The Challenge
Posed by India and Pakistan
By David
Krieger
"Today the flames of the nuclear fire are all
over. I am thankful to God...
that we have jumped into these flames."
- Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
"I cannot believe that we are about to start the
21st century by having the Indian subcontinent repeat the
mistakes of the 20th century, when we know it is not
necessary to peace, to security, to prosperity, to
national greatness, or to personal fulfilment."
- U.S. President Bill Clinton
In a three week period, both India and Pakistan have
conducted nuclear tests, thus becoming new members of the
nuclear weapons club. Their tests have brought forth broad,
even jubilant, support among the Indian and Pakistani
people. Following the Pakistani tests, one Pakistani clerk
effused, "Pakistan is now a superpower."
It is not surprising that India and Pakistan would view
nuclear weapons as a path to international security and
prestige. The five original members of the nuclear weapons
club -- the U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China -- have
treated their possession of nuclear weapons this way for
decades.
The major problem is not that India and Pakistan have
conducted nuclear tests. It is that they, like the other
members of the nuclear weapons club, have indicated by their
tests that they now choose to rely upon nuclear weapons to
maintain their national security.
The Indians and Pakistanis are doing no more -- in fact,
much less -- than the United States and the former Soviet
Union did throughout the Cold War in relying upon their
nuclear arsenals for deterrence. The policy of nuclear
deterrence -- despite the end of the Cold War and ostensibly
friendly relations -- continues to be the official policy of
the U.S. and Russia, as it is of the other nations in the
nuclear weapons club.
The nuclear weapons states claim that there has been no
nuclear war because of their nuclear weapons rather than in
spite of them. If deterrence is a viable theory, however,
there should be no problem with it being adopted by all
states, including India and Pakistan.
The truth is that deterrence is only a theory, and not
one that is believed to work universally. If deterrence were
in fact considered reliable, nuclear weapons proliferation
should in theory be encouraged rather than opposed.
I doubt if anyone believes that the Indian subcontinent
is safer now that India and Pakistan have demonstrated their
nuclear weapons capabilities. It is generally and rightly
recognized that the region has become far more dangerous
with this new capacity for nuclear annihilation.
Imagine, for example, that the Indians decided to respond
to the Pakistani threat by a pre-emptive first-strike to
destroy Pakistanís nuclear weapons and missile
delivery systems. Should the Indians fail, the Pakistanis
might respond with a nuclear attack. Even the fear of such
pre-emptive action by the Indians might lead the Pakistanis
to themselves launch a pre-emptive first-strike against
India. There are many other possible scenarios that might
lead to nuclear war.
Just as the problem is not the nuclear weapons tests, but
the policies that they represent, the danger is not limited
to South Asia. By the Indian and Pakistani tests, we are
reminded of the danger that exists from all nuclear weapons
in the world -- those in the hands of all nuclear weapons
states. We are also reminded that nuclear weapons
proliferation remains a seriouus threat to regional and
global stability.
There are not responsible and irresponsible nuclear
weapons states. All are irresponsible because they base
their national security on weapons which have the capacity
to murder millions of innocent people.
As a worst case scenario, and one that has been long
understood, a large-scale nuclear exchange between the
United States and Russia could result in ending human
civilization, such as it is, and destroying the human
species and most life on earth. Being willing to run this
risk does not demonstrate a high level of responsibility --
quite the opposite.
The choice before us is whether to deal with India and
Pakistan as an isolated regional problem, or whether to view
their nuclear tests as a wake-up call to commence
international negotiations to achieve a treaty to eliminate
all nuclear weapons in the world.
The first option is not viable. India and Pakistan will
not reverse their course unless the other nuclear weapons
states clearly demonstrate their commitment to achieving a
world free of nuclear weapons. Following its tests, India
issued a statement appealing for such a commitment in the
form of a Nuclear Weapons Convention: "India calls on all
nuclear weapons states and indeed the international
community to join with it in opening early negotiations for
a Nuclear Weapons Convention so that these weapons can be
dealt with in a global, nondiscriminatory framework as other
weapons of mass destruction have been, through the
Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention."
I have long maintained that a world with a small number
of nuclear "haves" and a much larger number of nuclear
"have-nots" is unstable and unrealistic. This instability
has begun to manifest itself in a detrimental way through
nuclear proliferation. We will continue in this direction
unless the course is reversed by serious negotiations among
the nuclear weapons states to eliminate all nuclear weapons
in the world.
The United States is capable of providing the leadership
to attain a world free of nuclear weapons. The U.S.,
however, has shown no inclination to assert this leadership.
In fact, U.S. policies under the current administration have
all been directed toward maintaining the existing structure
of nuclear "haves" and "have-nots". This must change. It is
our best hope for preventing a nuclear holocaust in the 21st
century.
One other possibility exists. It is for other nations of
the world, without the U.S. but including other nuclear
weapons states, to move forward on a treaty banning nuclear
weapons in the way that the treaty to ban landmines was
created without U.S. participation. Unless the U.S. steps
forward as a leader on this issue, I would hope that other
nations will proceed without us.
At the edge of a new millennium, the nation state system
is challenged on many fronts to solve global environmental
and security problems. The greatest of these challenges is
posed by weapons of manís own creation, the most
dangerous of which are nuclear weapons capable of destroying
humankind. Will we meet this challenge? Are there leaders
among us capable of picking up where Gorbachev left off that
can lead the world to end the nuclear weapons era?
Such leaders will have to pierce the illusions of
security that have been created to manipulate the people,
now including the people of India and Pakistan, into
believing that nuclear weapons should be a source of
national pride. Nuclear weapons are quite simply weapons of
mass destruction, meaning mass murder, and should be viewed
as a national disgrace. But where are the leaders to say
this?
As in all great issues of social change, the leadership
for a nuclear weapons free world will have to arise from the
people. This grassroots leadership is already emerging from
Abolition 2000, a global network working to eliminate
nuclear weapons, which is now composed of nearly 1100
citizen action groups from around the world.
The challenge posed to the world by the two new members
of the nuclear weapons club is nothing less than creating a
world free of nuclear weapons. It is a challenge of finding
new means of achieving security and settling our differences
without resorting to weapons of mass destruction.
______________________________
David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation. He may be reached at 1187 Coast Village Road,
Suite 123, Santa Barbara CA 93108, email:
wagingpeace@napf.org.
NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUNDATION
International contact for Abolition 2000
a Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons
1187 Coast Village Road, Box 123
Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794
Phone (805) 965-3443 * Fax (805) 568-0466
e- mailto:wagingpeace@napf.org
URL http://www.wagingpeace.org
URL http://www.napf.org/abolition2000
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