

# **Iraq: Humanitarian Issues and Tensions in the Oil-for-Food Programme 1998-2000 and Beyond**



**By**

***Hans - C. von Sponeck***

**TFF Associate &  
UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq  
(1998-2000)**

*This analysis was prepared for: The Inaugural Conference of the International Association of Contemporary Iraqi Studies at the University of East London, London - 1-2 September 2005*

*Please note that the attachments are taken from a forthcoming book 'Iraq Autopsy' by the author and should therefore not be used in other publications*

## **A)**

# **Eight Factors of Tension and Humanitarian Disadvantage for the Iraqi People**

### **1. The No-Fly-Zones**

Following Operation Desert Fox of December 1998, US and UK pilots operated under 'enlarged rules of engagement' in the northern and southern no-fly-zones. This was the concrete manifestation of a change in Iraq policy introduced by the October 1998 'Iraq Liberation Act' of the US Congress and the Clinton Administration. Containment policy was replaced by a regime change policy.

UNOHCI/Baghdad began to issue in early 1999 'Air-strike Reports' to document the worsening security situation in Iraq as a result of these enlarged rules of engagement (note: on average there was one air strike every three days!). During that year, Iraq experienced a marked increase in the number of civilian deaths and injuries as well as destruction of non-military property - see annex 1.

The maintenance of the zones, despite US/UK claims to the contrary, had not been authorized by the UN Security Council

and was therefore illegal. The protection of ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, if it ever was an element in the decision to maintain air exclusion zones, was replaced after Operation Desert Fox by systematic acts of de-stabilization. During 2002/03 Iraqi airspace became a practice ground for the planned invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

The running of the oil-for-food programme was adversely affected by these enlarged rules of engagement as the movement of humanitarian supplies and UN staff became more restricted.

## 2. The inadequacy of finance

A pre-sanctions assessment of humanitarian requirements of the Iraqi population was never carried out before sanctions were introduced in 1990. The Athisaari and Aga Khan missions of 1991 were qualitative rather than quantitative needs assessments. The initial (gross) allocations of the oil-for-food programme of \$ 2 billion each for phases I-III were based on rough and inadequate UN calculations of 1991. Subsequent increases, to which the UNSC agreed, were based on the same initial flawed calculations.

The inadequacy of the allocated resources for phases I-VI but also the considerable difference between gross allocation, net availability of revenue for procurement of humanitarian supplies and the value of goods that actually arrived in Iraq are shown in annexes 2 and 3. This shortage of funds was further aggravated by the decision of the Government of Iraq in 2000/01 to halt the pumping of oil on three different occasions in protest over UN oil pricing, rejection of resolution 1352 and in sympathy with the Palestinian intifada. This resulted in an estimated loss of \$ 2.9 billion.

The severe inadequacy of resources during the entire 1996-2003 oil-for food programme period becomes evident by the fact that out of a total of \$64 billion, just over \$ 43 billion were

available for the humanitarian exemption and out of this amount only \$ 28 billion or an average of \$ 185 per person per year (based on a mean population of 23 million) worth of supplies actually arrived in Iraq under the oil-for-food programme – see annex 4.

The UN Security Council was made aware of these resource constraints every year throughout the 6 years of the oil-for-food programme, particularly in 1999 by the humanitarian panel set up the UNSC, the so-called ‘Amorim panel’; by special reports from the UN system in Baghdad and by IGO and INGO reports (e.g., ICRC, CARE, CARITAS, etc.).

The UN Security Council reacted slowly to this awareness. A doubling of revenue occurred in February 1998; to respond to the continuously worsening of the human condition in Iraq, a special one-time allocation of \$ 3.04 billion was made in October 1999 to make up the shortfall of revenue which had occurred in phases IV and V; in December 1999 the UN Security Council decided to lift the oil ceiling.

This led the US and UK governments to proclaim that any suffering of the Iraqi people beyond this date would be entirely due to the Government of Saddam Hussein as Iraq could now produce as much oil as it needed to finance the well-being of the Iraqi people.

The lifting of the oil ceiling was in fact nothing but a political ploy. The US and UK governments as well as the other members of the UNSC were well aware that Iraq could not possibly produce more than 2.1. to 2.2 million barrels of oil per day for export. They had read the reports of the UN oil mission which were visiting Iraq every year at the request of the UN Secretary General. These missions had invariably concluded their reports by referring to the ‘lamentable and dangerous state of the Iraqi oil industry’. Under sanctions rules the dilapidated oil industry could only be maintained through repairs but not through major overhaul and modernization. The oil industry was therefore in no position to produce any more oil as a result of the removal of the oil ceiling – see annex 5.

In December 1999, the UNSC as part of the provisions of resolution 1284, agreed to local purchases. Had this been permitted earlier, e.g., for food purchases, the food basket would have been much healthier as it could have included fresh fruit and vegetables and possibly meat. The cost of this food basket also would have been much lower freeing resources for other needs of the population (note: in 1999 an internal UN review of the cost of imported wheat as compared to the cost of local purchase showed a ratio of 4:1).

A further cause of tension with negative impact on the volume of humanitarian supplies relates to the fact that the Government of Iraq had to 'pre-pay' out of its oil revenue allocation for the food and medicines it purchased during any phase for the three autonomous Kurdish governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleimaniyah. Reimbursement of this expenditure often took many months and limited the purchases the government could make for the area under its control.

The inadequacy of resources was made significantly worse by the diversion of 30% of oil revenue to the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) in Geneva (by 2003 the UNCC had paid \$18 billion of Iraq revenue for compensation claims) - see annex 6 .

### 3. Holds

The practice of temporary or permanent blocking of the import of humanitarian supplies by the US and the UK representatives on the 661 Committee played havoc with the distribution plans the UN negotiated with the Government of Iraq for each phase. Despite several hundred UN observers whose duty it was to confirm that items reached their agreed destination – a system that worked well – many so-called 'dual use' supplies were held back by the two governments often for periods stretching over several phases or even permanently. Many arrived items could

not benefit the population and had to be stored until complimentary items were released from hold.

This situation applies even to the small programmes of international NGOs operating in areas under the control of Baghdad. In 1999, for example, Ponte per Baghdad, an Italian NGO, was blocked by the 661 Committee to import minor quantities of water purification chemicals for a rural community in southern Iraq.

Contrary to common understanding, the green list fully introduced in March 2000 and the goods review list which replaced the green list in May 2002 did not result in an overall improvement in the volume of arrivals of supplies because of the increase over time in the volume of goods on hold. The peak of the volume of holds was during phase XII in mid-2002 when over \$ 5 billion (!) worth of humanitarian supplies were on hold – see annex 7.

It should be pointed out that while holds were a major factor in reducing the volume of arrivals of humanitarian supplies, there were other factors which explain the poor delivery rate of survival supplies, e.g., 661 procurement rules, government management incapacity, lack of cash, etc. – see annex 8

#### 4. The emergency nature of the OFFP

The Memorandum of Understanding negotiated between the UN and the Government of Iraq in 1995 confirmed the short term and emergency nature of the humanitarian exemption as had the earlier UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Appeal. UNOHCI and its UN partners in Baghdad were regularly reminded of this policy and discouraged by the UN Secretariat to consider any initiative that had a development orientation. As a result there was no planning beyond the on-going phase of the oil-for-food programme, there was no institution-building, training programmes were rare and financed with small amounts of

extra-budgetary resources; education including curriculum development were deprived of even minimal resources.

The UN and the Government over the years developed a supply and distribution mentality, a medium or long term vision for the physical and mental well-being of the population with few isolated exceptions such as efforts, e.g., by UNICEF, was not part of the national and international mind-set.

## 5. The linkage of disarmament and economic sanctions

Disarmament and a military embargo was the price the Government of Saddam Hussein had to pay for the illegal invasion of Kuwait and for its threatening weapons of mass destruction programmes. Comprehensive economic sanctions of a kind that had not been imposed by the United Nations on any other country were the corollary punishment for Iraq. The price for these sanctions had to be paid by the people of Iraq.

When it became increasingly clear that economic sanctions were harming the wrong party, the UN Security Council had the responsibility to protect the people of Iraq by lessening the grip of economic sanctions. This did not happen even though a majority of countries represented in the Security Council wanted to see an end of the comprehensive nature of economic sanctions. The debates in the Council during 1998 and beyond make this unequivocally clear. For Washington and London the linkage between disarmament and economic sanctions was not even a subject of deliberation, it was 'untouchable' policy.

A de-linking of disarmament and sanctions would have been possible. Import controls at the four border entry points could have been extended to cover non-986 commodities. Instead, the UN, intelligence agencies and countries bordering Iraq, all aware of 'other' imports, undertook nothing to have these inspected. Had inspection of all incoming goods been part of

international policy, disarmament and military embargo could have proceeded without the linkage to severe economic sanctions that punished a population for something they had not done.

## 6. The fragmented UN System sanctions management

At any one time, there were seven major resident UN entities involved in Iraq in the implementation of military and economic sanctions – see annex 8. These operated in splendid isolation from each other. An assessment of UN sanctions management can only confirm the complete absence of an integrated approach. Such an approach would have been in the interest of the welfare of the civilian population.

To illustrate this: UNSCOM/UNMOVIC & IAEA carried out their monitoring, verification and disarmament work without any contact with UNOHCI. Even though they were located in the same building in Baghdad, there were two administrations and two medical services – all paid for out of Iraqi oil revenue. This money could have helped in preventing Iraqi death and destitution. UNOHCI and the UNCC, both using scarce Iraqi oil revenue, had no contact with each other.

The 30% deduction of funds from the oil-for-food programme for the UNCC to pay compensation, inter alia, to well endowed companies and governments was made without any concern for the human catastrophe that was evolving in Iraq. Neither the UNSC nor the UN Secretariat ever showed any concern or suggested a temporary freeze of these deductions in view of the deteriorating human conditions in Iraq. There was also no contact between the UN Human Rights Commission and its rapporteur and UNOHCI, even though both entities were concerned with human rights in Iraq.



This lack of a vision, the absence of any principled stand or delegated authority to develop joint approaches in situ or to form an inter-agency supervisory committee in New York with the objective of protecting civilians in Iraq has contributed to the plight of Iraqis and added to the UN's far reaching moral default.

## 7. Mis- and dis-information

The politicization of the WMD issue and the manipulation of data concerning Iraq's state of armaments is well documented. Less well known is how data were created, interpreted, manipulated or ignored by the authorities in Washington and London to influence international policy on economic sanctions against Iraq:

**a)** "Socio-economic indicators confirm that Iraqi Kurdistan is making better use of the oil-for-food programme than areas under the control of the Government of Iraq because this area is outside the influence of Saddam Hussein."

The three Kurdish governorates indeed performed better than the other 15 governorates but for much more complex reasons than the one provided by the US and the UK. Had there been an objective interpretation of the causes for this progress mention should have been made of the following: i) the per capita allocation of revenue under the oil-for-food programme was higher in Iraqi Kurdistan: 13% of the population residing there received about 19% of the revenue, ii) sanctions regulations were interpreted by the UNSC much more leniently for that area, e.g., there was a cash component long before SC1284, e.g., funds could be used for construction and therefore created employment, iii) the 661 Committee while blocking billions of dollars worth of supplies for areas under Baghdad's control, put practically no supplies on hold for Iraqi Kurdistan iv) many NGOs resided in Iraqi Kurdistan and provided additional resources, v) trade and smuggling across

the Turkish and Iranian borders were easy, vi) the climate in the hilly areas of northern Iraq was more temperate and therefore there was a different epidemiological reality in Iraqi Kurdistan.

**b)** “Food and medicines meant for the people of Iraq are sold by the Government in the open market or abroad.”

During 1998 and onwards the World Food Programme carefully monitored the distribution of food in Iraq. This involved on average about 440.000 tons of food per month. WFP confirmed that only miniscule amounts of food brought into Iraq under the oil-for-food programme were found in the open Iraqi market. These food items were sold by cash strapped recipients of the food basket and not by the government. WFP had no evidence that food was sold in neighbouring countries. The US State Department in September 1999 published a report which alleged that baby milk had been found on a smuggler’s boat. The ‘baby milk’ turned out to be soap powder.

“The slow implementation of the special targeted nutrition programme for infants and pregnant or lactating mothers was seen by the US and UK governments as evidence that the Government of Iraq did not care for its people.”

It was objectionable that Government in 1999 took so long to procure special milk and biscuits for the targeted nutrition programme but the reason for the delay was not that it did not care but that it could not find a politically acceptable trading country. The Netherlands could have supplied these items but the Government of Iraq did not want to buy there because of the Dutch strong pro-sanction position.

Accusations were also made that “the Government of Iraq was selling medicines on the open market.”

WHO found no evidence that this was correct. Instead, it clarified that some 2600 private pharmacies in central and southern Iraq received from the Government general prescription drugs at no cost. The pharmacies could sell these drugs for government controlled prices. This approach was

followed in order to keep these private pharmacies open. Any pharmacist who sold such drugs at higher prices lost his license.

**c)** “US representatives on the UN Security Council would argue that the resources available for the oil-for-food programme were more than what countries such as Jordan and Egypt had at their disposal for similar purposes. If there was any suffering by the people, it was due to the Government of Iraq. One US representative even went as far as stating in the Council that Iraq had so much money that the emergency programme could be renamed a ‘development programme’.”

To explain the known suffering, nothing was said about the substantial blocking of goods by the US and UK governments or about the bureaucratic procurement procedures maintained by the 661 committee which resulted in erratic and slow arrivals of humanitarian supplies (see annex 4).

No mention was made of the fact that the state of the art infrastructure of the 1980s was very costly to maintain in the 1990s and consequently absorbed a lot of revenue and even more so because under sanctions, Iraq was only allowed to repair but not to overhaul or modernize.

**d)** “Iraq is not even using the allowable resources to implement the oil-for-food programme. The volume of contracts is always below the level of resources.”

This statement is false and malicious. The level of contracting was at all times well known to members of the UN Security Council. As annex 9 shows during no phase were the actually available resources higher than the value of the contracted supplies. Again and again, the UN Office of the Iraq Programme had to request the Security Council to agree to a re-phasing or even canceling of approved contracts during a given phase due to lack of funding.

e) “The Government of Iraq is deliberately withholding large amounts of medicines and other supplies from the population.”

The US Government rightly criticized UNOHCI in early 1999 for not being able to document our contention that the distribution of humanitarian supplies, despite serious logistical constraints (transport, warehousing, outdated management tools, etc.), worked satisfactorily. In mid-1999 UNOHCI introduced monthly reports to document the distribution.

These reports showed month after month that the distribution system worked well with 90% + of arrived goods every month reaching their agreed destination. The alleged ‘hoarding’ of medicines was nothing but the storage of what WHO calls ‘just in time’ supplies to be used at times of outbreak of epidemics or supplies which were undergoing quality control tests or supplies which had failed such tests or items which were awaiting complimentary items (e.g., syringes and vaccines).

The US and the UK governments would ignore these UN reports and continue to maintain that the distribution was politicised and did not work well.

Mis- and dis-information of the kind identified above or the casting aside of credible information that did not suit US/UK Iraq policy contributed to a climate in the UN Security Council which worsened the prospects for an improvement of the running of the oil-for-food programme and therefore harmed the Iraqi people.

## 8. Oversight

The responsibility for oversight rested with the UN Security Council. The Council’s main duty was to carefully monitor the situation in Iraq under sanctions and to follow the impact of its sanctions policies on the welfare of the people in Iraq.

In the course of almost 13 years of UN sanctions, the Council passed more than a dozen key resolutions on Iraq all of which had major implications for the welfare of the Iraqi people. It was therefore the duty of the Council to follow closely the impact these resolutions had on the ground. The Security Council had all the means to do that yet failed to make adequate and persistent use of these.

UN reporting on Iraq under sanctions involved 3 and 6 monthly UNOHCI/OIP reports. These were no more than supply statements with few references to local needs let alone measurable and comparative assessments. Their main purpose was to show the effort of the international community to extend 'humanitarian' assistance with Iraq's own resources. They did not present an analysis of the human condition in the country nor did they in any way examine in a critical way the impact of the Security Council's sanctions measures.

Efforts on the part of UNOHCI in Baghdad to change in 1999 the reporting format to be able to report at regular intervals on the evolving humanitarian crisis were consistently sidelined at UN headquarters. It was left to special reports by UNICEF, WHO, WFP and FAO to report on sectoral circumstances (water and sanitation, nutrition, food quality, health care and education). In 1999, the UN system in Iraq reacting to this serious reporting inadequacy prepared on its own a special social topics compendium for the benefit of the Security Council's 'Amorim panel'.

The Security Council did not once take an initiative to modify the reporting format. Neither did the Council, with one exception, resort to visits by members of the Council to Iraq for an in situ assessment.

The US and UK representatives repeatedly prevented Security Council briefings by Baghdad-based UN officials. This changed somewhat from 2001 onwards because the Council became aware of the benefit of such briefings and began to reject the objections of the two governments.

“The Security Council remains seized of the matter” was a frequently used phrase indicating that the Secretary General had to await further instructions from the Council before being allowed to proceed with Iraq-related initiatives. Ever since his bold visit to Baghdad in February 1998, Secretary General Kofi Annan was prepared to maintain a dialogue with the Iraqi authorities to seek solutions to resolve the crisis. Since the Council decided to be ‘seized of the matter’, he could not play the very role the UN Charta expected of him.

Even though the Security Council did not insist on regular reporting on the human condition or on visiting, briefing and dialogue as tools for their oversight, the Council was aware of the conditions in Iraq as the rhetoric of the debates before, during and after the 1998-2000 period shows. China, France and Russia, the P-3 group with diplomatic representations in Iraq, provided the Council at all times with relevant information. The UN system, on the other hand, well placed to carry out socio-economic and humanitarian analyses, was discouraged to do so and in any case largely sidelined.

During the years of economic sanctions, the UN Security Council resembled a tool box of the powers of the day. The UN Security Council again and again gave in to heavy pressure from the US and UK governments whether it was in the formulation of vital resolutions, the allocation of resources, the improvements in sanctions regulations or conflict resolving initiatives. Security Council oversight at all times was seriously flawed resulting in harm for the Iraqi people and increasingly violated UN Charter law and international conventions.

## B) Two additional comments

### Monocausal blaming

1) *For those ideologically tainted, it was politically expedient to argue monocausally. For the Iraqi government this meant to put all the blame for the conditions in Iraq on the US and UK. The governments in Washington and London, on the other hand argued that Iraqis would not suffer were it not for the government of Saddam Hussein.*

*Accountability for what happened and is happening in Iraq must mean to make a clear distinction between the ‘accounts’ of the Government (s) of Iraq and the Governments of the US and UK as well as others. To mix up the two or forget one can not do justice to Iraq and the Iraqis.*

### Security Council responsibility – legal and moral burdens of guilt

2) *As the UN Security Council had the knowledge of the negative impact of its decisions on the human condition in Iraq, the responsibility for death and destitution as a result of international Iraq policy falls not just on the shoulders of the US and UK governments, even though they are the two main perpetrators, but on the Security Council as a whole. As the UN Security Council as a council can not legally be held responsible under prevailing international law, the collective burden of guilt remains just a moral one.*

## **C. Results and conclusions**

### **Results**

There was an additive physical and mental impact on the Iraqi people during almost 13 years of sanctions. Slightly more resources in the course of time did not mean a turn around in the human condition.

To measure this additive effect of a flawed UN Security Council sanctions policy will remain the challenge of future research. There will be differences among analysts in estimating the human cost. Given the lack of rigorously collected data this does not surprise. What can be said already without hesitation, however, is that the human cost of this flawed policy was high.

To illustrate:

#### **1) Child malnutrition**

Prior to 1990 chronic and acute malnutrition rates in Iraq were modest and similar to those of a well-nourished population. The sharp increase in malnutrition between 1991 and 96 leveled off at moderately high levels as of 1997, the beginning of the oil-for-food programme. During 1998-2000, one out of five children under five in central and southern Iraq was chronically malnourished.

#### **2) Child mortality**

Mortality of children under five in central and southern Iraq rose more than two fold during and after the 1991 Gulf war. Instead of declining after the 1997 introduction of the oil-for-food



programme, it plateaued at unprecedented high levels and in 1998-2000 was between 100 and 120 death/1000.

### **3) Adult literacy**

Limited studies indicate that literacy among adults declined significantly during 1990-2003.

### **4) Primary and secondary school enrolment**

The percentage of children attending primary schools declined throughout the period 1990-2003. Nearly twice as many girls than boys dropped out of secondary school.

## **Conclusions**

The United Nations Security Council, even though it violated its oversight mandate throughout the period of the oil-for-food period, did have the awareness of the human conditions in Iraq and therefore had policy options and choices of sanctions implementation and management.

It chose to opt for a hardliner approach rather than for humane alternatives. The data presented on the following pages outlines what the Council collectively knew and what the Council actually did or did not do at the expense of the Iraqi people:

## Impact of Sanctions and Humanitarian Exemption on Iraq’s Civil Society

<u>A. Institutional Awareness</u>	<u>B. Institutional Reaction</u>
<b><i>I. Preparations for Sanctions and Humanitarian Exemption</i></b>	
<p>UN Security Council resolutions require interpretable <i>measurable objectives</i> for managing economic sanction and humanitarian exemption.</p> <p><i>Pre-sanctions assessment</i> Iraq. of socio-economic conditions.</p>	<p>UN Security Council Iraq sanctions resolutions were vague and with no detailed sanctions and humanitarian exemption objectives.</p> <p>No pre-sanctions assessment for Iraq</p>
<b><i>II. Implementation of Sanctions and Humanitarian Exemption</i></b>	
<p>Sanctions <i>strategy</i>; definitions of purposes, targets and roles; action plan for all UN sanctions units.</p> <p>Sanctions <i>timeframe</i> and provisions for termination or renewal.</p>	<p>Sanctions strategy for Iraq limited to linkage between disarmament and comprehensive economic sanctions. There were definitions of purposes, targets and roles, yet no integrated UN action plan.</p> <p>The sanctions timeframe for Iraq was open-ended as were provisions for termination, suspension or renewal.</p>

Security Council <i>oversight</i> mandate (ongoing monitoring) of sanctions and humanitarian exemption.	No continuous and comprehensive Security Council Iraq oversight.
<i>Consultative mechanisms</i> between Security Council and UN sanctions units; between sanctions units and with NGOs.	Ad hoc consultations only between Security Council and UN sanctions units; no consultations between sanctions units and only sporadic consultations between Security Council and non-UN entities.
UN <i>sanctions coordinator</i> .	No sanctions coordinator for Iraq.
UN <i>sanctions ombudsperson</i> .	No sanctions ombudsperson for Iraq.
Standardized <i>Terms of Reference</i> for Security Council Sanctions Committees.	Iraq Sanctions Committee had evolving terms of reference.
Regular <i>Reviews</i> between Security Council and targeted party.	Intermittent contact only between Security Council and Government of Iraq.
Standard <i>reporting</i> for Security Council and Secretariat.	No standard format for reviews of humanitarian situation in Iraq; standard format on Oil-for-Food Programme only.
Regular (continuous) Security Council <i>Assessments</i> of impact of sanctions on targeted country.	No regular sanctions impact assessments for Iraq.
Special humanitarian exemption measures for <i>vulnerable</i> groups.	Special measures for targeted nutrition only.
Provision of <i>special funding</i> for servicing and supporting humanitarian exemptions.	No special funding; humanitarian exemption and overheads financed entirely by Iraq.

<p><i>Training and institution building</i> for the management of targeted sanctions and humanitarian exemptions.</p> <p>Public <i>communications</i> on substantive issues of sanctions and humanitarian exemptions.</p>	<p>Limited training and UN institution-building for implementation of comprehensive economic sanctions and humanitarian exemption.</p> <p>Ad hoc interaction with media only.</p>
<p><b><i>III. Post-Sanctions and Post-Humanitarian Exemption</i></b></p>	
<p><i>Final Assessment</i> of sanctions and humanitarian exemption programmes.</p>	<p>No final assessments for Iraq available.</p>
<p><i>Feedback</i> of lessons- learnt from sanctions and humanitarian exemptions methodologies.</p>	<p>No lessons learnt for Iraq identified yet.</p>
<p>International support for <i>national rehabilitation and nation-building</i>.</p>	<p>Security conditions in 2004/05 in Iraq do not yet permit international support for national rehabilitation and nation-building.</p>

## D. Annexes 1 to 9

### Annex 1

#### **Iraq's No-Fly Zones: US/UK Air Strikes 28 December 1998 – 31 December 1999**


<i>Total number of air strikes: (days)</i>	132	<i>Total number of air strikes with civilian casualties. (days)</i>	56
<i>No. civilian deaths:</i>	144	<i>No. civilian injuries:</i>	446
<i>Northern No-fly zone:</i>	57	<i>Northern No-fly zone:</i>	133
<i>Southern No-fly zone:</i>	87	<i>Southern No-fly zone:</i>	313

***Source***

Confidential report prepared by UNOCHI/Baghdad entitled *Air Strikes in Iraq/Reported Civilian Casualties and Damages*, 28 December 1998 - 31 December 1999.

## Annex 2

### Data on OFF Programme for Phase V




*Source*

Secretary General's 180-day reports on the Oil for Food Programme, phases V-VI.

### Annex 3

## Oil-for-Food Programme: Planned Budgets, Actual Revenues and Goods Arrived (Phases I to XIII) 1996-2003



*Source*


Secretary General's 180-day reports on the Oil for Food Programme, phases I-XIII.

*Notes*

\*Figures for the value of goods arrived in phases I-III are not available. The figure stated is the average over phases I-III, based on the cumulative value of goods arrived at the end of phase III.

## Annex 4


### **Humanitarian Supplies for Iraq: Causes of Delayed Distribution**





## Annex 5

### Oil Revenues and Oil Exports




*Source*

Office of the Iraq Program “Basic Figures” on the Oil for Food Program  
 (<http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/basicfigures.html>)

## Annex 6

### Compensation Payments to UNCC and Humanitarian Supplies Arrived



*Source*


Secretary General's 180-day reports on the Oil for Food Programme, phases III-XIII

*Notes*

No data are available for the amount of goods arrived per phase before phase III.

## Annex 7

### Balance of Holds in Phases V through XIII (\$US millions)



*Source*

Secretary General's 180-day reports on the Oil for Food Programme, phases IV-XIII.

*Notes*

No data are available on holds before phase V. Data for phase V refers to contracts from phases IV and V only and might therefore understate the total number of holds. Also, the definition of holds is different in phase XIII.


## Annex 8

### The main UN Entities Involved in the Implementation of Sanctions Against Iraq

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>UNIKOM</b> The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (1991) → monitoring of the demilitarized zones</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>UNSCOM</b> The United Nations Special Commission (1991) followed by:</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>IAEA</b> The International Atomic Energy Agency (1991) → verification and destruction of Iraq's WMD (nuclear)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>UNMOVIC</b> The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (1999) → verification and destruction of Iraq's WMD (chemical &amp; biological)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>UNCC</b> The United Nations Compensation Commission (1992) → claims – Iraq's invasion into Kuwait</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>UNGCI</b> The United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq (1991) → protecting UN personnel, assets and operations</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>UNOHCI &amp; OIP</b> The United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq &amp; (UN) Office of the Iraq Programme (1996) → implementation Oil-for-Food Programme</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Special Rapporteur of the (UN) Commission on Human Rights</b> (1991) → monitoring human rights in Iraq</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>UNHCR</b> The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees → Iraq-based refugees</p>

## Annex 9

### Contracts Approved and Humanitarian Revenue per Phase



*Source*

Secretary General's 180-day reports on the Oil for Food Programme, phases VII-XIII.

*Notes*

No data are available on the value of contracts approved before phase VII.