Facing
the Failures of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Regime

By
David
Krieger, President, Nuclear
Age Peace Foundation,
TFF
associate
and
Devon Chaffee,
Research and Advocacy
Coordinator,
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
May 28, 2003
Each year the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) Regime becomes more uncertain. In the past
year alone:
- North Korea has become the first country ever to
withdraw from the treaty.
- There has been virtually no progress and
considerable regression on the thirteen practical
steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000
NPT Review Conference.
- The US has reasserted policies of nuclear weapons
use that undermine the negative security assurances
promised to non-nuclear weapon states parties (NNWS)
to the NPT in 1978 and again at the 1995 NPT Review
and Extension Conference.
- The doctrine of preemption, pursued by the United
States and adopted by other states with nuclear
weapons, threatens to accelerate nuclear weapons
proliferation in the face of the threat of aggressive
use of force.
- Bilateral policies of the nuclear weapon states
parties (NWS) to the NPT are increasingly integrating
those nuclear weapons states outside of the NPT
regime: India, Pakistan and Israel's legitimate
nuclear powers, through the elimination of sanctions
and technology exchanges.
The NPT regime obligations are having less and less
success in restraining the irresponsible behavior of
nations, especially the treaty's NWS, and the United
States in particular. As NWS move further away from their
obligations under the treaty, they are simultaneously
weakening incentives for non-nuclear weapon state parties
to the treaty to remain within the NPT regime. If such
regressions continue, they will inevitably lead to an
abandonment of disarmament goals and the gradual lack of
interest by non-nuclear weapons states parties to remain
within the regime's boundaries. It is time for members of
the NPT regime to issue a clear statement outlining how
the treaty is being undermined and by
whom.
The NPT 13 Practical Steps
Towards Disarmament Ignored
When the United States ambassador stated at the 2002
NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee that
Washington no longer supported many of the conclusions
from the 2000 NPT Review Conference he was clearly
alluding to the 13 Practical Steps to achieve complete
disarmament under Article VI of the treaty. In the past
year not only has no progress been made in fulfilling
these steps but NWS, the United States in particular,
have pursued policies that demonstrate significant
regression from fulfillment of their Article VI
obligations.
In the past year there have been no further
ratifications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by
nuclear capable states, including NWS parties to the NPT.
There has been no progress in moving towards a fissile
material treaty. The principles of irreversibility and
verification have been undermined by the United States
and Russia in the Moscow Treaty, which lays out
reversible offensive reductions without providing for any
verification methods. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM) and the START II arms reduction efforts have been
entirely abandoned as has progress towards START III.
There has been no effort to work towards the elimination
of nuclear weapons, and in fact the United States is
conducting studies on new nuclear weapon designs. The
only area where some progress in meeting the 13 Practical
Steps has been made is that some states submitted reports
with regard to their Article VI obligations at the 2002
PrepCom, a process that is still being resisted by many
NWS, including the United States.
At the NPT's inception, disarmament obligations under
Article VI played a key role in convincing NNWS that it
was in their best interest to sign the treaty, though it
restricted their ability to develop nuclear weapons. As
these disarmament obligations continue to be ignored by
the NWS, they eliminate a significant incentive for NNWS
to keep their side of the bargain.
Negative Security Assurances
Undermined
The US has reiterated its policy to use "overwhelming
force" against chemical or biological attacks. This
policy was reiterated in the recent US National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued
in December 2002, which states, "The United States will
continue to make clear that it reserves the right to
respond with overwhelming force including through resort
to all of our options to the use of WMD against the
United States, our forces abroad, and friends and
allies."
Such policies undermine the negative security
assurances promised by the United States in 1978 and
reaffirmed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference. These assurances are supposed to reassure
NNWS that they need not worry about becoming the target
of a nuclear weapons attack. Though the United States has
reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to
a chemical or biological weapon attack for some years,
the continued emphasis on this first strike policy
undermines non-proliferation goals. When the United
States, despite its overwhelming conventional military
superiority, takes up a policy that requires nuclear
weapons to carry out a strike against a potential
chemical or biological weapons threat, other states are
likely to conclude that nuclear weapons are also
necessary for their protection.
In addition, as the United States continues to fund
studies for new tactical weapons designs, such as the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penatrator, it further erodes the
confidence building effect of the negative security
assurances. These new nuclear weapon designs are not
strategic, to be used to deter a nuclear strike upon the
United States, but would most likely be used against the
chemical or biological facilities or in other tactical
battlefield maneuvers in a first strike, most likely
against a NNWS. By eroding its won negative security
assurances, the United States is diminishing another
important incentive for NNWS to remain within the NPT
regime.
Preemption Doctrine
Pursued
The United States government is pursuing a doctrine of
preemptive use of force, both in policy and military
action, which ultimately threatens to undermine
non-proliferation goals. The Bush administration's
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
states: "U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian
agencies must have the capability to defend against
WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases
through preemptive measures. This requires capabilities
to detect and destroy an adversary's WMD assets before
these weapons are used."
This US preemption doctrine, which was drafted largely
in response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001
and which was used in justifying the recent invasion of
Iraq, is likely to have serious negative effects on the
NPT regime.
First, it is setting a dangerous precedent for other
nuclear powers to justify using aggressive preventative
force to settle international disputes. Some countries
have already begun echoing the new US doctrine as a
possible approach to solving long-standing regional
conflicts. Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha stated
recently, "There were three reasons which drove the
Anglo-US forces to attack Iraq possession of weapons of
mass destruction, export of terrorism and an absence of
democracy all of which exist in Pakistan." On April 11,
2003, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said he
endorsed Sinha's recent comments that India had "a much
better case to go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan
than the United States has in Iraq." Such a doctrine of
preemption pursued by India towards Pakistan is extremely
dangerous, particularly given Pakistan's conventional
weakness. In the face of an Indian policy of preemption,
Pakistan is likely to approach its own nuclear arsenal
with an even higher alert status, bringing these two
countries a step closer to intentional or accidental
nuclear war, as well as accelerate the regional arms
race.
Second, the US policy of preemption is heightening the
level of threat felt by potential nuclear weapons states
by adding to the perceived need to possess nuclear
weapons in order to ward off an aggressive offensive
attack. Instead of warning or discouraging nuclear
threshold states such as Iran and North Korea from
developing nuclear arsenals, the lesson that these
countries are most likely to learn from the Iraq example
is that they must accelerate their nuclear weapons
programs in order avoid to the fate of the Ba'th
regime.
Israel, India and Pakistan's
Nuclear Arsenals Accepted
In addition to the many regressions from fulfilling
obligations under the NPT, NWS policies toward countries
with nuclear arsenals outside of the NPT regime are also
having a damaging effect on the treaty. Through their
evolving bilateral policies, NWS parties to the NPT are
increasingly integrating Israel, India and Pakistan into
the international community as legitimate nuclear powers
outside of the NPT regime, undermining incentives for
NNWS to remain within the treaty.
There has long been a double standard in calling for
the adherence to UN resolutions relevant to the
elimination of nuclear weapons within the Middle East
that puts little pressure on Israel to eliminate its
arsenal. While NWS have put increased pressure on
countries such as Iraq and Iran not to develop nuclear
weapons, Israel has never faced significant consequences
for having a nuclear arsenal of some 200 weapons outside
of the NPT regime. In fact, by continuing to aid Israel
in developing its missile defense technology, the United
States is helping Israel create a protective shield from
which it may, at some point, be able to launch a nuclear
weapon, without perceiving itself to be vulnerable to a
reciprocal missile strike. Not only is Israel developing
this potentially destabilizing anti-missile technology,
but it is also considering selling this technology, if it
is given US approval, to India, another nuclear power
that is not a member of the NPT regime.
The United States lifted sanctions against the sale of
dual-use technologies to Pakistan in 2001 in order to
gain Pakistan's cooperation in the post-September 11 war
on terror. Such sanctions against India, which were
partially lifted when India also became part of the
US-led "coalition against terrorism" in 2001, were
repealed in their entirety in February of this year. The
United States Congress is also examining ways to expand
the co-operative non-proliferation efforts from states of
the former Soviet Union to include countries such as
India, aiding them in advancing their nuclear security
technology and protocol.
Reports from a summit between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee in December 2002 also indicated that
negotiations are moving forward for India to lease at
least one Russian-made Akula-11 class nuclear-powered
submarine, capable of carrying a payload of nuclear
cruise missiles. Though the head of India's navy, Admiral
Madhvendra Singh, refused to confirm or deny assertions
concerning the possible lease, if such a lease is
undertaken it would significantly alter the balance of
nuclear capability between India and Pakistan. Prior to
the summit, Russia announced its intention to allow India
to become an associated member of the United Nuclear
Research Institute, one of the top nuclear research
institutes in Russia. India was previously denied access
to the facilities of this prestigious institute, where
nearly half of all Russian nuclear advances have
occurred, because it is not a member of the NPT. But
India's NPT status is a factor that appears to be of
decreasing concern to the Russian government when
considering weapons, science and technology
exchanges.
The increasing exchange of dual-use and missile
defense technology to Israel, Pakistan and India
continues despite the fact that these countries are not
restrained by the NPT regulations from sharing this
technology with NNWS, even in the case of Pakistan, a
country that likely aided North Korea in developing its
uranium-based nuclear weapons program. Such policies
clearly undermine the goals of the NPT, sending NNWS a
clear message: remaining outside of the NPT regime has
many benefits and few costs.
A Time To
Speak
The NPT was to be the cornerstone for disarmament,
arms control and the peaceful prevention of the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons, a role that the treaty
is clearly failing to fulfill. It is no longer fruitful
to wait and hope that the political will appears to make
the NPT a workable and effective regime. It is time,
instead, to realize how and why the regime is not working
and what countries bear responsibility for the treaty's
ineffectiveness. The NNWS members of the NPT should unite
in motioning for a type of censure, a statement that
clearly lays out the reasons for the NPT's failures
holding specific countries responsible for their part in
the regime's degradation. Such a motion would not pass
the NPT PrepCom's procedure of consensus, but it would
send a strong message that the majority of NPT members
are not complacent in the face of continuing disregard
for treaty obligations by the NWS.
In particular, the United States' persistent role in
undermining the goals of the NPT should be clearly
outlined by the other parties to the treaty. If the
United States is not going to take its obligations under
the NPT seriously, which it shows no intention of doing
in either the near or distant future, and if the United
States continues to pursue policies that directly
undermine the treaty regime, then this behavior must be
recognized and forthrightly condemned by the other
members of NPT regime. Such a statement is not likely to
be effective in changing US policy it could possibly
affect the sentiment of the American public. Given that
the NPT regime is hardly benefiting from US symbolic
membership, there is little to lose by members of the NPT
formally voicing a strong opposition to the United
States' many transgressions.
As the United States government is becoming more and
more frank in its disregard for multilateral diplomatic
solutions to security issues, so must the international
community be frank in its rejection of the aggressive and
dangerous policies of the United States that threaten to
draw the world into an unending arms race and a state of
perpetual war.
David Krieger is president of the
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and can be contacted at
dkrieger@napf.org.
He is also the co-author of Choose Hope, Your Role in
Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age (Middle way Press, 2002)
and editor of Hope in a Dark Time, Reflections on
Humanity's Future (Capri Press, 2003).
Devon Chaffee is the Research and
Advocacy Coordinator of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
and can be contacted at advocacy@napf.org.
The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a
non-profit, non-partisan international education and
advocacy organization that works to advance initiatives
to eliminate the nuclear weapons threat to all life, to
foster the global rule of law, and to build an enduring
legacy of peace through education and advocacy. To learn
more about the Foundation visit our web site at
www.wagingpeace.org.
©
TFF & the authors 2003

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