Sweden
in the militarisation of
the
European Union
PressInfo #
109
December
12, 2000
By Jan Oberg, TFF
director
Many changes in
Sweden's identity
Interesting things are happening in Sweden. On
November 28, 2000, the Swedish prime minister Goran
Persson told Financial Times that Sweden is no longer a
neutral country but that it remains militarily
alliance-free. That was two weeks before the Swedish
Parliament will focus a debate on the issue (December
13). The Social Democratic party program is under
revision. Sweden shall no longer be "non-aligned in peace
in order to be (able to be) neutral in war." A main
argument is that with the end of the two-bloc Cold War
there is nobody to stand "neutral" between and no longer
any reason to stand neutral. Only, Sweden will not
formally join an alliance and be obliged to come to the
rescue should another alliance member be attacked - - see
Romano Prodi's argument in TFF PressInfo 108.
In the full glare of publicity the Chief of Defence
Johan Hederstedt was rebuked in a press release (November
22, 2000) by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh,
and Minister of Defence Bjoern von Sydow for demanding
clearer directives on Sweden's military role in the EU
and possible consequences of participating in future EU
operations.
It is quite understandable that the Chief of Defence,
an ardent advocate of the internationalisation of the
Swedish military, wants clarity to emerge as to what the
political criteria, the guidelines and the leadership is
regarding the fundamental question: at what point does
crisis-management, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement
turn into warfare? After all, war is no humpty-dumpty
activity.
The Swedish defence minister is on record saying that
there are no defined limits as to where the EU Rapid
Reaction Force can intervene. One must therefore assume
that it can and might, in principle, intervene in any
conflict area where the EU deems it important.
Humpty Dumptying
for peace - - and backing into NATO?
The Swedish government's position is that the new
machinery of the EU is to take care of the whole scale of
conflict-prevention, crisis management and
peace-building. Participating in the EU's military
structure does not mean that Sweden gives up military
alliance-freedom. In the mentioned press release the two
ministers maintain that "We decide ourselves, each time,
whether we want to participate and in which way. A UN
mandate will be require to conduct military
peace-enforcing operations. That implies, among other
things, that all big powers are standing behind the
operation. The EU co-operation applies to
crisis-management, not mutual security guarantees and
territorial defence." [My translation].
In May this year an opinion poll showed that 47 per
cent of the Swedes are against Sweden seeking formal
membership of NATO. Only 19 per cent were in favour. The
government insists, therefore, that Sweden is not on its
way to become a member of NATO and that it will remain
alliance-free.
Why should Sweden seek formal NATO membership when
nothing prevents it, in its role as declared
alliance-free, from endorsing NATO's bombings, being a
member of PfP, standing under NATO/KFOR command in
Kosovo, participating in NATO and EU common
military-industrial projects and exercises and now
participating in EU militarisation, a cornerstone of
which is EU-NATO co-ordination and inter-operability?
At some point in the future, don't be surprised if you
hear the following words uttered by a Swedish politician:
"Since we have done all these things and loyally helped
NATO implement its policies, it is only natural that we
also want to get access to the rooms where the plans are
drawn up and decisions made, so we can have a say in
shaping those policies. After all, we may put Swedish
lives at risk." In other words, Sweden may be backing
slowly but surely into NATO.
It must also strike the reader that the Swedish
government emphasises the need for a UN mandate for
military peace-enforcing operations. It did not make that
point during NATO's bombing last year. Does it mean that
Sweden may endorse other types of military actions taken
around the world by the EU without UN mandate? And why is
a similar provision not stated in EU treaties and
documents - - some actually talk about autonomous EU
operations. With the big power ambitions now pervading
all of the EU, it is hardly credible that it would ask
"permission" from the UN in all cases. Indeed, much of
the debate about intervention argues that countries shall
not be prevented from intervening because the Security
Council can not agree to give the green light.
The only fundamental difference of opinion between
Sweden and NATO/EU is that Sweden, admirably, remains in
the forefront of the struggle to abolish nuclear weapons.
For Sweden to join may be a little more difficult because
it would mean endorsing NATO's nuclear doctrine and
nuclear war planning.
To put it crudely, much of the official argument looks
like humpty-dumpty logic. One day the words may mean
something Sweden itself did not want them to mean?
Security politics
is not a Swedish smorgasbord
Imagine that Sweden participates with a number of
other states in a future EU military enforcement
operation somewhere and the country/party against which
it is directed takes up arms against it. If Swedish
troops are attacked they must be able to defend
themselves, of course, but would Sweden not legitimately
expect that the other EU countries would come to their
rescue? Would Sweden be able politically to decide to
withdraw should another EU country's troops be attacked
in the same operation - - a situation which means
international war, whether declared or not?
Or, if Swedish soldiers are killed in an operation far
away, how would the government balance between a
presumably very strong home opinion against continued
engagement and the solidarity with those it started out
the mission with? In short, what is a country like Sweden
a) able, b) prepared and c) willing to do, d) where and
e) for what causes? And f) where are the limits? To say
that that will be decided freely on a case-by-case base
could turn out to be a recipe for unpleasant surprises
and nasty dilemmas.
EU's own treaties stipulate that the organisation aims
not only to conduct a common foreign and security policy
but also, later on, to operate a common defence policy.
Is it really a realistic assumption that single members
will have the de facto freedom to pick and choose, as if
it were a Swedish 'smorgasbord,' the day larger EU
countries want to do peace their way and the going gets
rough and EU soldiers are put in harms way?
Are we to believe that Sweden would undermine the
credibility of the EU and NATO in a tense situation or in
the middle of an operation and say: 'No, we do not agree
with you, we stay at home. You can go!' or 'Now it's a
bit too tough for us, so we withdraw now and leave it to
you guys to finish the job.' Sweden may say that it does
not participate in any alliance and thus does not have to
observe mutually binding obligations. But there is
something called political signals, credibility,
non-binding duties and moral obligations.
Incrementalism is an important concept here. What in
the EU starts out as a small military force and as
interim committees one day become a bigger force and
permanent bodies. An intervention for perceived
humanitarian or peace-keeping may develop into a
peace-enforcing mission and then into full-scale war.
These processes have an "Eigendynamik" for which reason
irreversibility is another important concept in
everything related to the EU: once you are there, don't
think of leaving or playing your own tune!
Incrementalism and irreversibility are also built into
military operations. What started out as a few days
bombing enterprise last year became a 78 days campaign
threatening to end up in a ground war involving hundreds
of thousands of troops for months. Tony Blair who
advocated ground invasion said it very clearly afterwards
on BBC that "the bottom line was that we could not loose,
we could not loose." Just imagine the risk to the
alliance's credibility, even its existence, had one of
the countries in the bombing coalition dropped out. The
same psychology will apply the day the EU intervenes as
the EU. And the EU is not 'only' a military alliance, it
is the basic structure of all of Europe covering ever
greater segments of our lives here. So even more will be
at stake in a way.
Could neutrality be
re-defined and not abolished?
The - - not very intellectual - - explanation for
dropping neutrality is that there are no two blocs to be
neutral between. It does not seem important to the
defence intellectuals and the decision-makers to explore
whether there could be new and different ways to be
neutral and whether you can be neutral not between two
but among many.
Neutrality has become a bad word, even when it means
staying out of war. Instead, side-taking, bravery, moral
commitment, conflict-management and humanitarian
intervention are the words of the day - - all
increasingly legitimating military means in violation
even of international law, if necessary, and of the norms
of the UN Charter.
For sheer heuristic purposes, let's try this
re-definition of neutrality - - knowing well that this
amounts to swearing in the church:
"A post-Cold war neutral country conducts a
policy and is perceived by others as an actor
committed to global, or otherwise higher, norms and
values such as the UN norm of "peace by peaceful
means" and has taken preparatory steps to implement
that policy when conflicts or other security
challenges emerge.
The neutral position implies a principled, active
preparation in peace-time to refrain from violent
activity in somebody else's conflict, violence, war or
intervention and permits the neutral actor to offer
its services to conflicting parties in a norm-based,
impartial and problem-solving manner at the earliest
possible stage of the conflict.
Thus, neutrality furthers violence-prevention and
-reduction and promotes the keeping and (re)building
of peace, security and stability, both at home and
abroad.
The neutral actor, however, is never neutral
vis-a-vis violence but uses its influence to identify
other means to approach a solution to conflict and
persuade others to use them."
In short, neutrality could be redefined and related to
the increasing need for early diagnosis,
violence-preventive diplomacy and impartial mediation in
conflicts. Countries and people in conflict may turn to
neutrals because they know they have no other motives but
to help mitigate and solve the issue with as little
violence as possible, i.e. at an early stage and in fair
co-operation with all sides. Whether or not we call them
neutral, countries and other actors with a philosophy
like this are dearly needed in the present and future
world system.
The changing role
of the Nordic countries
Much of this is fully compatible with what defines the
Nordic countries historically and the post-1945 image of
them abroad, not the least in the Global South. That's
what also made them ideal for UN missions. However, over
the last decade or so, Nordic governments have chosen - -
without consulting their citizens - - to substitute these
classical dimensions of their policies and Nordic
co-ordination with an almost blind
"internationalisation," EU-isation and Americanisation of
their defence and security policies. Denmark last year
carried it as far as actually bombing over Yugoslavia
(and its defence minister, Hans Haekkerup, has just been
rewarded through his appointment as new Head of the UN
mission in Kosovo, UNMIK).
The image of the Nordic countries would have made them
ideal as civilian mediators and negotiation facilitators
all through the 1990s in, say, various parts of former
Yugoslavia, Kosovo in particular. None of them took an
independent mediation initiative, they co-ordinated
instead with the big ones in the EU (common policy) and
with the U.S. and NATO and are now peace-keepers in areas
where there is no peace and where there would hardly have
been wars had the international community taken wiser
steps earlier to prevent violence and address issues of
substance.
In short, the EU profile is about one voice, one
policy and one shared responsibility behind the policies
of the stronger few. When it really doesn't work out well
- - as it didn't in ex-Yugoslavia - - the members are
also together in one Single Mistake. That prevents
democratic debate and open self-criticism. Why does it
seem so difficult to so many to imagine a new Europe that
would promote unity in diversity rather than unity in
uniformity? Peace generally comes closer to the former
than to the latter. (More about that in the forthcoming
PressInfo 110).
The Sweden that
acquiesce
During the last 10-15 years Sweden has been less and
less willing to promote its own analyses and views and
has, incrementally, adapted to EU and NATO policies in
numerous fields. Independent views which are different
from those of the EU and NATO are just a nuisance since
these organisations do not allow themselves the luxury of
more than one common policy which happens to be
compatible or identical with under the stronger
player(s). Thus, for instance, Sweden could not muster a
single critical remark about NATO's operation over
Yugoslavia last year.
Over the last four years, the Swedish government - -
probably as the only one in the world - - has produced
three comprehensive and excellent analyses on conflict
prevention, preventive diplomacy and non-military
conflict-management, including also a long series of
measures that must be given priority and implemented
sooner rather than later in these fields. The most recent
is dated October 19 and entitled "To prevent armed
conflict."
Perhaps it is history's irony that Sweden will chair
the EU from January 1, 2001 and by coincidence lead the
EU into militarisation and - - willingly or not - -
integrate it more closely with NATO and the U.S. And
although it has been the driving force in establishing
the civilian crisis management unit in the EU, that is
clearly a stepchild in the structure, as we have shown in
PressInfo 108.
The public debate in Sweden about such fundamentals is
scant and it is no wonder that the world around has not
grasped the extent to which Sweden has changed since,
say, the days of Olof Palme. Now, in contrast, Sweden has
lost its creative grasp on global concerns and its
solidarity with the disadvantaged and finds security in
following the herd.
© TFF 2000
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