|
Western
Civil-Society Empowerment
and
the Lessons Learned from
the
Balkans
By
Prof.
Biljana Vankovska
DCAF and the University of
Skopje
TFF
associate
May 7, 2002
DCAF Workshop
Promoting Civil Society in Good Governance: Lessons for
the Security Sector
Prague, 15-16 April 2002
At first glance it seems that the assessment of the
Western democracy promotion programmes in the Balkans is
a relatively easy task. The territory of former (or
better, Second) Yugoslavia has been a focal point of
various international interventions. Many of the lessons
learned (and/or lessons that should have been learned)
concern conflict management and post-conflict
peacebuilding. One way or another, all these attempts
have inevitably tackled the reform of the security
sectors. The old and the emerging security structures
have been de facto parts of the conflict structure(s).
Thus the security sector reform (SSR) is usually
associated with a painful debate on state building
through conflict but also on traumatised, fragmented and
frustrated civil societies and their recovery. Not
surprisingly, what managed to stay immune from the
ethno-nationalist zeal and/or emerged and matured during
the clashes with the most dictatorial regimes deserves
full appreciation not only as an object of further
international support but also as the 'best practice'
model for the others.
The starting premise of this analysis is that the
Western policy of civil society empowerment has at the
same time differed and coincided with the general policy
of conflict management (or better, mismanagement) in the
region. Western political interventions and civil society
aid programmes confronted and/or supported each other but
there has not been any consistent strategy of
orchestrated approach. Understandably, the results at the
end of the day appear to be minor and inadequate.
In order to avoid any misunderstandings (quite usual
when the presenter comes from one of the 'recipient
countries'), it is important to stress that the roots of
the problems are merely internal. But the paper primarily
deals with the lessons learned for the international
community, and consequently the observations and policy
recommendations will be made in terms of the interplay of
the local civil societies and international donor
community. The local actors (both political or societal)
have vastly misused the omissions and/or weaknesses of
the international endeavours. This unembellished approach
may sound cynical but the analysis represents an inner
view of someone who is in-between 'internationals' and
'locals' but also one who has experience in the research
and policy community. Being a 'local' by origin and
currently having an insight into the projects of the
"democracy-promotion community", the author tries to
point out the weaknesses of both 'internationals' and
'locals' in democracy-advocacy with special emphasis on
the SSR.
1. Civil Society Between Myths
and Reality
There is something charming and irresistible with
buzzwords - more they are used less there is a need to
re-consider their substance and ambiguity. The same
applies on civil society. The famous third wave of
democracy has been accompanied with a wave of
'democratisation business'. The post-communist countries
appeared to be a very receptive to the new ideas and
provided a good stage for the new 'business'. The notions
of democracy and civil society have been the dominant
leitmotiv for these endeavours, which cannot be said for
the SSR. A more than a decade later, numerous members of,
what Thomas Carothers rightly names, global chattering
class still argue whether or not the research and policy
community have paid balanced attention to the formal and
political/legal aspects of the SSR and civil society's
role in promoting good governance in the security
sector.
Advocacy of structural and institutional reforms of
the post-communist countries things looks as the easier
part of the job. Both donors and recipients agree that
countries in transition have, more or less, completed the
institution building and simultaneously have set up a
legal framework for the political processes and
objectives. These 'achievements' are quite visible and
even measurable, at least, on the surface. When it comes
to in-depth analysis of how the implanted institutional
and legal structures work in practice, the picture gets
more blurred contours. In many cases international and
domestic elites have found it convenient to praise the
swift pro-Western reforms and to plead for patience in
implementation process. Critical and somewhat cynical
observers put more emphasis on what they see as a bare
imitation of Western institutions and sycophantic
attitude towards the international community. At first
glance it looks as if almost all countries in transition
have successfully passed the so-called 'first generation'
of reforms but with various results. If the end of the
Cold war brought to the fore the so-called 'peace
dividend', almost simultaneously the collapse of
communism in Eastern European countries, and the
coincident process of consolidation in many countries in
Latin America and Africa, provided a ground for
'democratisation dividend'. The international donor
community and the aid recipients shared quite high and
unrealistic expectations. A decade later it is obvious
that in many cases the anticipated 'transition paradigm'
did not fit well the reality. 'Transitions' have not
always led towards democracy, and furthermore often did
not follow the pattern.
The sad truth is that in many cases, particularly in
the Balkans and the former Soviet Union space, the
transition meant beginning from the scratch. In the
collapsed or war torn states there was nothing much to
'redesign' or 'democratise'. Even worse, there was no
solid ground to implant the newly envisaged democratic
institutions. The state-building sometimes started with
the new militaries, or better para-militaries. The
invalid and definitively not democratically flavoured
security sector was supposed to be the main 'tool' for
the state and nation-building process. The states that
emerged after the collapse of the former communist
federations (with exception of Czechoslovakia), and some
other countries (i.e. Albania), created political agendas
on which the security sector was on the top; democratic
objectives had to take back seats and wait for the
state-building process to be completed (mostly through
violent means). The 'grey zone' of transition was
occupied by countries which could not be defined either
dictatorial or clearly headed emerging democracies. And
finally, only few from the 'transitional club' deserve a
praise of being 'successful stories' (such as Slovenia,
Hungary or Czech Republic). The vast variety of
individual cases lead some analysts towards the
conclusion that the word 'post-communism' has lost its
relevance due to the different outcomes of the democratic
transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. All this calls
into doubt the dominant transitional paradigm, which
blind adherence makes the aid programs wedded to the main
focus on political processes and institutions in the
respective countries. That is the 'original sin' out of
which many of the civil society-related myths come
from.
The modern debate on civil society creates somewhat
cacophonous voices on the relationship between civil
society and (good) governance. The crucial point of
divergence is whether civil society should be understood
and developed as merely 'apolitical' sphere of 'dense
network of civil associations', or as former communist
dissidents have advocated a strong political civil
society that would energise resistance to the
authoritarian regimes. In any case, civil society idea
veiled with euphoria and promises for a better future was
embedded into the 'spring movements' against the
communist regimes. The truth is, however, that it was
rarely a goal per se but rather contained a mixture of
enthusiasm and idealism with very pragmatic approach
(i.e. ousting communist regimes and installing the new
political/national elites). Civil society had a very
instrumental and merely political role in mobilising the
citizens against the ancient regime. It was very much the
practical usage of the Marxist idea of Antonio Gramsci on
civil society as medium for alternative and independent
political activity against oppressive regime. This
understanding and practical use of civil society's
potential had a boomerang effect on the very Marxist
notion and affected the very core of the communist system
i.e. its 'untouchable' security sector. For example, the
"Solidarity" epic movement and resistance are usually
taken as an example par excellence in this regard. The
communist security forces were on a test having been used
against own citizens and lost much of their
legitimacy.
Former Yugoslavia's contribution to the post-communist
story on civil society is a bit weird one. This case
showed how the very idea of 'democracy' and 'civil
society' can be misused for ethno-nationalist
mobilisation and belligerent politics. Truly, the first
attempts for de-mystification of the security sector and
spelling out new alternatives for the country's security
arrangements began in the most developed Yugoslav
republic, in Slovenia. The "Slovenian Spring" announced
first signals and demands for democratic civilian control
over the Yugoslav military. Slovenian civil society was
born and established through the critical observation of
the security sector. Civil society's appeals were
authentic and democratic, but without any national
substance, at least, at the beginning. However, a year
before gaining independence societal impetus was turned
into an instrument with political goal. The public debate
primarily focused on the need for demilitarisation of the
Yugoslav society and at the end it finished with the
search for an optimal solution for Slovenian state and
security system. This turnabout is explained by a
domestic author, who argues:
"Compatibility of pacifism and militarism was achieved
that moment when the idea of nation-state was promoted
and won at the election. Through the establishment of the
nexus nation-state, which indivisible elements are the
concepts of "one's own military" and "national security",
there was introduced a distinction between "our" and
"their" military, between the good (Slovenes) and bad
(the others) boys, between justified and unjustified
militarisation, and at last instance - all these led
toward revolutionary (Leninist) logic of differentiation
between "just" and "unjust" wars ..."
The concept of Demilitarised Slovenia remained at the
level of a cultural notion. It was a kind of reaction and
antithesis of the Yugoslav Army's privileged social and
political position. However, when Slovene society and
politics agreed on the thesis that "in order to truly be
a nation, we need our own state to protect us", the
creation of a separate Slovene Army became a necessity.
The opposition to the ruling communist regime, especially
when accompanied by harsh repression, created heroic and
victim-image for the civil society's leaders that
appeared to be a political credit for their would-be
political careers. The civil society movements associated
with ethno-national mobilisation, and even populism (such
as Serbian pro-Milosevic's rallies) proved to be very
efficient but not democratically oriented. In some cases
'civil society' (certainly in its unnatural and weird
way) served for re-establishing new ruling elites who had
two slogans emblazoned on their banners: one read
"democracy," while the other demanded "justice for our
nation". Nationalists had no democratic credentials, and
no plans to deepen democracy once they came to power.
Their emphasis instead was on the claims of nationhood.
Political opposition as well as ordinary citizens who
dared to question the new regime and its actions were
labelled traitors, international spies, foes of their
country and its independence. The lessons learned from
the period of pre-communist collapse could be summarised
in the following way: first, the idea of civil society
was intrinsically associated with the 'natural'
antagonism with the 'state' (i.e. political sphere);
second, this 'antagonism' sometimes lasted as long as the
new elite got into power and civil society's leaders
transform into politicians.
For the sake of the democratisation process itself but
also for the purposes of the international democracy
promoters it is very important to define the 'framework'
of a civil society. In other words, one should define
what is to be included into the category of civil society
actors. Such classification might be especially useful
from a point of view of SSR. Obviously not every actor
has the same importance and can give the same
contribution to the overall endeavour. One of the most
widely spread myths on civil society is on its benign
nature and democratic potential. Even within this
benevolent understanding there are still open discussions
on what belongs to the civil society 'club'. It seems
that democracy-promoters rarely think on a strategy with
dealing with the 'dark side' of the civil society in the
countries in transition. As many rightly stress, civil
society can (and often has) very malign forms and
elements (such as various criminal gangs, mafia groups
often associated with state structures, private security
actors, etc.), such as the one created by Radovan
Karadzic in Republika Srpska (in Bosnia) or the ones
vigorously operating in today's Kosovo. (By the way, the
latter does not represent a classical state entity, but
the issue does not lose its accuracy even applied on a
would-be state or an international protectorate.).
The 'bright' side of the story on post-communist civil
society manifests extraordinary proliferation of NGOs and
other forms of organisations that reminds on the
appearance of 'mushrooms after the rain'. The picture
should be completed by inclusion of what many see as a
"virtual army of Western non-governmental organizations".
At first glance it looks as if the civil society space
constantly expands but it also gets (too) crowded.
Unfortunately, the number of NGOs and the figures
concerning their budgets, programmes and publications do
not always give a realistic picture on the effectiveness
and vivacity of civil society. The 'traditional' civil
society, that once ago managed to keep ties of the
communist society, the neighbourhood, seems as if it has
lost its significance in the modern times. Interestingly,
some recent public opinion surveys indicate that the
citizens exist in a sort of a 'vacuum'. Namely, the exact
number of registered members of NGOs and other
associations is extremely low but even more indicative is
a very high per cent of people unwilling to join any
political or non-governmental organisation. That shows a
'missing link' between the citizens and the state and
societal forms of organisation. The huge gap and even
distrust into the institutions and leading elites still
leaves some free space for other 'unidentified' forms of
social networking, which usually stays beyond political
and other actions.
2. On Perceptions of the SSR and
the Role of Civil Society
Somewhat congested civil society in the transitional
countries is burdened with various paradoxes, which are
given different interpretations depending on the one who
does so. The first and most important paradox is that it
is not because of the membership that the civil society
looks dense but rather because of numerous forms of
formally registered associations. The second indicative
thing is a pretty vague 'division of labour' is
accompanied with competing interests in the arena. Being
very tiny and not well-established agents, local NGOs are
constantly engaged into grants hunting, mostly from
foreign sources. However, sometimes the competition
emerges between international NGOs and local ones over
certain projects, not to talk about purely Western
competition. The bad image and sometimes the bitter taste
that stay at the end of the day raise the question if all
this is about business as usual.
The civil societies into the transitional countries
are usually fragmented and badly synchronised. The local
NGOs are nothing but 'one man/woman show' created with no
intention and/or power to make a real impact on the
societal/political sphere. As some see it, for a good
market presentation i.e. for a NGO to be easily sold out
all that is necessary is relatively good education,
English proficiency and an attractive name (usually
centred on democracy, peace-building or human rights). On
the side of the international partners, the situation
shows high degree of competitiveness, lack of
coordination and awareness of the other in-theatre
actors. The other extreme is related with international
NGOs' underestimation of the local potentials and bring
their own experts to work in the field. That makes also
the foreign budgets to make one full circle and
practically stay within the original framework. On more
substantial level, it is even more important that foreign
experts engaged in such missions (some call them
cynically 'missioners') usually have no expertise on the
respective country and its specific problems
whatsoever.
The empowerment of civil society in respect to the SSR
in the countries in transition depends on several factors
that should be taken into account by everybody
involved.
1. Security sector belongs to the spheres of special
interest for every state. Most of them are unwilling to
let 'non-experts' and/or foreigners to meddle with their
sovereign domains. Acceptance of the international
assistance is usually a result of the countries' wish to
gain a better image in the eyes of the 'international
community' (especially in the light of their wish to join
NATO). The likeliness of a state's officials to cooperate
is usually higher with external 'guests' than with the
local actors. The good standing of the international NGOs
could, consequently, be very helpful in providing better
prestige and positioning of the local NGOs with their
reluctant governments.
2. In the war torn societies the civil society's
actions are not needed only in respect to the 'formal'
(i.e. visible) security sector but also in regard to many
shadowy actors (such as non-state security actors,
paramilitaries, rebel groups, corrupted elites, etc.).
The crucial question is not always how to 'empower'
(parts of the) civil society but also how to 'disempower'
(other parts) of that very civil society.
3. The crucial issue for the security sector reform
(SSR) endeavours imported from the West is the selection
of the local partners. The same question can be posed on
the other side: how to chose or is it possible to
'select' one's external partner. It looks as if there is
no reliable criteria towards which the local NGOs should
try meet in order to be granted a support from the
external sources. On the other hand, the local NGOs have
much more limited possibilities to be 'selective' because
having an external partner is often a matter of
survival.
4. Being too close to the power centres, as the
experience of the countries in transition shows, can be
very seductive. Intellectuals and scholars are usually
the main agents of civil society but they are not immune
of these affections. To the contrary, often they change
the 'sides' and are seduced by the political
opportunities and/or by their being 'opinion-makers'.
Civil society in the post-communism brings in a special
element of 'seductiveness' - it can be transformed into a
profitable business only for the people who are in a
position to articulate voices and serve as messengers
between elites and society, while for the rest of the
society gets only the leftovers.
5. Some local analysts rightly talk about 'enforced
politicisation' of the civil society. One of the reasons
is already mentioned 'mobility' between the political and
civil society 'elites'. However, in the opinion of some
intellectuals, the post-communist Balkan countries lack
human potential and time to develop separate economic,
political and intellectual elites. In their opinion, it
is a moral duty of the intellectuals to get politically
involved in the processes in a society burdened by
nationalism and traditionalism. Others, however, believe
that independent civil society 'elite' has to stay
independent and critical towards the political sphere
even when the 'good guys' get into office, and in that
context they warn on a sort f a 'brain drain' that
usually follows the more radical political changes. The
additional reason for this 'politicisation' of the civil
society is in the very fact that in the turbulent times,
when the state and society face historical choices, civil
society's activity is exactly about political choices,
values and methods.
6. No matter how important is the building of an
alliance between international and local actors there is
a tendency of taking ownership of the conflict in all its
dimensions. This is the experience drawn from the
Yugoslav conflict(s). External interventionists rushing
for fast results and quick fixes have usually forgotten
that the reforms of security sector depend merely of the
acceptance by the local stakeholders. Building up the
ability of the respective societies to find solutions for
themselves is usually one of the missing points in most
of the realised projects.
7. Conditionality of the international assistance also
may hamper the civil society's development, especially if
the local partners perceive it as unjust or as
blackmailing.
8. As tailoring of the security structures'
composition has proved to be a long-term and rather
sensitive process within the national efforts, the same
applies to the external actors. However, the rush into
direct and overt interventions often give opposite
effects in long run, especially if the point of
intervention has been identified only within the security
structures. Following the 'logic of the business' some
forget that the SSR cannot be the first item on the
democratisation agenda but represents rather a
'mine-field' that calls for a patient and cautious
approach.
3. Teaching and/or Preaching:
Learning from One's Mistakes or Misfortunes
Various and numerous exchange programmes, workshops,
trainings and assistance endeavours have flourished in
all transitional countries in the past decade. Something
unimaginable before the Cold War has become a fashionable
trend all at sudden. This development helped inciting a
new and more open way of thinking of problems that used
to be reserved only for researchers of military
provenience. In many respects, 'eastern' scholars have
started learning the alphabet of democracy and democratic
control of armed forces throughout their frequent
meetings with their 'western' counterparts. After the
initial blooming, however, also some problems
appeared.
The 'recipients/students' have often been offered
quite basic knowledge and even old-fashioned theories.
The original interest of the 'teachers' in their own
environment has, however, shifted toward issues beyond
the classical theory of civil-military relations. The
result is not difficult to assume: again the gap has not
been bridged between 'Western' and 'Eastern' strategic
community and civil society. In other words, dominant
scheme is that there is an invisible division between
'recipients' and 'donors'. The obvious lack of real
dialogue and exchange of expertise and opinions resembles
the talk of deaf people. The vocabulary of the chatter
class has been 'enriched' by introduction of the
distinction between 'internationals' and 'locals' even
without being noticed that it assumes paternalistic
approaches and implies un-equal and humiliating
relationship for one of the 'partners'.
Openness in regard to one's own society but also
towards the outer (regional, international) community is
(or should be) an inherent characteristic of genuine
civil society. Progress depends on the open and frequent
contacts with various forums and associations existing on
a national level but also on the international one.
Hence, any civil society (and particularly an immature
one) faces challenges of international cooperation.
Mediation with one's own governments and societies is
still the major objective. However, 'internationals'
still overlook a very important fact of life. While for
them SSR can be a noble project, business or even hobby
it can be highly dangerous matter for their local
partners dealing with the SSR. Such activities call for
an exceptional personal courage and many of the local
intellectuals have paid (or will pay) huge prices. Their
personal examples thou rare can make far more impact and
get bigger echo than any successful international
workshop or publication.
Having proved unable to cope with the transitional
hardships as well as with the intra-state conflicts in a
peaceful manner, many SEE states have became a scene of a
decade long presence and interference of the
international community. In that sense the external
influence (both positive and negative) has become a very
important variable of all significant developments and
processes in the region. The effects of this unique
external policies can be seen through two main dimensions
- conflict resolution endeavours and political/economic
impetus. Unfortunately, political meddling was not always
accompanied with relevant scholar analysis and advice
about the countries concerned. As some authors rightly
stress, research and policy communities do not
communicate well. What has never been lacking is 'peace
and/or democracy business' for all kinds of
international, governmental and NGO missions in the
region.
There is a widespread belief that the issue of
democratic management of the security sector cannot be
seen in the traditional perspective as a purely domestic
affair of the state concerned any longer. Concrete
analysis of the effectiveness, or better the
possibilities and limitations of international assistance
to the post-communist countries must take into account,
at least, two dimensions. First, one has to identify
points of 'intervention' and methods how to do it in the
best possible way. The other question is identification
of the appropriate agents who can do the job. So far, the
interventions from abroad resemble to physicians
prescribing treatment without prior diagnosis. To put it
in a simpler way: research community has a knowledge-how
but has no means to make an impact, while the policy
community has a budget and a will but is still unaware of
its being ignorant about the basic facts on their own
missions. The policy community pick ups the recipients
countries ad hoc and in accordance to some major
political concerns. Since the priorities are made in rush
(due to the somewhat unpredictable political turnabouts,
such as fall of Milosevic, for example), there is no time
to collect all relevant data, to scan the situation on
the 'terrain' and to create specific methodology of
work.
The race that followed the 2001 October change in
Yugoslavia, in the words of the local experts, was akin
to 'safari'. Over-night the deeply isolated and demonised
country turned into a very attractive market for selling
various democratisation projects. This very case,
however, shows also another side of the coin of the
democracy-promotion community. Truly, a vast
international effort (i.e. money) had used in civil
society's empowerment in order to oust the strongman in
Belgrade. However, in the aftermath of the 'Belgrade
Revolution' each side claimed "we did it" - the
'internationals' had to justify their budgets and
politics, while the 'locals' needed an internal
legitimisation. By its very nature the democratic control
of the security sector is supposed to be determined and
dependent merely on the internal factors. The way they
are implemented in a certain society depends on a list of
factors with various natures (societal, economic,
political, cultural, and historical).
In regard to most of these factors there is
practically no way of influencing or re-directing them in
the short-run either from within the country or through
the international assistance. For instance, historical
traditions are what they are (although historical
perceptions differ sometimes radically). Economic
development is also a process that takes time and is
usually accompanied with many hardships and pains.
Democratic constitutions and legal regulations can be
easily copied but their implementation calls for
democratic culture that assumes decades of hard work and
learning on own mistakes. The radical re-building of the
security sector in the countries with deep traumatised
historical experiences are very much related with the
courage, willingness, self-confidence and disobedience of
the citizens.
On the surface it may look that the dictatorial
regimes are strong and powerful because of their reliance
on the use of force (i.e. security structures), but the
moment people dare and become disobedient the regimes
show their fragility and collapse as a card tower. The
question is how can international community help in this
regard? Hence, the international assistance programmes
should be focused on a positive action in the points
where it is indeed possible to prevent, support or advice
the local agents. Expertise of the international
organisations (governmental, international,
non-governmental, foundations, academia, etc.) in many
cases represents very useful and helpful advice on how
democratic institutions can assert themselves, and
especially how to avoid possible dangers and challenges
that lead in opposite direction. However, despite the
current 'inflation' of offered external expertise there
is something that most of the donor-agencies forget:
expertise must be based on a solid knowledge NOT only
about democracy but rather about the target country.
Abstract and merely theoretical concepts have no
effect if they do not correspond with the conditions that
prevail in a certain country and especially its specific
needs. So far there is a usual pattern of giving such
expertise: the expert has his/her first contact with the
state-receiver when comes for the mission accomplice.
Paradoxically enough, the expert gets confused and needs
some time to understand the national setting, the
political culture - and finally, needs some instruction
from the local staff. Given the sensitivity of SSR the
international donor organisations prefer to be on the
safe side i.e. to work with consent of the host
government. The 'real-politic' requires that they
cooperate and launch programs even when the partner has a
dubious international standing. Thus, since very
beginning there is a sort of 'flirting' with the host
government officials and the local strategic community.
Giving open support to the critically oriented NGOs may
endanger the 'business'. Thus, the 'compromise solution'
sometimes follows quite a weird logic. Namely, the
'perfect' local partner can be one of the so-called
phantom NGOs, established either by the ruling regime or
by the former supporters of the overthrown dictatorial
regime who have just re-written their CVs and put on
attractive labels (such as 'Atlantic Club of...').
Reforms concerning democratic management of the
security sector inevitably involve reliance on foreign
civil (and military) expertise due to the simple fact
that one has not enough time to 'learn on one's own
mistakes'. Nevertheless there are also some objective
limitations. The best proof is the fact that South East
Europe has the biggest ratio of 'democratisers' per
capita while still stays a grey zone of instability and
insecurity. Many international agents get engaged in a
region not because of their altruistic wish to promote
democracy but rather because of running their business
and circulating their budgets, or at least that is the
general perception among the local community. For
example, recently a well-known Western-based centre for
security studies made a concrete proposal to an
independent research centre in Yugoslavia. According to
it, some 13 foreign experts were supposed to give
training to 17 parliamentarians, while the role of the
local research centre was supposed to be only in
organisational matters with more than humiliating
compensation for their work. Such an arrogant attitude
only contributes to deepening the gap between the parties
that are supposed to work together on promotion of the
democratic control of the security sector. The Western
officials and experts have constantly claimed, "the West
does not want to impose a model of democratic control of
armed forces". It may be true but the immature political
elites in the post-communist states have developed
clientele psychology and insincerity.
As long as there is no open and frank dialogue between
the donors and receivers on the authentic needs and the
best methods of satisfying them - there cannot be
substantial results. In the globalised world the
questions related to peace and democracy promotion call
for international co-operation. But cooperation is not
the same as assistance. Hence, the ultimate criterion for
the effectiveness of the international assistance to the
governmental and civil society institutions is (or
better, will be) a hypothetical situation in which the
aid receivers transform into equal partners and
furthermore, learn from each other. It looks even more
important to stimulate regional cooperation. There is a
huge unused potential of sharing good, and especially bad
experiences from the past decade equally. There is a
striking mix of best and worst practices when it comes to
the civil societies' role in the past developments.
Surprisingly, these cases in the Balkans do not follow
the stereotypes on the respective countries'
international images. For example, some of the best
practices can be found in Yugoslavia and Croatia, which
civil societies had to cope and get mature during the
struggles with the open autocracies, while Macedonia that
used to be known as 'oasis of peace' has the weakest and
ethnically divided civil society. Most of the countries
in the region share similar problems but the achievements
differ. Their bringing together may help in various ways,
such as tackling the most sensitive issues of the role of
their security forces in the nation-building and the
state building processes, their transformation in the
context of the democratic changes in the political
sphere, and finally - the whole discussion can help the
reconciliation process and building a regional awareness
on the indivisible nature of peace and security.
Democratic control of the armed forces cannot be a
gift. Hypothetically, even if one imagines that it is
possible - yet there is a necessary precondition i.e.
there must be willingness for the gift to be accepted and
embraced. Post-communist states, especially those
burdened with internal conflicts, first of all must be
ready to accept the 'gift' and to open the package.
Transitional civil societies should accept responsibility
for introduction and advocacy of the new ideas and
concepts. At the same time, their counterparts in the
West bear responsibility regarding their own policy
community, which have to learn to listen to the research
community and its advice before the major political
decisions are made.
4. The Way Ahead: The Day After
Western Aid Ceases?
Despite the good wishes and willingness, often the
donor community has own constraints that directly reflect
on the state of affairs in the recipient countries.
First, the number of 'clients' that need international
assistance grows rapidly, far faster than the increase of
the international organisations' budgets. The second
factor is that the target countries and regions are often
selected according to some global geo-political
considerations: one day a country can be in the headlines
and gets full attention, but the next day it may be
easily forgotten. That is why the most important question
for everybody in this business should be - what to do the
day after the Western assistance ceases to flow in the
country/region?
A decade of international assistance in the Balkans
sadly shows a very ambiguous picture. The dependency
syndrome is often associated with a self-pity or victim
image held by the local communities. Citizens still
suffer out of apathy and unbelief in own potentials and
strength to take own destiny in the hands. Unlike the
citizens, some individuals and small groups are
fascinated either by state or by 'civil society
business'. The race for international grants and pleasing
the donors make them beholden to their foreign donors
more than own public. As some more critical analysts
rightly stress, the local NGOs are often funny
caricatures of their Western models. Their objectives are
merely limited to pleasing the donors, and in that way to
ensure own existence and budget. Instead of speaking for
a segment of their own society and to their government,
they invent stories that they guess the Western donors
would like to hear. These 'usual suspects' are rarely to
be found out from the capitals and small elites. In case
the local NGOs are unlucky with the international donors
they easily turn towards the internal alternatives and
become clients of semi-political groups and/or political
parties, and thus lose their independence and raison
d'etre. Some naively believe that the recovery and civil
society maturation need time and that naturally the
'generational change' will bring more positive results.
The sad truth is that these countries are facing bad
perspectives ether because of the huge 'brain drain'
towards the West or because of having traumatised young
generations that still remember and suffer from the war
traumas, poverty and social hopelessness. In such
circumstances human security plays far more important
role than any military/defence/police reform. In other
words, the international donors should think twice before
launching an assistance programme, or should wisely
re-think how can the SSR help re-allocate more money into
the social sphere by making security structures more
transparent, less expensive and more accountable.
It is not difficult to conclude that 'internationals'
come and go, but 'locals' stay and it's up to them to
finish their 'homework'. So far the most helpful
programmes have been the ones that focused on cherishing
and supporting grass-root movements and local expertise.
It is possible only with Western institutions that do not
hold stereotypes on 'communism' and its alleged lack of
professionals and knowledge. These institutions do not
preach but try to empower the best core of the local
civil society by showing empathy, understanding and
encouraging them to find their own solutions for the
accumulated problems. Unfortunately, the majority in the
international race for democratisation business lacks
empathy and refers to the recipient countries with
cynicism and irony calling them in the couloirs 'ghostly'
or 'primitive' countries that should be though the
lessons if necessary by endlessly repeating the 'Western
wisdoms'. Instead of sticking to their moralistic
approaches and the perception on self- righteousness, the
Western donors should also think a bit more on the
conflicting role the Western diplomacy, military power
and aid programmes have been playing for years. It is far
easier to judge than to get into one's shoes and sense
the whole seriousness of the situation in which the
'locals' have to live and promote democracy.
The reality in many of the countries that badly need
consolidated governments and powerful civil societies is
depressive indeed. However, the paths and options are
numerous, while case-by-case approach is the best.
Regional mirroring and exchange sometimes can be more
beneficial and less costly than any missionaries from the
West. Furthermore, the actions must get wider scope and
reach people in the small provincial towns equally as it
is the case with he capitals. Training of the future
trainers makes the better future a reachable goal.
Democracy as well as civil society will hang over as
empty phrases as long as there is no substance i.e. solid
economic ground for change and progress. Weak
non-functional states and poverty create fertile ground
for extremism, radicalism and all negative forms of civil
society. Striving to achieve grand results the Western
donors are sometimes unaware that doing small (on the
surface insignificant things) can be much more valuable
than their expensive conferences, stock-taking charades,
etc. The civil societies of the poor and non-democratic
countries badly need small things that would help them do
their 'homework' (i.e. deal with their own sources of
insecurity and their 'securitizers' on the top of the
state hierarchy). These small things include more
libraries, journals, access to reliable and independent
information, Internet, tools and methodology of better
education, etc. International donors should make up their
mind whether they prefer 'high profile' policy-oriented
spectacles or 'low-visibility' but more effective
approaches. The latter will certainly not bring fast and
excellent publicity but will breed the seed for the
better future.
©
TFF & the author 2002
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