identity ("better dead than red.") and the
reluctance of the existing nuclear state to seek ways of
reliably denuclearizing world politics.
Yet in this period, despite the ideological cleavage
that affected all dimensions of global policy as coupled
with the realist zeitgeist, there were important
developments that set the stage for later developments.
First of all, initiatives in civil society challenged
statist approaches to both international human rights and
environmental protection. Civil society actors (earlier
known as NGOs), with transnational links began to promote
adherence to weak, yet existent, international norms,
exerting pressure especially in democratic societies for
their implementation. Starting with the Iranian
Revolution at the end of the 1970s, non-violent populist
pressures for democratizing change were mounted under the
extreme conditions of authoritarianism prevailing in
Eastern Europe, as well as in relation to the racism
associated with apartheid in South Africa. Secondly,
militant opponents of cold war policies believed to
violate fundamental norms of international law and
morality began to invoke the Nuremberg idea as the basis
of their refusal to support official policies. This
process took place in America especially during the
latter stages of the Vietnam War and later on with
respect to symbolic acts of resistance by individuals
seeking to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons with
first strike characteristics. In both instances, feeble
or flawed inter-governmental undertakings relating to
accountability that were supposed to be confined in their
application to their original facts, were kept alive in a
mutated form, while being generalized by civil society
activists. These activists, often associated with deeply
religious backgrounds, gradually came to view "democracy"
through neo-natural law eyes as the spontaneous exercise
of "popular sovereignty" in deference to the authority of
a normative order higher than that of the secular state.
Such attitudes, particularly as vindicated by varying
degrees of success, helped set the stage for subsequently
mounting a normative revolution of global
proportions.
A final stage-setting development was the totally
unexpected visionary global outlook provided by Mikhail
Gorbachev during the last years of the cold war. In
seeking to undertake drastic reforms internally and
diplomatically, including a negotiated end to the cold
war, Gorbachev revived a normative global agenda with a
sweep and passion that recalled Woodrow Wilson.
Unfortunately, this visionary call by Gorbachev for a
more cooperative and demilitarized world order, sustained
by a stronger United Nations and an increased acceptance
of the rule of law, was dismissed at the time either as
"propaganda" or as a feeble effort by the Kremlin to
conceal the mounting evidence of Soviet decline. Unlike
the efforts to deepen the commitment to human rights
norms and to keep alive the Nuremberg tradition, this
Gorbachev crusade led no where, despite its humane and
sensible content, and has been barely acknowledged. Most
regretfully, the United States, the most satisfied of
superpowers, saw no need to respond to this Gorbachev
approach either by way of endorsement or at least with a
reform agenda of its own. Even after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Washington failed to seize the occasion to
promote a system of humane global governance. Unlike the
endings of major hot wars over the centuries, the end of
the cold war did not induce the victorious powers to
offer the peoples of the world a program of global reform
that would contribute to future human wellbeing. The two
most tangible opportunities for global reform as of the
1990s were a serious effort to achieve phased nuclear
disarmament and a commitment to strengthening the
capabilities and independence of the United Nations
System.
Despite this disappointment at the inter-governmental
level, other positive developments ensued to make the
hypothesis of a normative global revolution seem well
worth entertaining.
The previously mentioned trends toward global economic
governance and European regionalism were accelerated due
to favorable geopolitical conditions for their evolution.
Without cold war preoccupations, greater attention could
be turned toward the coherent management of the world
economy and the effective participation of Europe in a
global trading and financial system that was dominated by
the United States and Japan. Overall, the end of the cold
war brought to the fore an economistic outlook toward the
goals of global policy, particularly given the absence of
serious strategic or ideological conflict. China's moves
to enter the world economy and submit to the discipline
of world capitalism has operated as a major factor in
reorienting world order around global economic
policy.
These developments taken together with a series of
technological developments, especially in the broad area
of information technology (IT)- the computer and
Internet, as well as the rise of networking
organizational schema in business operations- led to the
realization that there was a sufficient disjunction
between past and present to require a new descriptive
vocabulary. Hence, globalization. In some respects, the
advent of globalization, especially as historically
enacted according to quite contingent neoliberal
precepts, represented a serious normative regression: a
declining willingness to divert resources to overcome
poverty and social deprivation combined with a reliance
on the market and private sector to address human
suffering. The point here is that the technological
infrastructure that has made world integration feasible
and beneficial could occur in relation to a more socially
compassionate set of presiding ideas. Other
"globalizations" more normatively acceptable than
neoliberal globalization were possible, and yet may be
negotiated to bring "peace."
This regression associated with the rise of neoliberal
ideas was offset to some controversial extent by an
effort to make democratic patterns of governance, by
which was meant periodic multi-party elections and free
markets, the foundation of legitimate state/society
relations. Leaders of Western states, whether knowingly
or not, became unwitting (although partial) adherents of
Immanuel Kant's ideas about "democratic peace," and
conditioned their enthusiasm for globalization by this
call for democratization.
Also important was the changed role of violence in
world society. There seemed to be a growing sense of
obsolescence associated with major warfare as territorial
gains were rarely worth the effort, and the backlash
could be severe. In this sense the Gulf War of 1991 was
an anomaly, and it also demonstrated the point that
aggressive undertakings could generate massive responses
to achieve a reversal. Of course, unsettled borders and
unresolved territorial disputes still threaten future
wars, but for limited ends that do not threaten
international stability, with the possible and highly
unlikely exceptions of wars fought by China to gain
control of Taiwan or of North Korea to take over the
entire Korean Peninsula or the renewed outbreak of
Indo-Pakistan warfare relating to the future of Kashmir.
Despite these lingering concerns, the prospect of
strategic warfare is receding from the political
imagination, although not smoothly as ongoing debates
about missile defense systems and regimes for the
prohibition of biological weaponry suggest.
As a result of this tendency, and in view of the large
number of persisting forms of violent encounter, there
has grown a focus on intranational violence, and on the
limits of sovereign power and authority. There has
emerged the awareness that international law and the UN
as now constituted fit awkwardly into the new paradigm of
political conflict. Both international law and the UN
Charter accept the idea of territorial supremacy and
sovereign rights of the state, thereby rejecting any
external accountability of a government or responsibility
on the part of the world community to protect an abused
society or ethnic minority. This tension between moral
imperatives and the constitutional order generates
efforts to find new normative ideas that will bridge the
gap.
A further actuating circumstance is the emergence of
global problems that can only be solved by the logic of
collective action. The US refusal as of 2001 to back the
Kyoto Protocol relating to global warming without
offering a substitute measure is indicative of the
vulnerability of the peoples of the world to a normative
framework that is conditioned on the right of a single
state to defy the collective will of the world community.
The issue raised is whether collective action can be
arranged either by way of a revised US assessment of its
own interests or by way of procedures that take
precedence over its refusal to accept a global regime of
restraint. The short-term outlook is not promising, but
as the evidence of harm from continued emissions of
greenhouse gasses at current levels mounts, there is
likely to take shape a strong political effort to insist
that the United States in its behavior act as "a
responsible sovereign," which might include cutting back
aspects of its way of life that are globally
damaging.
A further background consideration is the dual
realization that armed struggles have difficulty gaining
their goals, and that governments are not able to prevail
over their citizenry by reliance on coercion alone. The
1980s and 1990s bore witness to a post-Gandhian rise in
non-violent revolutionary challenges to established
political orders and an abandonment of armed struggle
strategies. The trend toward negotiated compromises was a
promising, although not consistent, development.
Non-violent challenges were turned back in several Asian
countries, most prominently in China during 1989, and
armed struggle tactics succeeded in some instances, as in
inducing the NATO intervention in Kosovo that result in
the expulsion of the Serb oppressive police and military
forces.
My argument is simple: that a series of developments
have set the stage for the unexpected surge of
normativity that has taken place globally (and regionally
to an uneven extent) during the last decade or so. The
next section will identify the main dimensions of this
normative phenomenon, to be followed by a short section
assessing its sustainability.
III. The Normative Surge
since 1989: A Quest for Global Justice
Although the hypothesis being explored is that the
cumulative impact of the normative initiatives underway
may amount to a global revolution if sustained for the
next decade or so. It may also fizzle, and there are also
present some lively possibilities of normative global
regression. The main elements of what is being presented
here as the elements of the normative revolution are, by
and large, not novelties, but extensions of earlier
initiatives that had appeared to be stillborn with only a
historical significance. That is, the latent normative
potential of the Westphalian evolution of statism during
its latest phases are the main building blocks of a
possibly emergent normative global revolution. The
political project associated with achieving global
justice and humane global governance amounts, then, to
activating these latent elements.
Accountability: Justice for the Perpetrators.
Undoubtedly, one of the most striking developments with
moral/legal/political implications, involves a multitude
of efforts to hold those who act on behalf of sovereign
states internationally accountable for their behavior, at
least to the extent of severely abusive behavior. The
substantive scope of "abusive" is unclear, and will
undoubtedly evolve to incorporate shifting sentiments,
but seems now definitely to extend to genocide, crimes
against humanity, torture, rape as a military tactic, and
possibly crimes against peace and severe violations of
human rights. Such efforts to impose international
accountability is a direct and fundamental challenge to
the central Westphalian idea of territorial supremacy of
the sovereign state, and the related doctrines of act of
state, sovereign immunity, and superior orders. This
impulse to hold leaders, and their subalterns,
accountable for adherence to norms is not new, tracing
its origins to medieval efforts to uphold codes of
chivalry in times of war. In the last century the
half-hearted insistence by the Allies that Kaiser Wilhelm
of Germany be prosecuted as a war criminal for his role
in starting World War I suggested a rudimentary type of
international accountability, which came to nothing.
The true precursor to the recent initiatives was, of
course, the Nuremberg/Tokyo trials held after World War
II. At the time, these trials seemed to promise a radical
innovation in international relations, but turned out to
be limited to their historical circumstances associated
with the outcome of a war deemed just by its victors. Or
were they? The benevolent virus of international criminal
accountability had been released into the body politic,
and it spread unpredictably, establishing its authority
as a standard of criticism and self-judgment. This was
especially the case for the United States, which was the
main architect of the Nuremberg approach, and also the
state most vulnerable to claims from within its own
society, as well as from the broader community of liberal
democracies. In fact, cold war priorities inhibited
allies from complaining about US departures from the rule
of law with respect to the use of international force,
but it did not similarly constrain outraged citizens,
especially in response to growing domestic and
international opposition to the Vietnam War in the late
1960s. Notable in this regard, was the convening in
Europe of a tribunal composed of well known moral
authority figures to assess the criminality of American
conduct in Vietnam by the British philosopher, Bertrand
Russell. Also significant was Daniel Ellsberg's much
publicized release of the Pentagon Papers, which he
explained in public and under oath at the time as
responsive to the text and teachings of the Nuremberg
Judgment.
But the 1990s witnessed the inter-governmental revival
of international accountability procedures, at the formal
initiative of the United Nations Security Council,
initially with respect to the breakup of former
Yugoslavia and then shortly thereafter in relation to
genocide in Rwanda. The establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
at The Hague in 199- led to a renewed interest in
international accountability. This interest was
intensified some years later when Slobodan Milosevic was
indicted in the midst of the Kosovo War, along with other
high-ranking officials in Belgrade, while he was
officially head of state, and again in 2001 when
Milosevic was handed over for prosecution as a result of
a change of government in Yugoslavia. These developments
stimulated civil society and moderate governments to seek
the institutionalization of international accountability
through the establishment of an international criminal
court. Surprisingly, this collaboration resulted in the
Rome Treaty of 1998 that comes into force once it secures
60 ratifications, which seems likely within the next year
or so, but without the participation of such vital states
as the United States, China, Russia, and Israel. There is
still prevalent the idea that accountability is a
selective instrument that cannot be used to judge the
behavior of individuals acting on behalf of the powerful
states. The silence of the West in relation to Russian
behavior in Chechnya is revealing of the extent to which
normative principles are subordinated in favor of
economistic and geopolitical goals.
Of comparable interest, and even greater salience, has
been the efforts by national courts in Western Europe to
claim the legal competence to punish foreign governmental
officials for criminality even if committed within their
own country. The landmark experience involved the
criminal indictment of Augusto Pinochet for crimes
committed in Chile during his period as dictatorial
ruler, and his later detention in Britain for the purpose
of assessing whether he could be extradited to face
prosecution. This effort yielded some notable legal
decisions in Britain, including a final determination by
a Law Panel of the House of Lords, that Pinochet was
subject to extradition, but for a very portion of the
criminality charged. In the end, Pinochet was returned
for Chile, being declared by the British Home Secretary
as unfit to stand trial, a conclusion also reached later
on slightly different grounds by Chilean courts.
Subsequently, in 2001, Ariel Sharon, while Prime
Minister of Israel is under investigation with regard to
his allegedly criminal role in connection with the
massacre of Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatila in
1982 while he was Defense Minister. The massacre occurred
at the last stage of the Lebanon War, perpetrated in West
Beirut with alleged Israeli complicity by the Phalange
Militia, while it was under the control of the Israel
Defense Forces. The Israeli Foreign Ministry in August
2001 has reportedly prepared a map for its officials and
diplomats that points out which countries have empowered
their courts to prosecute for crimes against humanity and
other crimes of state, and have warned of possible
embarrassment to Israel.
A group of scholars and legal practitioners has
formulated a set of guidelines as to the extension of
universal jurisdiction to allegations of this type. There
is a definite movement underway to challenge the
traditional idea of sovereign immunity when it comes to
crimes of state, which if it becomes established in the
years ahead, will represent a major step in the struggle
to bring law to bear on the behavior of governments. It
will also give pause to leaders who could no longer count
on immunity or asylum. It is notable that national courts
functions as agents of both global civil society and of
an international society of states to the extent that
such accountability is implemented.
It is important to ask why such a momentous set of
developments has taken place in the last decade,
especially given the failure during the prior half
century to follow up on the Nuremberg precedent. The
obvious answer relates to the absence of geopolitical
inhibitions of the sort that existed during the cold war.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, it seemed to become
more tenable to assert universal standards of
accountability whose application would not be seen as a
propaganda victory or defeat, and would not be an
occasion for a heightening of superpower tensions. Also
relevant was the increasing importance of international
human rights, with the exemption of crimes of states thus
seeming like an anomaly.
Redress of Grievances: Justice for the Victims.
Parallel, yet seemingly disconnected from these
extraordinary moves toward international accountability,
has been an unprecedented effort in an array of settings
to achieve on behalf of victims some measure of redress
for past grievances. It is possible to view the
imposition of criminal liability on the perpetrator of
abuses as also simultaneously responding to the pleas of
victims and their families. Indeed, capital punishment in
the United States is often defended as a form of justice
for the victims, particularly since other arguments based
on deterrence and prevention seem so unpersuasive. Yet it
seems helpful to separate the efforts to hold
perpetrators individually accountable from the efforts to
obtain redress from a variety of actors associated with
perpetrators (and entities such as banks and industrial
firms, and even governments) in various ways.
The most salient instance of redress was associated
with the efforts of Holocaust survivors and descendants
to recover their share of gold that had been confiscated
from them by the Nazi regime in Germany and deposited in
various European banks, especially those in Switzerland.
These claims along with related claims to unclaimed bank
deposits seemed suddenly to receive moral backing from
important governments, including that of the United
States. The Swiss Government and a consortium of its
leading banks negotiated a large settlement, and
"redress" became an idea whose time had definitely come.
A variety of claims followed seeking recovery of earnings
from slave labor, insurance proceeds, and art
objects.
The experience of pursuing Holocaust claims seemed
inspirational for other communities of victims. Most
obviously, those in Asia/Pacific who had suffered at the
hands of Japanese imperial power sought redress with a
special intensity. Japan, far less than Germany, took the
first step toward redress, which is an acknowledgement of
wrongdoing. At present, in Japan more than 55 years after
the end of World War II, school textbooks continue to
whitewash the past, which itself has kept from healing
the wounds of victims and those who identify most
closely. Some of the Asian efforts are merely to coerce
remembrance and accurate historical reconstruction
through such devices as books, films, museum exhibits,
and conferences detailing the Nanking Massacre of 1937.
And from remembrance, the impulse to obtain redress seeks
informal acknowledgements of wrongdoing, which eventually
will produce a formal apology by the responsible
government, and possibly some sort of offer of
compensation.
The more monetary approach to redress associated with
the Holocaust survivors was also emulated by
Asian/Pacific survivors who have been seeking to recover
damages for slave labor and other abuses endured at the
hands of Japan. So-called "comfort women" abducted in
various Asian occupied countries to satisfy the sexual
appetites of Japanese military forces have also sought to
obtain some sort of belated compensation for the abuses
sustained, so far failing to find satisfaction from the
Japanese judicial system. From an international law
perspective, the redress process directed at Japan has
encountered special difficulties arising from the waiver
provision in the Japanese Peace Treaty that purported to
extinguish all claims of individuals on both sides of the
conflict. There are important ways around this apparent
barrier, but they are yet to be accepted by courts.
A form of redress that has achieved great prominence,
and can be viewed also as a diluted approach to
accountability, is the establishment of truth and
reconciliation commissions to record and document past
wrongs, as well as to elicit testimony and expressions of
remorse by confessed wrongdoers. These commissions were
established in Latin American countries in the process of
making peaceful transitions from dictatorial regimes to
constitutional democracies, and seemed to offer a more
stable way to walk the tightrope between impunity and
accountability in societies where the old order was still
entrenched in the military and security forces. Ever
since Nuremberg the argument has been made that one of
the main functions of criminal prosecution is to build a
documentary record of past wrongdoing, both to avenge the
feelings of the victims and to educate the society and
the world in the hope of avoiding repetition. South
Africa's remarkable transition to a multi-racial
democracy relied on a truth and reconciliation commission
as an alternative to seeking "justice" by prosecuting
those whom carried out the criminal policies of the
apartheid regime. Such an attempt to make transitions to
democracy successful is not without controversy, with the
most severely victimized elements of the society
exhibiting bitterness about letting the perpetrators of
unforgivable crime get off so easily. On balance, the
truth and reconciliation approach has proved to be a
creative compromise, repudiating past criminality without
treating those associated with the former regime so
harshly as to provoke their resistance. Of course, there
is no incompatibility between engaging in a truth and
reconciliation process and relying on accountability
procedures to deal with certain unrepentant or severe
offenders.
Redress as a moral and political tactic is definitely
in the mind of victim communities. Without surveying the
vast array of claims, it is worth observing the issuance
of apologies by leaders of dominant countries for such
past abuses as colonial rule and the institution of
slavery. Refusal of acknowledgement, as with respect to
Armenian allegations of "genocide" by Turkey in 1915-16,
has been treated by segments of international public
opinion as tantamount to an endorsement of the historic
abuse.
Among the most militant and persistent pursuers of
redress have been indigenous peoples acting in various
ways through their representatives. These initiatives
have been notable for their assertiveness without any
strong base of military or economic power, but through a
moral and legal crusade to enjoy the protection of
property and other rights, including respect for
sovereignty and traditional way of life. Indigenous
peoples have been able to establish a forum for
networking, expressing their grievances, and positing a
protective regime based on a legitimated normative
order.
The logic behind the redress movement is that the
victims of severe wrongdoing are entitled, even with the
passage of decades or even centuries, to obtain some sort
of symbolic or material form of compensation for past
injustice. The relevant actors are both individual and
collective, with various entities engaged as claimants
and responsible party. This validation of a redress ethos
reverses an earlier dominant cultural and political view
that the past is a closed book as to rectification of
wrongs. The new context has lent credibility to claims
and contentions that were formerly dismissed as
frivolous, as was the case with efforts by
African-Americans to demand reparations (in the billions
of dollars) for the suffering endured due to the practice
and institution of slavery.
The significance of this redress ethos is difficult to
assess at this stage. It does clearly form part of an
increased sensitivity to issues of justice wherever and
whenever, and the relevance of their resolution to a
peaceful and equitable world order. Why during the 1990s?
It seems evident that the end of the cold war, coupled
with concerns about accountability, human rights, and
democracy, led those who identified as victims improperly
acknowledged toward adopting activist positions. In
addition to this normative atmosphere, two other factors
seem worth noting: the relativizing of sovereignty made
states and their representatives more vulnerable to legal
and moral claims than previously; and the preoccupation
with the future imparted a new salience to time and
history, giving to the past a present relevance.
None of these considerations is conclusive. It remains
to be observed whether the redress movement is
sustainable, and achieves enough tangible results to
influence our understanding of the nature of global
justice. What can be agreed upon is that diverse redress
claims are being asserted to an unprecedented degree
during this period, and that this process contributes to
the impression that a normative global revolution is
underway.
Humane global governance: justice for the peoples of
the world. In the background of this quest for global
justice is the effort to achieve humane global governance
within a political setting that can no longer be
conceived or dealt with as an assemblage of nation-state
communities. In this regard, the normative global
revolution is accompanying a transition from a pluralist
world of sovereign states to a solidarist world of
peoples. The sites of struggle and controversy are
complex, inter-linked, and diverse, and can only be
indicated here in the most cursory manner. Several sites
can be mentioned: the legality and legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention; the movement to globalize
democracy; the resurgence of religion; and the struggle
for people-oriented development.
Humanitarian Intervention. The NATO War over Kosovo in
1999 heightened an awareness of humanitarian
intervention, occasioning intense debate that persists.
To the extent that humanitarian intervention is justified
on ethical grounds, it expresses the right and duty of
collective action on an international level to protect
victims of crimes of state, including victims of gross
violations of human rights. Humanitarian intervention
overrides territorial sovereignty, implying a use of
international force in circumstances other than
self-defense. If underwritten by a United Nations mandate
that is processed by the Security Council, then there is
a general acceptance of legality associated with
humanitarian intervention despite the UN Charter's
promise in Article 2(7) that the Organization will not
intervene in matters that fall within the domestic
jurisdiction of member states. Implicitly, the severe
abuse of people by a territorial government no longer
insulates the behavior from international coercive
protective action.
The more difficult challenge arises when a Security
Council mandate is not forthcoming despite overwhelming
evidence of catastrophic human abuse. Such was the case,
as understood by those who supported the Kosovo
intervention. As the Independent International Commission
on Kosovo argues in its report, the Kosovo intervention
disclosed a troublesome gap between legality and
legitimacy in relation to claims for humanitarian
intervention. The Commission approach was to propose a
set of guidelines to shape such an intervention and its
assessment, but the possibility persists that a
humanitarian intervention can appear to be legitimate
from the perspective of morality and politics and yet
illegal from the perspective of international law.
On a purely conceptual level the idea of humanitarian
intervention suggests the emergence of a protective
global regime that responds to the vulnerability of
peoples being victimized by a government that does not
respect international law in dealing with its own
territorial population, usually a dissident minority. It
reflects the pressure for normative revolution by
subordinating claims of territorial sovereignty to those
associated with humane governance. But humanitarian
intervention of the Kosovo variety is highly contested in
theory and practice. It is attacked for its defiance of
international law and the UN Charter on a matter of
cardinal importance- the unconditional prohibition on
uses of non-defensive force in international relations.
It is viewed as a new modality of imperial control by the
strong in relation to the weak: if Kosovo, why not
Chechnya, Tibet? It is attacked as a cover for old
geopolitics repackaged for public relations. And it is
opposed on pluralist grounds of support for sovereign
rights as the most consistent means to protect the
wellbeing of peoples at the present stage of
international history.
Global Democracy. If the normative revolution is to
succeed it will need to extend the principles and
practices of democracy to the main arenas of decision and
policymaking operative in the world. "Globalization" is a
shorthand for suggesting that many of these arenas fall
outside the statist framework. The anti-globalization
movement, although unfocused, does emphasize its refusal
to accept the authority of institutional actors who do
not act in accordance with the precepts of global
democracy: transparency, participation, and
accountability.
One idea for advancing the agenda of global democracy
involves the establishment of a Global Peoples Assembly
either within the UN System or as a free standing
institution. There are many formats that could be used to
get such an institution into being, with various methods
available to select representatives. A GPA could start
modestly as "a coalition of the willing," and gradually
improve the quality of its representativeness. The
experience of the European Parliament is instructive,
both in terms of its evolution and the degree to which it
has gained in respect and authority through time despite
being dismissed as irrelevant at various points by
cynical and realist-minded critics.
Global democracy to be realized implies a solidarist
world order, which in turn presupposes the completion of
a normative global revolution. It is connected with
earlier discussions of accountability and redress, and
connects democratic process with global justice. As with
other aspects of the revolutionary possibility, it is
premature to draw firm conclusions. It seems evident that
resistance to globalization is likely to lead its
managers to offer some coopting gestures of
democratization, but whether these amount over time to
"governance" is the critical and now unanswerable
question.
Religious Resurgence. Perhaps, even more controversial
than other aspects of the argument relating to a
prospective normative revolution, is the inclusion of a
religious dimension. It is controversial, to begin with,
because many commentators on the international scene
regard religion as a divisive element, and closely
connected to the Huntington postulate of "a clash of
civilizations." The view favored here is that religion
has a dual aspect, partly destructive of the prospects
for humane global governance, but partly indispensable to
its attainment. The contribution of religion is to
mobilize mass sentiment around several themes: the
spiritual and moral context of the human condition; the
unity of the human family; the shared perspectives- what
Aldous Huxley called "the perennial philosophy"- being
promoted by Hans Küng and others.
What is not in doubt is the reality of the religious
resurgence as a worldwide phenomenon that suffuses all of
the great world religions, although unevenly and with
differing impacts. The preoccupation with religious
extremism, especially in the Islamic world, diverts our
attention from the degree to which the rise of religion
is a normative reaction to the material and secular
fundamentalisms embedded in economic globalization.
Calls for inter-civilizational and inter-religious
dialogue are part of the effort to construct a shared
human identity that could combine an understanding and
acceptance of differences with an affirmation of common
values and goals. It builds normative networks outside
the domains of conventional transnational activism, and
emphasizes cultural and civilizational boundaries more
than those of sovereign states. As such, the religious
resurgence could contribute to humane governance within a
variety of regional frameworks. The positive sides of
religious consciousness also affirm responsibility for
the poor and afflicted, providing a normative antidote to
those who believe that economic growth and private sector
charity can handle human suffering. Finally, the
religious approach to the global challenges posed by such
divergent realities as global warming and human cloning
suggest the insufficiency of reliance on either
economistic or secular modes of problem solving.
People-oriented Development. More utopian than other
aspects of the current revolutionary turmoil, is the
demand that people and not profitability shape the
allocation of resources for development, particularly in
countries of mass impoverishment. There is some shift in
the rhetoric of such international institutions as the
World Bank and the IMF that seems responsive to such a
demand. To the extent that such an approach to
development is accepted by influential actors, it adds to
the impression of an emergent normative climate in world
politics.
At present, such a re-orientation of the developmental
ethos away from profitability and growth seems utopian in
the sense that almost everywhere the prevailing mood and
allocational patterns governing the use of resources
continues to be capital-driven. Banking principles and
financial markets exert direct influence on the behavior
of governments, even to the extent of overwhelming
traditional postulates of economic sovereignty. Even a
country as strong and nationalist as Turkey has ceded
substantial control to external decision makers
implementing a neoliberal view of development. Commenting
on a visit to Turkey by Stanley Fischer, former high
ranking IMF official, in July 2001, a journalist named
Mehmet Ali Birand writes: "Fischer's trip revealed
something of great importance: The Turkish economy it
transpires is being run from Washington. As if nobody
knew already. What was not clear was the degree of detail
involved."
No normative global revolution can succeed unless it
address directly and as a matter of priority issues of
economic deprivation, but also the degrees of disparity
between countries, regions, and classes. It may be both
the most obvious and elusive issue as its resolution
would require the substantial revision, if not the
abandonment, of the current ideological orthodoxy
embedded in globalization.
IV. Conclusion
The presentation above tried to make credible the case
for believing that a normative global revolution is
underway, but that its sustainability and outcome are
highly uncertain and beset by contradictory evidence and
trends, especially given the onset of the war on global
terror. The goal of such a revolution is the
establishment by stages of humane global governance that
is responsive to the functional needs of an era of
globalization. Whether the sovereign state can adapt to
this revolution, or mounts a counter-revolution on behalf
of a pluralist world order, is a major area of
uncertainty. It would seem that rates of adaptation are
uneven, with interesting collaborative opportunities
evolving for states favoring normative reforms joining
with civil society actors to achieve such ends as an
international criminal court or a ban on anti-personnel
landmines.
Another crucial uncertainty involves the direction
taken by the United States, and the manner in which it
chooses to discharge its global leadership, especially
now that it has shifted its focus to a decidedly
militarist pursuit of security. Its present
anti-solidarist unilateralism and reliance on a
militarist view of global security is discouraging, but
it may generate counter-tendencies within the United
States and elsewhere that are supportive of the normative
global revolution.
In the end, the secular prospects for the normative
global revolution will depend on the degree to which the
anti-globalization movement converges with the struggle
to promote and achieve global democracy. But even if this
movement evolves in a constructive manner, its ultimate
success will depend on its capacity to relate positively
to the creative and visionary aspects of the religious
resurgence, and not get trapped into an embrace of
secular fundamentalism as a reaction to religious
extremism and its mega-terrorist enactments.
©
TFF & the author 2002
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