The
United States and Korea:
Time
to Wake Up!
By
Glenn
D. Paige
Professor Emeritus of Political
Science, University of Hawai'i
President, Center
for Global Nonviolence
TFF
associate
March 5, 2003
When I interviewed former President Harry S Truman in
Independence in 1957 for my book The Korean Decision:
June 24-30, 1950, I asked, "Mr. President, as a
devout Baptist, when you made the decision to engage the
United States in the fourth largest war in its history
[now fifth after Vietnam] did you pray?" "Hell
no!" he replied, "There's right and wrong going back to
Greece and Rome. It was the right thing to do. I made the
decision and went to sleep."
Unfortunately war-rooted United States policy toward
Korea, both North and South, has been deep in righteous
sleep for more than fifty years. Officially everything
about American engagement with its ROK South Korean ally
has been right and everything about its DPRK North Korean
enemy has been wrong.
But now events raise alarm that it is long overdue
time to wake up. Confronted with the threat of nuclear
weapons development in the North and rising youthful
challenges to continued American military presence in the
South, it is time to exercise some empathy and creativity
in United States-Korean relations.
Empathy is essential because failure to understand the
feelings and needs of others lies at the heart of
conflict and violence in politics as well as in personal
life. Creativity is needed because we have to question
and replace divisive assumptions and policies toward
war-divided Korea with constructive Korea-centered
integrative thinking. The United States must shift from
its Hot and Cold War mindset of paternalism and enmity to
become a constructive partner in helping both Koreas to
achieve their historic task of independent peaceful
reintegration.
An obvious but crucial basis for empathic
understanding is to recognize that the exercise of United
States power on the Korean peninsula, however righteously
or demonically portrayed, is seen as a foreign intrusion.
Korean patriots do not wish to see their country as a
dependency, protectorate, or target of any country--not
Japan, not China, not Russia, and not the United States.
Oncoming generations of Koreans, numbering now some 47
million in the South and 23 million in the North, will
not accept it. Koreans both North and South will insist
upon respect for their independence and integrity. An
example is the DPRK's liberation of itself from being a
Soviet satellite or a Chinese tributary state despite
military obligations to them for its creation and
survival.
Despite division Koreans have a strong sense of
distinctive national identity based upon language,
history, geography and culture. Singing together the
Korean folk song "Arirang" can bring about emotional
unification in any meeting of Koreans from North and
South. But while insisting upon respect for identity and
independence, Koreans also want to live in peace with all
nations of the earth. This is proclaimed at critical
moments in Korean history such as in the peaceful March
1, 1919 uprising against Japanese colonial rule and in
pre-division political manifestoes upon Liberation in
1945.
In empathy for the South, the United States must
understand that its Cold War anti-Communist alliance with
repressive conservative forces associated it with
atrocities and violations of human rights (such as the
Kwangju massacre of 1980) that would have brought
outraged condemnation in the United States if committed
in a Soviet satellite. It must also be appreciated that
many Koreans credit courageous student demonstrations in
1960 and 1987 for progress toward electoral democracy in
the face of lagging U.S. policy. In the South, of course,
there is also gratitude for aid in repelling the 1950
DPRK invasion and for assistance in postwar
reconstruction.
In understanding North Korea it is essential to
empathize with the fact that its people were subjected to
massive U.S. Air Force bombing--as well as Navy
bombardment --throughout the 1950-53 war. In contrast,
the South was not bombed except by American and allied
planes. Pyongyang, Wonsan, and other cities were
flattened. Industrial and transportation facilities were
destroyed. People were forced to live and work
underground. There was great loss of civilian as well as
military life, including that of Chinese soldiers. To
such experience must be added the unambiguous American
threat since 1953 to repeat that devastation, including
continuing threat to employ nuclear weapons.
People subjected to such devastation can be expected
to exhibit both defensive bellicosity and a striving for
credible removal of the threat of its repetition. Thus
becomes understandable the current DPRK move to acquire a
deterrent nuclear weapons capability combined with a call
for a nonaggression guarantee and peace treaty with the
United States.
Another key to understanding the current nuclear
crisis is that numerous DPRK peacemaking overtures
directed to the United States Government and Congress
have been ignored or rejected. In 1973 the DPRK claimed
at the UN that it had made 131 unanswered peace proposals
to the United States. Only when signs of atomic bomb
development appeared in 1993-94 did the United States
agree to talk. A Cold War slogan was, "The only thing
that Communists understand is force." Regrettably as
illustrated by the DPRK atomic case this also seems to
apply to the anti-Communist superpower United States.
Rather than "blackmail,"
the DPRK atomic weapons message can be interpreted as,
"We want to talk to you about a peace treaty and normal
diplomatic relations. Take us seriously."
Among several previously missed peacemaking
opportunities for serious consideration by the United
States and ROK was the 1980 proposal by Kim Il Sung to
reduce the size of the DPRK and ROK armed forces to
100,000-150,000 soldiers on each side. Another was the
DPRK proposal to co-host with Seoul the 1988 Olympic
Games. This was rejected by the IOC on grounds that the
Games are awarded to cities not countries, missing the
chance to recognize Pyongyang as a city that had already
invested in extensive Olympic-class sports
facilities.
An essential point for empathy is that DPRK actions,
like those of the United States, are not only proactive
but reactive as well. For example, the bloody 1983
Rangoon assassination attempt on ROK President Chun Doo
Hwan can be interpreted as revenge for General Chun's
role in the 1980 Kwangju City slaughter. Similarly the
atrocity bombing of the KAL airliner in 1987 can be
understood as a frustrated reaction to exclusion from the
upcoming Seoul Olympic Games. In the same vein, the
revived DPRK atomic weapon program can be understood in
part as deriving from fear of a U.S. preemptive strike to
achieve "axis of evil" regime change as well as from
frustrated attempts to achieve a genuine peace settlement
and diplomatic recognition. This is not to excuse such
atrocities but to try to understand them. All parties to
the Korean tragedy, including the two Koreas and the four
Big Powers, have blood on their hands and have yet to
master the art and science of nonkilling politics.
For further understanding it is helpful to recall that
Cold War proposals to establish US-DPRK diplomatic
relations were rejected with the argument that when the
Soviet Union and China recognized the ROK, then the
United States and Japan could recognize the DPRK. Even
after the DPRK and ROK entered the United Nations as
sovereign states in 1991, followed by recognition of the
ROK by China and Russia in 1992, the United States and
Japan still have not done so.
The present wakeup call being issued from both Koreas
to the United States is that it must make a creative
transition from partisan bellicosity to co-partnership
for peace and mutual benefit. Both Koreas seek respectful
recognition and support for inevitable unification. The
United States must shift from obstacle to facilitator.
Chinese policy provides a model. Although a wartime ally
of the
DPRK, China has established diplomatic relations with
the ROK and considers both Koreas its friends. The ROK
has become China's third largest trading partner while
China continues to be a major source of economic aid to
the DPRK.
In long range terms China favors a unified neutral
Korea. Russia has also shown itself capable of
constructive dual engagement. Only the United States and
Japan remain self-excluded in Cold War antagonism.
If a nuclear-weapon-free united Korea is a primary
objective of United States policy it should do two
things.
First, the United States should engage the DPRK
directly on nuclear disarmament issues and move
resolutely to establish diplomatic relations. If the
United States could establish Cold War diplomatic
relations with the big nuclear powers Russia and
China--or even later with victorious Vietnam--why not
with its DPRK partner in defeat in the stalemated Korean
War? Although both sides claimed victory, each was
actually defeated since neither succeeded in unifying
Korea by killing. Why not go forward from mutual military
defeat to partnership for peace in Korea and the
world?
Second, the United States should support South Korean
leadership initiatives in establishing peaceful
political, economic, and cultural relations with North
Korea that seek to facilitate reconciliation and gradual
national reintegration. The United States needs to
cultivate empathy and creativity to support peace efforts
in both Koreas.
It is time for the United States to wake up in its
Korean policy for creative, catalytic, peaceful change.
Waking up means gaining binocular vision to see itself,
the world, and the needs of the Korean people through the
eyes of both Pyongyang and Seoul. It means translating
wakefulness into two-handed assistance to Koreans in both
North and South to peacefully reunify their country as a
major example and contributor to the advancement of
nonkilling global civilization.
©
TFF & the author 2003

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