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Brrainstorm on the Iraq Crisis (part A):
Diagnosis


TFF PressInfo 32

Go to part B

Dear Selected TFF PressInfo Recipient,

It's a pleasure for us to send you this PressInfo about the Iraq crisis.

During the build-up of the Iraq crisis, TFF initiated an international e-mail brainstorm. We asked some 150 peace researchers and conflict-resolution practitioners around the world to respond, within four days, to the following six questions:

1) WHAT IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CONFLICT?

2) WHY ARE WE ONCE AGAIN WITNESSING A MASSIVE MILITARY PROJECT THAT MEETS LITTLE DEBATE?

3) WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE UP TILL NOW - MID-FEBRUARY 98 - AND BY WHOM, TO PREVENT IT?

4)WHAT CAN STILL BE DONE TO PREVENT WAR AND BY WHOM?

5) WHAT IS THE BEST WAY TO CREATE A DEBATE AFTER A NEW WAR THAT WILL FOCUS ON ALTERNATIVES?

6) ARE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS?

Not all, of course, were able to respond within this short notice, but those who did provided us with so many perspectives and proposals - some writing several pages. We made a selection and edited it all in two PressInfos for you to reflect on - as another TFF service for peace. This PressInfo contains the answers to the first three questions. No 33, the latter three.

"What is immediately evident," says TFF director Jan Oberg, "is that there is so much more to say about the diagnosis and possible conflict-resolution than you experienced in the general media coverage. Second, the experts are much more self-critical about the United States and Western policies; they clearly see that we are part - historically - of the problem and not the solution. Third, we must be painfully aware that the conflict is by no means solved."

So, we advise you to keep these points, you may need them in the weeks and months to come. And please share them with colleagues and friends."

 

1) WHAT IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CONFLICT - STRUCTURE, EVENTS, POLICIES, CULTURE, STRATEGIC INTERESTS?


• All of it, it's complex and historical

If the actors themselves or the media reduce it to "Bill-versus-Saddam" we will keep on making the wrong moves. Of particular importance is to know something about history, particularly from Lawrence of Arabia and 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the economic history of oil.

• Cultural/religious differences

The adversaries conduct politics ignorant of the humanistic aspects of their respective cultures and religions. Probably they have no dialogue but only parallel monologues.

• Strategic interests

The military needs to test new weapons under "real life" circumstances.

• Economic causes

The U.S. in particular must keep control of oil producing regions as it has no alternative energy policies. The arms industry will get new orders and arms merchants make profits.

• Psychological aspects

The superpower insists on being obeyed by a smaller power, and this smaller power insists on being respected and listened to. Leaders demonstrate their power, their prestige, honour and reputation while others pay the price of the consequences. Personalities are important but so are the conflicting interests. Right now it looks like Hussein has out-foxed the only superpower.

• Power politics

The US knows that military strike will not resolve any problem of the UNSCOM. The real objective for the USA is to destroy the regime and its leader.

• Domestic politics

Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein probably feel that military action will strengthen them, or divert attention from other, troublesome issues. They both have a strong sense of mission and try to obtain domestic support to strengthen their positions.

• High politics based on philosophical nonsense

Three aspects: a) we are telling the Iraqis that we THINK they hide something but we cannot prove it. If we bomb them, we have amoral obligation to KNOW that they hide and cheat: bombing on the basis of a hypothesis that could prove wrong undermines the whole argument. So, we are requiring the Iraqis to prove that they don't hide and cheat. But no matter what they give us free access to, we can still have the suspicion that somewhere there is something, for instance deep down in the dessert, because 2) what we are looking for (chemical and biological substances) can be so small that they are virtually impossible to detect. 3) Even if we could detect every gram and destroy it, once it is all over, they can quickly be developed again - and the crises and wars return.

• Conflicts abound among Arab states

The Iraq-Iran conflict was a conflict among Muslims. The Iraq-Kuwait clash is among the Sunni Arabs. Which capital will be the power base: Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo or Riyadh? Similar battles one occurred in Europe among Paris, Madrid, London, and Berlin. We can choose to mitigate these facts of life or intervene to make things much worse, lifting it into a trans-civilization conflict.

 

2) WHY ARE WE ONCE AGAIN WITNESSING A MASSIVE MILITARY PROJECT THAT MEETS LITTLE DEBATE, RESISTANCE AND FEW ALTERNATIVE VIEWS?


• The US and others have sent the wrong signals

Many see America as having saved the world from a potential Middle Eastern Hitler. But we encouraged Saddam earlier. When Iraq attacked Iran in September 1980 and the rest of the world did nothing to stop it, not even condemn it, it was a terrible mistake to do nothing to oppose the clearest case of aggression since World War II. The West and Russia armed and supported Saddam right up until the eve of his invasion of Kuwait, even though his intentions were obvious.

• Others have been allowed to develop weapons of mass destruction

Israel has violated Security Council resolutions and has nuclear weapons. Iraq has used and threatened to use weapons of mass destruction, but so has the USA and others, and Saddam Hussein's record is one of carefully calculated reason (as when he was deterred from using such weapons during the Gulf War). Yes, Saddam is a murderous thug, but then so is Syria's Assad, Israel's Sharon, and all too many others in the region.

• Others have gone unpunished for similar crimes

Saddam's attempts to circumvent UN resolutions is said to justify murderous air strikes (by a power that arrogates all rights of interpretation and judgment), while others' similarly-condemned occupations (Syria's of Lebanon's Beka valley, and Israel's of the Gaza, West Bank and the Golan) remain unthreatened and unremarked.

• The US has used nuclear and chemical weapons

The United States used chemical weapons in Vietnam. It's the only state to have used nuclear weapons (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) and threatened to use them in a number of crisis situations - indeed, that's what deterrence policies between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was all about for 45 years! Thus, the United States is not exactly qualified to moralise and judge others.

• Lack of trust and ongoing demonisation

Saddam Hussein calls America the Great Satan, but Americans too have dehumanised Saddam, and therefore it can, without qualms, kill hundreds of thousands of reluctant Iraqi soldiers -- in the same spirit as it attempted to bomb Vietnam back into the stone age. It bombed Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Iraq -- in the name of peace and freedom.

• International law is applied to "them" and not "us"

The partisan and selective application of "law" offends the very notion of law. Law must be generic and impartial, at least in principle, and not based on whim, personal need or spite. Laws applied only to "them" and not "us" smacks of what we rightly accuse Saddam of. The permanent five, nuclear members of the Security Council have consistently ignored the idea of nuclear disarmament which was the quid-pro-quo of non-proliferation.

• Post-Cold War insecurity

We lack new thinking and institutions to deal effectively with crisis like this after the Cold War. If a hammer is your only tool, that's what you must use. There is still no operational globally/regionally oriented security concept for the post-cold war period. The concept of comprehensive security has no operational outcome, institutes or mechanisms. Policies of punishing the designated Bad Guys by military force and military methods still dominate in world politics. The tendency towards "peace enforcement" is wide-spread during the post cold war period. Those who ought to play a central role - the UN, regional and nongovernmental organisations - remain in the shadow of NATO and national interest policies.

• Washington simply doesn't have a legal case.

Resolution 687 of the Security Council that confirmed the cease-fire deal with Iraq at the end of the Gulf War gives no authority for one Security Council member unilaterally to start up hostilities again. The SC resolutions do not provide sufficient legal basis. The basic norm is that starting aggressive war is illegal. This time it is not a response to war or aggression, it's the US (in UN disguise) wanting to initiate it. It doesn't make sense to invoke the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter as if America was about to be invaded.

• Misreading Iraq, false analogies with 1991

Iraq is not a military threat. Mr. Clinton's profound mistake is that he has acts all along as if he were back in 1990, in George Bush's shoes at the time of the Gulf War, threatened by a military monster armed with weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein is not being confrontational because he is strong, as he was eight years ago. He is being difficult and provocative because he is weak. Saddam Hussein no longer has the power to invade Kuwait or threaten Saudi Arabia.

• Chemical weapons overestimated

Chemical weapons have been attributed a potency out of all proportion to their military value. It is a misnomer to describe chemical weapons as a "poor man's nuclear weapon". Even for an unprotected population a large-scale chemical attack would have less impact than a small atomic bomb. Moreover, while there is no defence against a nuclear device a city population can be given masks. However nasty, the chemical weapons Iraq possesses, therefore, cannot be said to constitute a threat to world peace and security. In contrast, biological weapons ARE something to worry about, but in the future more than today.

• Lack of fairness during the 1990s

Iraq did an unacceptable thing and lost the war. One may ask whether the Security Council resolutions were wise; no other independent state has been forced to accept unconditional, unfettered and unlimited access to installations important to its defence capacity and do so for an undefined period of time. Sanctions have killed more than 1 million citizens. There should have been an earlier outcry of the unfairness of the "peace" arrangements between Iraq and the U.S. which would eventually emerge in this showdown. Part of this outcry should have been the development of an agreed upon international standard by which all countries in possession of weapons of mass destruction should be inspected. The U.S. should be examined under such standards as well as Iraq.

• Confusing the UNSCOM mandate with bringing peace and democracy

We may not like Saddam Hussein - not even while he was the darling of the Western powers, but confusing the UNSCOM mandate with bringing peace and democracy, or whatever, to Iraq is bound to end in failure.

 

3) WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE UP TILL NOW - MID-FEBRUARY 98 - AND BY WHOM, TO PREVENT OR DIFFUSE THIS THREATENING SITUATION? LESSONS LEARNT OR NOT LEARNT SINCE 1991?


• Build new institutions

We could have institutionalised conflict-resolution and peace mechanisms adapted to the post-Cold War world, rather than expanding NATO. In particular, we could have expanded nonviolent mechanisms. For example, the OSCE played a constructive role in the nonviolent East European revolutions and in the nonviolent demise of the Soviet Empire. But after the Cold War ended NATO came to dominate events - and the U.S. dominates NATO. The role of regional organisations such as the Arab League and OAU should be boosted.

• Brainstorm good ideas, coming from small countries

Campaigns in favour of peaceful means, dialogue and compromises must be mounted. Media can accept a responsibility for fostering not only violence but also nonviolence. Independent-minded actors can refuse to offer support for bombings. Ministries of Foreign Affairs could gather expert groups for brainstorm sessions on how to come up with better, short- and longterm civilian strategies towards conflict-resolution.

• Positive incentives are essential

Iraq must be given assurances that it will not for ever be the object of investigation, and that other countries possessing the same weapons will be monitored the same way as it is/has been. Once and for all, without the ambiguity of previous occasions, the UN Security Council should make plain that sanctions on Iraq will be lifted if the work of the UN inspectors is allowed to proceed until they've completed their task.

• Smaller countries does not HAVE to follow the big ones

The voice of small, like-minded countries is hardly heard anymore; it is strange if we remember the traditionally active policies of the Nordic countries during 1970s. They now support a tough, military-based policy and forget to offer their good offices for mediation.

• Inspection should be inspection

Military strikes are being planned by the country whose citizens are in majority among the UNSCOM. The inspectors formally are not entitled to hand over the information received to their countries of origin. But it happens. If countries who deliver UNSCOM inspectors on behalf of and in the name of the UN intend to strike militarily those objects the inspectors are entitled to check and visit, the credibility of UNSCOM as well as of the UN can be undermined and its impartiality questioned. This could mean that the UN inspectors have made intelligence and reconnaissance job to be used for military strikes in the name of the United Nations, by the USA and its allies. This is unacceptable.

• Face-to-face meetings with diplomats

Government and citizens diplomats may not get access to Saddam Hussein, but there are plenty of others to talk to - his diplomats in and outside Iraq, Iraqi movements and ordinary citizens. They must also talk with OSCE, EU, NATO, the Arab League and other diplomats and influence the decision-makers in their own governments, no matter where they are as it is now a world policy issue.

• Visit Iraqi citizens and empathise, now and after a war

Missions that go there and empathise with the suffering, innocent civilians can do a lot to reduce the hate of present and future generations. It's a way to show that we do not support our governments' policies or the killing of innocent civilians.

• Recognise that sanctions is a weapon of mass destruction

It should have been acknowledged that sanctions, at least in this case, is a weapon of mass destruction that must be condemned. Media could have exposed the suffering of the Iraqi people must more and highlighted the solid evidence in FAO and WHO reports.

• Promote a broader debate everywhere

NGOs should not await a post-Saddam era if they want to achieve a resolution of conflict in the Gulf/Middle East area. Supranational actors and local actors are the best for influencing events. The UN may be the only legitimate non-regional actor in the Middle East. At the same time, we can raise the debate with our own governments.

• Recognise that military force brings no genuine conflict-resolution

88,500 tons of bombs fell over Iraq in 1991, more than 100,000 died; then followed 7 years of sanction said to have cost the lives of perhaps 1 million people. None of it lead to peace, justice or trustful cooperation between the West and Iraq; neither did anyone inside Iraq remove Saddam Hussein. So, what kind of war now will do the trick? The West chose not to start World War III when Stalin imposed a series of Soviet client regimes in Eastern Europe. If we contained Soviet expansion for forty years, we could also choose to contain Saddam Hussein for a few more years. At stake is also Iraq's legitimate claim to integrity, respect, sovereignty and national self-defence.

January 12, 1998

Go to part B

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