Mobutu: When
a Dictator Dies
By JONATHAN POWER
LONDON-- Most of the world will cheer when the grand
dictator of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, dies. "The evil that
men do lives after them, the good is oft interred with their
bones," said Mark Anthony as he buried Caesar. We too will
doubtless happily forget that it was strongman Mobutu that
bound the factionist, disintegrating, post- colonial Congo
back together, changed its name and made its destiny so
important to Cold War-ridden Africa that the Soviet Union,
France and the U.S. competed for his favors. Instead we will
remember that it was Mobutu who robbed his country blind,
who pilfered and wasted away the enormous potential wealth
of this country, a country that if it had been properly
managed would be as prosperous as perhaps Malaysia or
Thailand or, at least, the Philippines today.
For every dictator in the world who did his country
economic good, Pinochet in Chile, Park in South Korea, there
are a dozen who did it harm, living out their fantasies,
indulging their own greed and brooking no dissent. Thus the
memories of evil doth live on and so they should.
About ten years ago Samuel Huntington, now famous for his
controversial new work "The Clash of Civilizations," wrote
an interesting article in Harvard University's
"International Security." He analyzed the impact of the
deaths of 22 dictators who had died a natural death, not as
a result of revolution or coup d'etat. Out of the corner of
my eye I have been watching this scene ever since and not
much, i think, has changed.
Within four years of the leader's death there were coups
or attempted coups in 10 cases: Bhutan, Haiti, Kenya,
Panama, China, Egypt (after Gamal Nasser), the Dominican
Republic, Guinea, South Korea and Portugal. There was severe
turbulence in nine countries: Kenya, Kuwait, Nepal, Egypt
(after Anwar Sadat), Yugoslavia, the Dominican Republic,
South Korea, Portugal and Spain. There was guerrilla
terrorism in eight cases: Saudi Arabia, Haiti, Panama,
China, Egypt, Yugoslavia, the Dominican Republic and Spain.
And there was revolution in Portugal.
What then, if any, are the determining influences on the
degree of upheaval? The following stand out:
* If there was major instability after a leader died
there had usually been serious unrest before. Conversely, a
quiet pre-death situation usually meant a quiet transition
after.
* The longer a leader had been in power the more
post-death instability there was--as in Portugal, Spain and
the Dominican Republic.
* Political turbulence was more likely after a dictator's
death if social organizations had been allowed some
autonomy. In South Korea, Spain, Portugal, Egypt and the
Dominican Republic, labour unions, political parties,
churches, cooperatives and universities were given some
freedom.
On this score certainly Zaire has all of the ingredients
of upheaval. So do Indonesia, Burma, Morocco and Syria.
But, despite the obvious good sense of much of
Huntington's analysis, extrapolating from present to future
is never foolproof. When he wrote this he predicted upheaval
in Tunisia after the death of the then enfeebled 82-year-old
President Habib Bourguiba, who when once asked by a reporter
about the nature of the Tunisian political system replied
"What system? I am the system." Huntington, observing that
Tunisia was the Arab country with the most moderate stance
toward Israel, feared that a new revolutionary government
would work with neighbouring radical Libya to undermine
Western interests by provoking Egypt and other nearby
pro-western states. But what happened? In his dotage
Bourguiba was gently elbowed aside and there was barely a
murmur. Tunisia remains totalitarian and, in its alignments,
pretty much as it was.
Nevertheless, despite the element of unpredictability in
any forecasting exercise, it is fair to conclude that the
longer dictators stay in power (and hence more "stable"
their regimes appear to be) the more likely it is that a
country will become unstable if the leader dies in office.
The evidence also suggests that the longer they stay in
power the more likelihood there is of outbreaks of
instability during their tenure. Often this can so shake the
regime that the leader is driven from office, as happened
with Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia or the Shah of
Iran.
From this analysis Huntington drew four conclusions: U.S.
interests are more likely to be hurt if pro-American leaders
are overthrown. They are less likely to be hurt if they die
naturally in office. They are at least likely to be hurt if
they die before decades of endurance by their subjects wears
out their welcome. American interests will therefore be best
served if long-time dictators die a natural death, soon.
As much as one can judge it from this distance this seems
to be exactly how Washington--and Paris--are viewing
Mobutu's illness. They don't want to see the successful
rebellion in the eastern provinces spread its victories all
the way to the capital, Kinshasa, in the west. They don't
want persons unknown to stage a coup in the capital. They
just want Mobutu to hurry up and die in his hospital bed or
his villa in the south of France and for someone known, safe
and predictable to put the country back together and unlock
its fabulous potential.
March 19, 1997,
LONDON
Copyright © 1997 By JONATHAN POWER
Note: I can be reached by phone +44 385 351172
and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
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