Iraqi
elections must
go ahead as scheduled:
The alternative is much worse
By
Dr.
Farhang
Jahanpour
Department
of Continuing Education, University of
Oxford*
January 14, 2005
Elections
amidst ongoing violence
The Iraqi election is scheduled for
30th January. The vote will be for a 275-member
transitional National Assembly. This will choose a
president and two deputy-presidents from among their own
members. This so-called presidential council will in turn
appoint a prime minister who will hold the main power,
and other ministers. The National Assembly will then
draft a constitution to be voted on in a referendum by 15
October 2005, and if approved it will be followed by
another election for a permanent government in December
2005. So, the 30th January election is only the first
stage in a long process. While President George Bush,
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad
Allawi, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and many
others have insisted that the election will be held as
scheduled, many others including the Iraqi insurgents
have vowed to disrupt the election.
Meanwhile, the reports from Iraq
are getting worse by the day. Even those who were
advising the US and Britain not to go ahead with their
illegal invasion of Iraq could not have imagined that
things would get so bad so quickly. It was hoped that
after the initial shock and horror, the situation would
gradually improve. Unfortunately, the further we move
away from the initial 'shock and awe' operations, things
are deteriorating further, to the extent that there is
now a real possibility that the insurgents might be able
to push the Coalition forces out of Iraq or to unleash a
full-scale civil war. If this happens, it will create a
nightmare much worse than anything that existed under
Saddam Hussein. Even if this gloomy prediction does not
come true, there is every indication that the conflict
will continue for a long time, and that it will get worse
before it gets better.
On the one side, we see brutal
murderers, religious fanatics, suicide bombers, and
throat slitters who do not show any mercy even to a kind
and helpless woman, Margaret Hassan, who had spent most
of her life helping the Iraqis. All these unimaginable
atrocities are committed in the name of Islam. On the
Coalition side, apart from the daily attacks on the
insurgents, we have witnessed the almost total
destruction of Fallujah, a city of more than half a
million people. This must surely be regarded as the worst
US atrocity since the Second World War that can only be
compared to the destruction of Grozni by Russian forces.
In the Vietnam war, US forces destroyed a few villages in
order to 'save them', but the destruction of Fallujah
falls into a different category.
According to US claims as many as
1,600 insurgents have been killed during the operations
in Fallujah, and God only knows how many civilians also
perished. Out of hundreds of thousands of residents who
fled the city before the attacks, only a few hundred have
returned to their bombed out houses, and even some of
these have decided to leave as there is nothing for them
to come back to. The rest are still living in temporary
tents, with no water, electricity or medical facilities,
out in the cold. All this, meanwhile, is done in the name
of democracy and human rights.
Yet the grim statistics provide an
account of continuing misery and loss of life on both
sides. On 7th January 2005 it was announced that seven US
soldiers had been killed in a bomb attack by insurgents
in Baghdad. In a separate incident, the military reported
that a marine had been killed in Anbar province, west of
Baghdad. The Pentagon revealed that more than 10,000 US
military personnel had been wounded in Iraq before the
end of the year 2004. Of the 10,252 total wounded, the
Pentagon said 5,396 had sustained serious injuries such
as lost limbs and sight and were unable to return to duty
and 4,856 sustained injuries that were light enough to
allow them to resume their duties. These figure do not
include tens of thousands of non-combat related injuries
that are omitted from this carefully edited picture of
the occupation. More than 31,000 veterans have sought
"disability" benefits for physical or psychological
injuries. Also most experts concede that Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder - which can lead to alcoholism, domestic
abuse, homelessness, and suicide - could affect up to 75
percent of all returning soldiers.
Meanwhile, the number of U.S.
military deaths in Iraq stood at 1,335 by the end of the
year, according to the Pentagon. The wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan are costing the US taxpayers at least five
billion dollars a month, and there is no end in sight for
either conflict, and there is no indication that US
forces can leave Iraq or Afghanistan in the near future.
The US Administration is expected to ask the Congress for
another £100 billion to cover the cost of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the Iraqis have borne
the main brunt of casualties. According to the research
led by Les Roberts of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School
of Public Health in Baltimore and published in the
reputable British medical journal The Lancet, about
100,000 Iraqi civilians - half of them women and children
- have died in Iraq since the invasion, mostly as a
result of air strikes by coalition forces. They also
found an increase in infant mortality from 29 to 57
deaths per 1,000 live births since the invasion.
On Thursday 6th January it emerged
that 18 Iraqi men recruited to work at a US base near
Mosul had been murdered. On Wednesday 5th January, dozens
of Iraqi police and soldiers were killed, at least 15 of
them during a graduation ceremony in Hilla, south of
Baghdad. On the same day a car bomb killed two Iraqi
civilians and wounded 10 others in Baghdad. These
explosions came a day after gunmen assassinated the
governor of Baghdad, Ali al-Haidari, the highest-ranking
Iraqi to be killed since the assassination of the
chairman of the interim governing council in May. In a
separate attack, the insurgents killed at least 10 people
outside the headquarters of the Iraqi National Guard. In
a separate incident, at least four civilians died and two
more were injured when they were caught up in fighting
between US forces and insurgents in the Sunni town of
Ramadi, west of Baghdad.
On the same day (5th January), the
Iraqi interior ministry released figures that revealed
that a staggering 1,300 Iraqi policemen have died in
attacks during the last four months alone. Just during
the past couple of weeks, the number of Iraqis and
Coalition forces killed runs into hundreds. On 19
December 2004 more than 60 died in twin suicide car
attacks in Najaf and Karbala. A suicide blast in a US
military base in Mosul on 21st December killed at least
24, including 14 US soldiers and 4 contractors, and
wounded 57. On 27th December, at least 13 died in a
Baghdad car bomb targeting the office of the chairman of
the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
Abdul-Aziz Hakim, who according to the polls is the most
popular Iraqi politician. On 2nd January 2005 at least 23
Iraqi soldiers were killed by a car bomb in Balad. On 3rd
January more than 20 people were killed in a day of
violence across Iraq. The grim list goes on and on. The
question is how much worse can it get? The sad answer is
probably much worse, especially if the terrorists and the
insurgents win.
These dreadful statistics have
forced some Iraqi and foreign politicians to call for a
postponement of the election. They include Iraq's
president and most senior Sunni Arab official, Ghazi
al-Yawar, who after his earliest assurances to President
Bush that the election would go ahead as scheduled, on
4th January suggested that the United Nations should
examine whether national elections should be postponed.
The Elder statesman Adnan Pachachi, who chaired a meeting
of a coalition of Sunnis calling for the postponement of
the election for at least three months, has again called
for a delay. In a letter in the Washington Post he argued
that the delay might reduce the level of violence and
encourage more Sunnis to take part in the election. A
leading Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, is
boycotting the vote. Most importantly, the influential
Sunni dominated Association of Moslem Scholars has come
out strongly against the elections. The Iraqi Defence
Minister Hazem Shaalan said that if Egypt and Jordan
could persuade the Sunnis to take part in the election at
a later date, the election may be postponed.
From outside Iraq, some leading
Sunni politicians, including King Abdullah of Jordan and
various Egyptian and Persian Gulf leaders have also
called for a postponement. Even in the United States some
senior politicians, including Henry Kissinger and General
Jay Garner, the first US civil administrator of Iraq,
have sounded alarm bells that the election might result
in a Shi'i-dominated government that will lean towards
Iran. In view of these conflicting views it is important
to study the facts about those who advocate to hold the
election on time, and those who call for a postponement,
and to examine the reasons that are put forward for
postponement.
Analysing
the opposition to elections being held now
Those inside Iraq who oppose the
election and are hostile to the presence of Occupation
forces can be divided into four groups:
1.
Al-Qa'ida
terrorists led allegedly by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, and a
number of other militant groups.
A statement on the website of the Ansar al-Sunna group,
believed to have been behind the attack on a US base in
Mosul, warned the Iraqis not to take part in the
election. It was co-signed by the Islamic Army of Iraq
and the Army of the Mujahideen. The main argument of
these groups was not that the Sunnis would be
under-represented or that the time was not right for
holding the election, they were opposed to the idea of
election in order to choose a government. Their statement
said that democracy was un-Islamic, polling stations were
centres of atheism and that the election would lead to
the passing of un-Islamic laws. "This vote is a mockery
by the enemy to grant legitimacy to the new government
which serves the crusaders. Participating in these
elections would be the biggest gift for America, which is
the enemy of Islam and the tyrant of the age," the
statement said.
These groups are responsible for
the most barbaric atrocities, such as large-scale
kidnappings and beheadings of innocent victims, the most
deadly attacks not only on coalition forces, but also on
the hapless Iraqi security forces and soldiers, and on
Shi'is. The group associated with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi
was probably behind the massive car bomb in Najaf that
killed more than 100 people, including Ayatollah Muhammad
Baqir Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The same group now known as
Iraqi Al-Qa'ida also claimed responsibility for the
recent assassination attempt on the life of Abdul-Aziz
Al-Hakim, the brother of the dead SCIRI leader and the
present leader of the group. It has also been blamed for
the recent spate of attacks in both Najaf and Karbala.
There is no way of reaching a
compromise with these groups. It should be borne in mind
that if the election is postponed it would be mainly due
to the atrocities committed by these terrorists, and they
will be the ones who will take the credit for destroying
the chances of democracy in Iraq. Their victory would be
seen as a terrible capitulation to terrorism and would
constitute a long-term defeat both for the Coalition, as
well as for the prospects of calm, security and the rule
of law in Iraq. The postponement of the election would
boost the morale of the terrorists and would recruit many
more to their ranks.
If the election were to be
postponed, it would be much more difficult to reinstate
it later, and there is no guarantee that any postponement
of the election would calm the situation. On the
contrary, the cancellation of the election would further
intensify the violence, as the terrorists would come to
believe that their atrocities are bearing fruit and
scuppering Coalition Plans. Even those who are strongly
opposed to the presence of the Coalition forces in Iraq
must realise that if the terrorists win they will
establish a regime far worse and more violent than that
of the Taleban in Afghanistan. Any regime led by
Al-Qa'ida and the likes of Zarqawi would be more
fundamentalist and extremely more brutal than anything
that the world has experienced in the past and would
provide a new base for international terrorism, both in
the region and beyond.
Postponing the election due to the
activities of these terrorists would also alienate and
infuriate the majority of Shi'is. The postponement of the
election would not win back the terrorists, but might
incite the Shi'is whose dream of a democratic
participation in power has been denied due to terrorism,
to take up arms and join the opposition to the Coalition
forces. That eventuality would greatly compound the
problems faced by the Coalition forces, and might
actually result in civil war and the partition of Iraq
between the Kurdish north, the Sunni centre and the
Shiite south. That would definitely be the worst of all
scenarios and it should be avoided at all
costs.
2.
The second
group is composed of the remnants of the Ba'thist regime,
some of whom have been gradually co-opted back to the
system after they were summarily dismissed by Paul Bremer
shortly after he was appointed the administrative
governor of Baghdad. The
hasty disbanding of hundreds of thousands of soldiers who
were generally apolitical and who could have been won to
serve in the new Iraqi administration was wrong and
ideologically motivated. It is the presence of these
trained and armed former soldiers and members of Saddam's
intelligence forces, the Mukhabarat, in the ranks of the
insurgents that has made the security situation in Iraq
so grim.
US and UK officials constantly
refer to the insurgents as being composed of a few
'dead-enders' and 'former regime diehards', and put their
number between 5,000-10,000. However, the head of Iraq's
intelligence service General Muhammad Abdullah Shahwani
told a Saudi newspaper on Tuesday 4th January that US and
Iraqi forces were facing as many as 40,000 'hardcore
fighters', backed by 150,000 to 200,000 other insurgents,
guerrillas and spies. When asked if the insurgents are
winning, Shahwani replied: "I would say they aren't
losing."
Many Iraqi and foreign experts
believe that these figures are closer to reality than the
much smaller number suggested by US officials. Anthony
Cordesman, an analyst with the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, commented: "The
Iraqi figures do... recognise the reality that the
insurgency in Iraq has broad support in Sunni areas,
while the US figures downplay this to the point of
denial." These figures do not represent an insurgency.
They represent a full-scale war. In fact, if these
figures are correct, the number of insurgents far exceeds
the number of US forces, while in a classic guerrilla war
the number of regular forces should be many times that of
the guerrillas if they can have any hope of success.
James Dobbins, Director of the
International Security and Defense Policy Center at Rand,
and a former U.S. Special Envoy in Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti,
Somalia, and Afghanistan, has for the first time admitted
that the Iraqi war is a lost cause. In an article in the
influential Foreign Affairs he writes: "The beginning of
wisdom is to recognize that the ongoing war in Iraq is
not one that the United States can win. As a result of
its initial miscalculations, misdirected planning, and
inadequate preparation, Washington has lost the Iraqi
people's confidence and consent, and it is unlikely to
win them back." His grim prediction is that the US
Administration is faced with only a bad and a worse
choice. He writes: "Keeping U.S. troops in Iraq will only
provoke fiercer and more widespread resistance, but
withdrawing them too soon could spark a civil war. The
second administration of George W. Bush seems to be left
with the choice between making things worse slowly or
quickly."
Yet if US forces cannot defeat the
insurgents, it is quite clear that the poorly trained
Iraqi forces are no match for that large group of
fanatical and dedicated fighters, as the events of the
past few weeks have shown. There have been many reports
indicating that the insurgents have infiltrated the Iraqi
forces, as was seen in the recent suicide attack on a US
base in Mosul, which according to the latest figures
killed 24 and injured 57, which was described as having
been an inside job. But even when Iraqi forces have not
been disloyal, their performance against the insurgents
has been very weak. When Iraqi forces were put in charge
of Fallujah after the US attacks in April 2004, they
surrendered to the insurgents en masse, giving them their
weapons and equipment. On many occasions, as in Mosul in
December 2004, the insurgent attacked the Iraqi forces,
killed a large number of them and stole their weapons and
uniforms.
Having done the damage, it is very
difficult to reverse it, except through a democratic
process. Postponing the inevitable will not help. Only if
proper elections are held and the insurgents see that
they have not been able to disrupt the will of the
majority will they begin to give up their opposition and
join in the democratic process. This is why it is
important for the Assembly that emerges out of the
election to be open and magnanimous to the Sunni fighters
and try to co-opt them into the new Iraq. However, that
is the only realistic concession that can be made to the
insurgents, not capitulation in advance. Any postponement
of the election would simply convince the insurgents of
their power and the correctness of the methods that they
have adopted, without any hope of guiding them towards a
democratic process.
3.
The
third group of those who oppose the election is made up
of ordinary Sunnis who have been angered at being
sidelined and who have been especially infuriated as the
result of the destruction of Fallujah and attacks on
other Sunni towns. However,
if they see that the only way that they can have a say in
the future of Iraq is by taking part in the election they
could be persuaded to do so. For a large number of
ordinary Sunnis, the Sunni-Shi'i split is not an issue.
They have lived together for decades and there are many
close links of marriage between them. Most Iraqi cities,
including the capital Baghdad, have a mix of Sunnis and
Shi'is. There are at least two million Shi'is in Baghdad,
mainly in Sadr city.
Therefore, the argument that the
Shi'is would receive a bigger vote in the election and
this would prevent the Sunnis from taking part in the
election is an exaggerated myth. That attitude is only
true of the Wahhabi fundamentalists, often supported by
some Arab regimes in the region, and does not apply to
the majority of Iraqis. The Arab Sunnis realise that
constituting only 15 percent of the total population of
Iraq does not entitle them to have a monopoly of power as
was the case under Saddam Hussein's regime. They can only
play their part and have their say in future Iraq if they
take an active part in the election. Otherwise, they
would marginalize and disenfranchise themselves.
The domination of the Sunnis in
Iraqi politics dates back to the time when the Sunni
Ottomans ruled over Iraq and in their confrontation with
Shi'i Iran tried to make use of the Iraqi Sunnis. That
situation was perpetuated during the colonial period when
the British also felt it useful to use the services of
the Sunnis who held the dominant positions in the
government. However, in an Iraq that wishes to be
democratic and live by the ballot box rather than the
bullet, it is natural that the Shi'is, who constitute a
much bigger majority than the Sunnis, will be able to
achieve their proper share of power. This, however, does
not mean that one group will dominate the other, because
that kind of language belongs to an era of despotism not
to a more democratic society which will hopefully emerge
in Iraq.
The majority Shi'is have formed an
umbrella organisation led by a former nuclear scientist,
Husain Al Shahristani, called the United Iraqi Alliance
(UIA). This embraces 22 factions, including both Shi'is
and Sunnis. In fact, the list of election candidates that
has been prepared with the blessing of Ayatollah Sistani
includes many prominent Sunnis, and even Christians and
Turkmens, as well as Shi'is, but formally excluding the
young radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. If more prominent
Sunni candidates come forward and win seats to the
Assembly their share of deputies would clearly increase
further. The majority Sunni population of Iraq must not
allow itself to be manipulated by radical Wahhabi groups.
Although election under occupation is not the desired
option, yet even a faulty election is much better than
the victory of the terrorists that would create a hell
for both Sunnis and Shi'is.
4. The fourth
group that is opposed to holding the election is composed
of radical Shi'is led by Muqtada al-Sadr.
In the past year, he tried
to stir up trouble against the interim Iraqi government
and against the Coalition forces, but he failed. In his
attempt to use the holy shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf - one
of the holiest places for the Shi'is of the world - into
a battlefield, he alienated many Iraqi Shi'is. It was
only due to the wisdom and popularity of Grand Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani that Sadr's rebellion was contained and
the city of Najaf was saved the fate that befell
Fallujah. Although he clearly enjoys support among some
sections of Iraqi Shi'is, it is clear that he has been
overshadowed by the much more influential Ayatollah
al-Sistani.
Iran
and Iraq - intertwined for centuries
Apart from these domestic groups,
some outside figures, such as King Abdullah of Jordan,
have also raised the alarm about Iran's desire to form a
"Shi'i crescent" in the region, stretching from Iran to
Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. This kind of sectarian talk can
only inflame passions and deepen the divisions. Do they
propose that the 65 percent Iraqi Shi'is should always be
excluded from power, just because they share the same
faith as the Shi'is in Iran? There is no evidence that
the establishment of an Assembly with a majority of
Shi'is would necessarily mean an increase in Iranian
influence. In fact, up to a short time ago, many American
commentators argued that the establishment of a
Shi'i-dominated government in Iraq would undermine the
rule of the mullahs in Iran, and that Najaf would become
a main theological rival to Qom.
Grand Ayatollah Sistani has openly
declared that he is not in favour of the establishment of
an Islamic Republic ruled over by the mullahs. The
experience of the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq is
sobering. Although Iranian clerics tried to incite their
fellow-Shi'is against Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Shi'is
demonstrated that the idea of Iraq had gelled in their
minds and that they were Iraqis first, and Shi'is second.
There is no reason to suppose that in the future, the
Iraqi Shi'is would lose their patriotism and would link
up with Iran.
The late Ayatollah Mohamed Baqir
Al-Hakim, addressing thousands of worshippers in a speech
in Karbala, demanded to know why Iraqis were not running
their country. "Haven't Iraqis reached the age of reason?
Why do they not have the right to form a government and
to manage their affairs?" he asked. "We do not want a war
for hegemony waged by the clerics to take power. We want
a modern government, but one that respects Islam and its
values." These sentiments have been echoed by his
successor Abdul-Aziz Hakim who also said that the Iraqi
government would not be modelled on the Iranian system.
Even Ahmad Chalabi, the former darling of the
Neo-Conservatives in Washington, has recently said that
he does not want Iraq to become a battleground between
the United States and Iran.
It is often forgotten that the
moderate Ayatollah al-Sistani is an Iranian by birth, and
yet he has always been against Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini's thesis of Velayat-e Faqih (the guardianship of
the jurisconsult), or rule by the clergy. In fact, most
of the leading grand ayatollahs in Iraq have been of
Iranian origin. Ayatollah Shirazi, the most eminent
source of emulation in recent times, who was one of the
main voices in anti-British campaigns and who led the
Tobacco boycott in Iran against a British company was
Iranian, as were most of the leading clerics during the
past few decades. Ayatollah Khomeini taught in Najaf for
13 years, and Grand Ayatollahs Kho'i, Mar'ashi-Najafi,
Golpayegani, Behbahani, Hakim and a host of other leading
ayatollahs who have wielded great influence in Najaf were
Iranians. As Professor Juan Cole has pointed, "To say
that Iran should not interfere in Iraq is like saying
that the Pope should not interfere in Ireland", or indeed
in the Vatican. The religious history of Iran and Iraq
has been intertwined for centuries, and it would be
foolish to pretend otherwise.
Loose
federation, no partition
Apart from the Shi'is, the Kurds in
the North too have warmly welcomed the elections. They
have been living under a partial form of autonomy during
the past decade, and they would like to consolidate their
position in a new democratic Iraq. In fact, if the
present Sunni insurgency and boycott of the election
continues, the outcome would be the partition of Iraq and
the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the
north, something that will not be in the interest of
Iraq, and indeed Turkey, Iran and Syria. The only factor
that can fuse all these ethnic and religious groups into
one state would be a form of democracy that respects and
recognises the right of all its citizens.
Indeed, one solution that would
give the Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shi'is some space and
would prevent the domination of one group over another
would be the formation of a loose federation in Iraq.
Traditionally, Iraq was divided into three governorates
under the Ottomans, consisting of the Kurds in the North
with their main cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, the Sunni
Arabs in the centre with Baghdad as their capital, and
the Shi'i south mainly based around Basra, Karbala and
Najaf. Although it is important to maintain the unity and
territorial integrity of Iraq, there is no reason why
that unity cannot be maintained within a federation. The
Kurds would like to be able to preserve their distinct
identity, their language and their customs. They will be
best able to do that in a loosely structured federation,
while the Sunni and the Shi'i Arabs, the Turkmens and
others could form the other major components of a united,
federal Iraq, without any need for the partition of the
country. This would mean that even if in the present
election the Sunnis do not achieve a proportionate share
of power, the door would always be open to them to play a
larger role in the future.
The
larger regional perspective and what the U.S. must
do
In the above-mentioned article in
Foreign Affairs, James Dobbins rightly argues that if the
United States wishes to achieve success in Iraq, it must
simultaneously do three things. It must win the support
of Iraq's neighbours, must try to find a solution to all
the problems of the Middle East, including the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and to engage other countries in
Iraq. He writes: "Peace, stability, territorial
integrity, and respect for national sovereignty are the
themes on which a compelling regional strategy can be
built to motivate Iraqis to take responsibility for their
own destiny, induce Iraq's neighbors to support the
emergence of a moderate, broadly representative, and
regionally responsible regime in Baghdad--as
Afghanistan's neighbors have done in Kabul--and secure
broader international support for the effort."
The United States cannot hope to
succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan by constantly trying to
antagonise Iran by isolating her, and antagonise the
Arabs by turning a blind eye to the plight of the
Palestinians. At the same time, it will not receive the
backing of major European countries, or China, Russia or
Japan without a serious involvement of the United Nations
in Iraq. The time is ripe for a bold and farsighted
approach that would include all Iraq's neighbours.
However, any hope of long-term success in Iraq must be
accompanied with an unequivocal promise that US forces
will leave Iraq at the earliest opportunity and that the
US does not intend to stay permanently in Iraq and
control its fate.
The cancellation of the election at
this late hour would only increase terrorism, embolden
the insurgents, alienate the Shi'is and the Kurds,
prevent regional countries from helping to stabilise
Iraq, and prolong the agony of US troops in
Iraq.
* Farhang Jahanpour received his
PhD from the University of Cambridge in Oriental Studies.
He is a part-time tutor at the Department for Continuing
Education at the University of Oxford and a member of
Kellogg College, Oxford. He was formerly professor and
Dean of the Faculty of Languages at the University of
Isfahan, and also worked for 18 years as the Editor for
Middle East and North Africa for the BBC.
You may write to professor
Jahanpour at fjahanpour@btopenworld.com
Other articles on TFF by Farhang
Jahanpour
The UN
should try to end Iraq's occupation
Militarism
is a greater threat than terrorism
Shirin
Ebadi, the Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize
©
TFF and the author
2005
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