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The
Orphan Peace Plan: Kofi Annan's Proposal For a Reunited
Cyprus
By
Ann-Sofi
Jakobsson Hatay
TFF
associate
The Turkish Daily News, 9 December 2002
According to one theory, parties engaged in protracted
conflicts are so habituated to conflict that only a shock
can induce the reorientations necessary for peacemaking.
Whether or not the UNSG Kofi Annan was inspired by this
notion when he tabled his recent outline for a settlement
of the Cyprus conflict in all its complexities is
unknown. Nor is it clear whether or not the rapid
dissemination of the "Annan-plan" among the public that
followed was intentional or resulted from unauthorized
leaks. What is clear, however, is that the peace plan,
Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the
Cyprus Problem, dropped like a bombshell on the divided
island, sending shock waves through the two
communities.
Presented to the parties on 11 November, together with
a tight deadline, Annan's outline instilled a sense of
urgency into a situation that ten months after the
resumption of peace negotiations (in mid-January 2002)
had slipped into a familiar deadlock.
The first stage of 'the solution', as it was called,
was to be completed with the signature by the two leaders
(Greek and Turkish Cypriot presidents Clerides and
Denktash) of a Foundation Agreement, including the main
articles of a constitution for a new Cyprus and a map
delineating the boundary between its two 'component
states'. The signing was to take place prior to the
upcoming European Council meeting in Copenhagen (12-13
December). The final agreement would then be signed by
the leaders 'not later than 28 February 2003' and be put
to simultaneous referenda on both sides on 30 March 2003.
In the meantime, the EU would have been saved from having
to deal with the admittance of a still divided Cyprus as
one of the new member states, a prospect that has given
rise to considerable concern within the union.
Initially the parties were asked by Annan only to
consider whether or not the outline constituted 'an
acceptable basis for continuing negotiations', and return
their replies within a week. Despite repeated assurances
to the contrary, however, the proposal had strong
undertones of a take-it-or-leave-it-offer, further
reinforced by all those who had played a pivotal role in
putting the plan together, whether centre stage (like the
UNSG himself and his aide Alvaro de Soto) or on the
sidelines (like US and UK 'special Cyprus
representatives' Thomas Weston and Lord David Hannay).
They all now appeared on stage, unisonly voicing the
message that the parties had been offered a window of
opportunity that would soon close. The refusal to engage
in speculations about what the consequences would be if
the parties failed to reach an agreement ahead of the EU
summit was universal. As far as they were concerned, a
plan B did not exist. In the meantime, Greek and Turkish
Cypriots could be seen wandering around with the plan,
downloaded from the Internet, in their hands, trying to
understand its contents, the looks on their faces serious
and puzzled.
If the plan indeed had been intended for public
consumption at this stage of the peace process, the
presentation of it to a wider audience had been
completely overlooked. The document is of considerable
length (145 pages), its text full of details (down to the
holidays to be observed in the new Cyprus) and dense with
legal intricacies and creative ambiguities. Even those
possessing an adequate command of English &endash;
although widely spoken on the island the mother tongue of
neither community &endash; could be excused for failing
to see the woods for all the trees.
It is therefore understandable that the initial
discussions centred on the more easily accessible
alternative maps that accompanied the plan. Territorial
distribution being one of the most contested issues in
the conflict, the maps were guaranteed to provide enough
fuel for heated and bitter debate, particularly among
those who either found themselves on the 'wrong' side of
the demarcation line between the two 'component states',
thus facing the prospect of having to leave their current
dwellings, or those who would not &endash; as they had
been repeatedly promised over the years by politicians
eager for their votes &endash; be able to return to
settlements they had had to leave as a result of the
conflict. Offering visual clarity to the text's verbal
cloudiness, the maps gave all Cypriots a glimpse of what
the Annan plan might mean for them personally.
On both sides, the newspapers were quick to move in to
fill the information gap left by the plan's masterminds.
Offering their own translations of extracts of the plan,
they predictably picked its most controversial elements.
So when the plan finally &endash; after almost two weeks
&endash; became available in the local languages in its
entirety it had already superimposed another division on
the divided island: between those who rejected the plan
outright and those who were willing to accept it, at
least as a basis for further deliberations.
The Greek Cypriots were first to subject the plan to
the judgment of public opinion. In a poll commissioned by
the Politis newspaper one day (!) after the presentation
of plan, 52 per cent said no to further negotiations on
the basis of Annan's proposals. 28 per cent said they
approved while 20 per cent said that they either did not
know or would not give an answer. In a second poll a week
later, opposition had increased to 64 per cent.
When the Turkish Cypriots pollsters finally caught up
with their Greek Cypriot counterparts, their results
showed that Annan's plan had fared somewhat better north
of the green line. A poll commissioned by the Ortam
newspaper indicated that three weeks after its
presentation 52 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots approved
of the plan. 40 per cent said that they would vote no in
a referendum while 9 per cent were undecided. A third
Greek Cypriot poll carried out at the same time showed
that the opposition had diminished somewhat: 59 per cent
now said that they would vote no.
Meanwhile rejectionists on both sides, usually the
more vocal, started to get mobilized. Displaced people
unhappy with the prospect of being denied the right of
return or with the amount of compensation that could be
expected for property left behind, farmers about to lose
the land they have been toiling, inhabitants of villages
scheduled for 'relocation', made up the backbone of a
predictable rejectionist lobby. While Turkish Cypriot
sceptics were somewhat subdued by a perceived lack of
alternatives to what the Annan plan offered, Greek
Cypriot rejectionists, supported also by the influential
Greek Orthodox Church, were the more vocal.
Most impressive among the expressions of support for
the peace process was a "pro-settlement,
pro-EU-membership" rally in northern (Turkish Cypriot)
Nicosia on 27 November. Organised by the chamber of
commerce, trade unions and other NGOs, the rally &endash;
unrivalled in the Greek Cypriot south &endash; attracted
10.000&endash;15.000 people. In the meantime, however,
plans were underway among the "Annan-plan-rejectionist"
faction of Turkish Cypriot civil society to hold a
protest rally (on 10 December) under the banner "Yes to
Peace, No to This Plan".
In a rare example of a joint interethnic response, a
group of academics from both sides produced a statement
welcoming Annan's proposals as something that could lead
to «a balanced solution». However, initial
reactions indicated that advocates of the plan would
indeed face an uphill struggle on both sides in order to
secure the popular endorsement envisaged as the climax in
Annan's settlement schedule, an example with precedents
elsewhere.
Popular endorsement of peace agreements has
increasingly been accepted as a crucial element of a
peace process. Not only does such endorsement confer
popular legitimacy on an agreement reached by political
leaders by providing an avenue for expression of consent
by those who are to live with it. The requirement of
public consent is also believed to have a healthy
moderating effect on the preceding peace negotiations.
The prospect of having to submit the end-product of
negotiation to the public, forces the parties to take
also the other side's concerns seriously. Passing the
test of public opinion becomes a common interest.
As recent peace processes show, popular endorsement
can take several forms. In Northern Ireland, for example,
the 1998 Belfast agreement negotiated in (almost)
all-party negotiations and signed on Good Friday, was put
to the people in a referendum six weeks later.
In an era where conflicts within states are far more
numerous than conflicts between states, transition to
peace is often accompanied by a simultaneous transition
to democracy (South Africa, Mozambique, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Cambodia, etc). In such cases, the new state
of affairs is endorsed by the people indirectly, by the
means of elections to new political institutions.
Irrespectively of the mechanism, however, the outcome
has rarely &endash; if ever &endash; been predetermined.
Even in favourable circumstances, people's approval
generally requires some amount of persuasion.
So, for example, was the yes vote in the Northern
Irish referendum preceded by an intensive lobby campaign
where the political parties who were signatory to the
agreement, together with the British and Irish
governments, the Clinton administration, different local
interest groups, civil society organisations, and the
media. etc.. took it upon themselves to 'sell' the
agreement to the public. With only one week to go,
opinion polls indicated that the agreement would barely
pass the test: 51 per cent said that they were going to
vote yes, 24 per cent said no and 24 were still
undecided. The campaign was intensified and at the end of
the day 71.1 per cent voted in favour of the
agreement.
This brings us back to the Annan-plan and its
'delivery' to the Cypriots (and again we do not know
whether this was intentional or not). The important point
is that while the Belfast agreement was put to the people
after it had been endorsed by democratically elected
leaders which in itself conferred on it an important
element of legitimacy, Annan's plan was subjected to
public scrutiny as a draft proposal in all its details
before any agreement had been reached among the parties.
Not only did this mean that any concessions in the
continuing negotiations would be extremely difficult to
make for both sides, as they would be there for anyone to
see. It also meant that there was no-one there to sell
it. And there could not have been at this stage of the
peace process. Despite the heavy involvement of external
actors in the settlement efforts, local sensitivities
towards external interventions and impositions prohibit
representatives of the 'international community' from
coming out as open advocates of the plan for fear of
undermining it. Moreover, the plan had not (yet) received
the backing of the two communities' political leadership
&endash; their preoccupation at this stage being rather
on how to strengthen their own hands in the on-going
bargaining game than on endorsing a plan that has
unpalatable elements for both sides. And as both sides
are hoping to 'improve' the plan to their advantage,
anyone who would embrace it at this stage would render
themselves vulnerable to accusations of undermining the
bargaining position of their respective leaders. Thus,
not only was the plan's delivery premature: the timing
also ensured that it would be left an orphan.
If, despite the unpropitious circumstances, the plan
survives, at the end of the day the peoples of Cyprus
will, as they should, be given a chance to have their
say. When this day comes, its advocates would do well to
consider the following.
Transitions are times of uncertainty and insecurity.
Even against a backdrop of a protracted conflict
situation that everybody wishes to escape from, the
decision to embark on a radical departure into the
unknown &endash; in partnership with the former foe
&endash; is bound to create considerable agony and
distress.
Some concerns may be unfounded, others may be real.
But in either case they have to be taken seriously as
they otherwise may risk derailing the peace process.
Accurate information delivered in a credible and
accessible manner may help to dispel some worries. In
Northern Ireland, the final peace agreement was delivered
to all households ahead of the referendum. This may be an
example to follow (provided that the agreement is
distributed in the local languages) but the 'lesson
learned' from this case is that there is also a need for
other communication channels in order to help people make
an informed decision: authoritative written summaries of
the agreement, public hearings, seminars, videos and
workshops may be some.
The Annan plan, if ever implemented albeit in a
revised form, will mean a dramatic change in the lives of
all Cypriots. These changes will be more painful for some
than for others. A lot of people will be asked to leave
the house they have been staying in for the last thirty
years or to give up the dream of being able to return to
a home they were once uprooted from. Somehow they will
have to be persuaded to make this sacrifice. Appropriate
mechanisms will have to be found to allay such
understandable and legitimate concerns.
Ahead of the Northern Irish referendum, it was such
painful individual concerns, rather than the
constitutional elements of the agreement, that were
foremost on people's minds. The prospect of release of
prisoners convicted of 'terrorist' offences caused
particular distress in a society where no-one had escaped
the suffering caused by decades of violent conflict. In
order to enlist the support also of the conflict's many
victims special efforts were made during the campaign to
reach out also to them. Preparations were already
underway to establish a 'victims commission' "to look at
possible ways to recognise the pain and suffering felt by
victims arising from the troubles of the last 30
years".
In Cyprus, the provision of adequate funds for
relocation and compensation is likely to play a similar
crucial role when it comes to eliciting the support of
affected segments of the population. Such funds would
help to make a difficult transition smoother. This as of
yet unsolved problem will have to be given particular
attention in the coming months, that is, if the plan
passes the thresholds ahead of it and the orphan finds
parents willing to adopt it and able to nurse it.
Ann-Sofi Jakobsson Hatay is a peace and conflict
researcher at Uppsala University, Sweden, who specializes
in conflict resolution and the study of peace processes.
She can be reached at the following email address:
Ann-Sofi.Jakobsson_Hatay@pcr.uu.se
©
TFF & the author 2002
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