Live and Let
Live With the
"Rogue" Nations
By JONATHAN POWER
LONDON-- Perhaps there is an important political moral in
the tale of the American baloonist, Steve Fossett, who
earlier this week had to cut short his attempt to fly around
the world, running out of fuel over India after being forced
to detour Libyan airspace--that attempts to isolate
so-called "rogue-regimes" can, if allowed to fester
unresolved for too long, curdle all sense of proportion, by
both perpetrator and object alike. If the Libyan regime has
looked at this high flying baloon with ridiculously sour
eyes then the U.S. and its western allies are also at fault
for seeing Libya and other rogue states, Iran, Cuba, North
Korea and Iraq as irredeemably outcast, not as manageable
problems but as all-consuming threats.
This is really to overdo it. All are basket-case
economies. All are diplomatically isolated. All are bordered
by states possessing great military potential. As the editor
of Foreign Policy, Charles Maynes, put it recently, "Even if
they were to acquire weapons of mass destruction these
states could not pose an existential threat to the U.S. They
might over the course of several years acquire the power to
strike back at the U.S. heartland in a limited way, but it
would be at the price of their own extinction."
These states, badly mistaken and misgoverned though they
are in many ways, are neither crazy nor suicidal. They are
cornered and feel, rightly or wrongly, paranoid about
American power. In fact the U.S. has attempted at one time
or another to overthrow their regimes.
The reality is that Tehran's threat to American interests
is very much a limited one. Militant Shi'ite Islam has not
become, despite all the shouting, a model for other Muslims
and Iran's military prowess is exaggerated. By focussing so
tightly on Iran's supposed religious and military muscle
Washington has obscured the domestic and political failings
of the Islamic Republic. There is, in reality, a great
degree of internal opposition to the regime, even among
clerics, but Washington's embargo and policy of isolation
allows the ruling group to blame this for their failings and
to portray their predicament as a cultural clash between the
Christian West and Islam.
Under the Clinton Administration the confrontation has
been ratcheted up way beyond what it was before, provoking
its western allies to be publically critical. It is not to
be surprised at. Little concrete evidence has emerged to
support the U.S. allegation that Iran is trying to build
nuclear weapons. Indeed, the director-general of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, Hans Blix, has pointed
out that he has no difficulties with Iran in implementing
safeguard agreements. Neither is Iran possessor of a great
military machine. Its military is much inferior to Iraq's,
despite the drubbing the latter took in the Gulf War.
It would be far more productive if the U.S. would do as
it has done with North Korea over nuclear arms
development--reverse engines from hostile confrontation and
engage its antagonist in an effort to assimilate Iran into
the norm of reasonable behaviour.
This was ex-President Jimmy Carter's great contribution
to the North Korean nuclear stand-off three years ago. Just
when President Clinton was about to launch a full-scale
confrontation with Pyongyang over its apparent nuclear bomb
program, egged on by the likes of former National Security
Adviser Brent Scowcroft and ex-CIA Director Robert Gates
telling him to hurry up and bomb the North Korean
reprocessing plant, Carter went to North Korea, engaged the
leadership in negotiations and won a deal to freeze all
nuclear developments, a deal still satisfactorily being
implemented.
But, unwisely, the Clinton Administration has refused to
learn from its own lessons and extend this conciliatory
diplomacy into other areas of its fraught relationship with
North Korea. It continues to maintain an array of
anachronistic sanctions designed during the Cold War to
isolate Pyongyang, even to the point of not fulfilling some
of the commitments made in the nuclear freeze deal.
Washington--and this time also its allies in Europe, Canada
and Japan--appear to take insufficient account of the
changes in North Korean behaviour since the Cold War years,
(partly forced on it by the cut-off in Soviet and Chinese
food and petroleum lifelines). They take too little account
of North Korea's efforts to engage in a policy of economic
liberalization that will enable it to evolve in a Chinese
direction of freedom in economic matters if not in
political. And it appears they take not enough serious
account of North Korean statements that indicate that the
leadership no longer opposes the presence of U.S. forces in
South Korea.
The present Western policy of waiting for North Korea's
regime to collapse is both long-winded and unnecessary. A
non-nuclear North Korea that ended its military
confrontation with the South and is liberalizing its economy
should be enough to build a live and let live
relationship.
Endless confrontation is endlessly counterproductive
(what Washington, paradoxically, has decided with what is
arguably the greatest "rogue" state of them all, Syria).
There is no evidence that isolating or cornering a state
succeeds in moderating its behavior. Engagement is the only
way, short of war, to produce results that move nations out
of their entrenched positions--and, as Mr. Fossett would
doubtless remind us, keeps the balloons flying in the
fastest direction.
January 22,
1997, LONDON
Copyright © 1997 By JONATHAN POWER
Note: I can be reached by phone +44 385 351172
and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
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