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State
terror, terrorism, and the spiral of violence:
A
Balkan perspective
By
Biljana
Vankovska
Institute for Defence and Peace
Studies, Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje,
Macedonia
TFF
associate
1. A Global
Perspective and General Deliberations - and Concrete
Repercussions
September 11th will surely go down in the annals of
terrorism as a defining moment. Terrorism had long been
recognised as a global, regional, and national security
threat, but the developments of the last year have the
potential to outline the future shape of the world
community. September 11th gave momentum to two processes,
the consequences of which are very difficult to control
or foresee. The mass-scale terrorist attacks and the 'war
on terrorism' are caught in the same vicious circle. They
comprise a global spiral of violence. The crucial
difference behind this 'post-modern' terrorism is that it
involves major non-state and state powers: a powerful
global network of terrorist cells, Al-Qaeda, and the only
global super-power, the USA.
Unfortunately, the struggle between the 'elephants'
brings heavy consequences to the 'ants' of the 'global
village'. Certain parts of the 'village' possess their
own historical and practical experiences with terrorism
and state terror. For example, the Balkan experience
confirms the well-known thesis that one man's terrorist
is another man's freedom fighter. It seems that the
global, regional, and national dimensions of terrorism
propel each other, as their configurations are changed
through mutual intercourse. Therefore, theoretical
demarcation between several crucial notions, such as
terrorism, terror, freedom fighters, guerrilla, rebels,
etc. has immense utility in today's circumstances. The
significance of such a demarcation goes beyond academic
purposes, because the potential (mis)use of each of these
categories has an immediate political consequence. On the
other hand, it is also true that the politicians seldom
follow scholars' advice or have time or understanding for
their research findings. Unfortunately, in this era of
serious terrorist threats, political understanding
prevails over critical intellectual thinking.
The phenomenon of terrorism neither began on 11th
September 2001 nor is Al-Qaeda its most dangerous
proponent. The September 11th developments have been
given an extraordinary significance for several reasons.
First on the list is the death toll, although the number
of casualties is not the highest in the world history of
terrorism. The second factor is the way in which the
terrorist attacks were undertaken. The third factor was
shock at the vulnerability of the only super-power, which
also contributed to the harshness of the response. Human
lives were lost, yet the US tries only to regain its
credibility and reputation as a mighty super-power
capable of providing security for its citizens.
One year later, one can say that terrorism has not
been diminished but instead intensified. A strike like
the first strike was not repeated, but this can give a
false impression. The sources of terrorism in the world
are deeply entrenched. The causes of terrorism as well as
of any other form of extremism are to be found in
poverty, social injustice, and unequal distributions of
resources and power on national, regional, and
international levels.
During the last one-year period, the most dominant
'definition' of terrorism has been the one given by the
US President. In the interpretation of Bush and the
international media, terrorism is associated exclusively
with the so-called non-state actors. In other words,
state terrorism is out of the picture, or even worse - it
is excused and justified:
"Because the US Government mobilizes for war in a
tribalist manner, it is disabled from reflecting upon its
own conduct, and is unwilling to take steps that might
address those grievances that are just, and in accord
with international law and morality. Worse than this, it
is seduced by its own hyperbolic rhetoric about terrorism
to throw its weight behind oppressive policies of great
severity... To add Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and
Jaish-I-Mohammed to the 'terrorist underworld', as Bush
did in the State of the Union address, is to associate
terrorism exclusively with non-state actors when in fact
violence against civilian population is engaged by both
sides, and with greater ferocity by the states in
question, whether Israel or India. The proper role for
the US in these conflicts is to work toward a just
solution that brings peace and accommodation, and not to
confuse its response to 11 September with policies of
support for a variety of state terrorisms."
The ongoing anti-terrorist campaign headed by
President Bush centres on this very narrow definition of
terrorism, which actually gives political and moral
legitimacy to state terrorism. Some analysts make a case
for the well-founded debate over the decade-long use of
terrorism as a part of US foreign policy. Interestingly,
the ground for this debate is the way terrorism is
defined in the US. Namely, in a 1984 US document (US Army
Operational Concept of Terrorism Counteraction) terrorism
is defined as a "calculated use of violence or threat of
violence to attain goals that are political, religious,
or ideological in nature... through intimidation,
coercion, or instilling fear." According to the American
Heritage Dictionary, terrorism is the "use of force or
violence by a person or an organized group against people
or property with the intention of intimidating or
coercing societies or governments, often for ideological
or political reasons." The US itself has a long history
of using such methods in order to topple regimes or to
impose others. In one recent example, adding to the
'humanitarian intervention' rationale, Madeline Albright
repeatedly stated that the NATO campaign was not directed
against the Yugoslav people but against the Milosevic
regime. Even today many US analysts claim that
Milosevic's fall was a direct consequence of the
air-campaign. In the words of Douglas Lummis, a
distinguished political scientist, "air bombardment is
state terrorism. It is the terrorism of the rich. It has
burned up and blasted apart more innocents in the past
six decades than have all the anti-state terrorists who
ever lived".
The 1999 NATO intervention in Yugoslavia has made a
special impact on the global understanding and evolution
of terrorism and state terror. The intervention itself
sent a clear message all over the world. Unfortunately,
that message did not address human rights protection -
instead the message appealed to regimes that gravely
violated part of their population's human rights, as well
as various secessionist and terrorist groups. The message
read: violence is a worthwhile political tool; the
distinction between the 'terrorist' and 'freedom fighter'
(or, fighter for greater human rights) is a matter of
discussion and interpretation; once a group legitimises
itself as national-liberation and/or rebel army, it has
pretty fair chances to get support through international
intervention. Unfortunately, the message that was sent in
the September 11th's aftermath is also very clear.
Denunciation of non-state terrorism has provided an
endless arsenal for many governments in dealing with
their own terrorists (such as Russian, Israeli or
Chinese). In this 'securitizing' game, a terrorist threat
is simply what governments define as such. The world-wide
alliance in the war against terrorism is a rather false
but obviously a dangerous one. Each of the allies has
interests of its own, specific terrorist groups that
threaten, and rather colourful 'counter-terrorism
policy.' In their small security games, states agree on
one crucial thing, that they are 'naturally' exempted
from the list of the 'bad actors' and they take it for
granted that in the war against terrorism the final end
justifies the means. Furthermore, the decades of
inconsistent US foreign policy created grounds for a
distinction between 'good' and 'bad' terrorist groups,
depending on their usefulness and loyalty to US strategic
interests. In many ways Osama Bin Laden is an American
product, which also applies to Saddam Hussein. In other
words, the US has a long history of supporting certain
terrorist groups which could have been used as proxies
for achieving US national interests all over the world
(Afghan mujahedins, UCK, Northern Alliance, etc.) but
also terrorist states (such as Israel). Bush's cry that
'everybody who is not with us is against us' serves,
among other things, as an alibi for internal political
and ethnic purges and struggles. The September 11th
attacks triggered a vicious cycle and counter-terrorism
has become a name for the endless spiral of violence.
However, the ongoing 'war' is raising tension and
impatience with some of the US allies within NATO.
European powers (except the UK) are getting impatient to
see some palpable result from 'our victory' and
eventually the end of the anti-terrorist campaign.
Instead they are facing a new 'referendum on loyalty' to
USA. Since the very beginning the US has usurped the
right to define the enemy, the goals of the campaign, and
its means. It seems that Americans have discovered the
useful function of the 'war on terror' regarding their
allies. The war has transformed into an efficient means
for disciplining NATO/EU (which happens approximately
every other year) and also for diverting their attention
from the previous fiasco. For example, a year later,
several questions are still waiting to be answered: 1)
What is going on with hunt for Usama Bin Laden? 2) Are
there any reliable indicators to prove that Al-Qaeda
suffered serious and irreparable damage? 3) Is there a
functioning government in Afghanistan and does the
population live better (particularly, the women)? 4) Did
the American local allies turn into war criminals,
massacring thousands of war prisoners before the eyes of
the US troops? 5) Are Western citizens' rights and
liberties in better or worse shape today? 6) Do the
countries involved, such as Russia, China, Israel, India,
Pakistan, etc. like the war on terrorism - and why? 7)
Are the Guantanamo prisoners under Geneva Conventions
protection or not?
The US retaliation politics may look like an effective
and decisive way to oppose the Al-Qaeda threat,
especially in the eyes of the domestic public that
becomes paranoid under daily announcements coming from
their intelligence services. Despite the harsh stance and
calls for the total defeat of terrorism, the world faces
America's inability to be (or at least to pretend to be)
an honest broker in any regional or local conflict all
over the globe. The possibilities to use double standards
and to preserve international credibility are more than
minor. What is ethically justified in the US response to
terrorists is now well exploited by others who are not
ready to listen to the US double speech when urging for
restraint and peaceful conflict resolution. The most
illustrative case is, certainly, Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Overplaying the card of the global war against
terror has a price and hits as a boomerang in US foreign
policy attempts in other parts of the world. Thus, the
war against terror not only propels the spiral of
violence in a global scope, but also has a strong impact
on regional spirals, especially in the zones that are
heavily under the external influence of the US.
The war on terrorism, or in the words of President
Bush 'the first war of the 21st century', has apparently
introduced some novelties in the general understanding of
peace and security in the world, and particularly about
the so-called Western security community. First of all,
it has changed the perceptions of war, security, and the
superiority (relevance) of military power. Military
experts and strategists have started thinking about the
new security challenges and adequate responses. Indeed,
the new millennium has begun in a most tragic and
unexpected way. Sadly enough, very few consider if
mankind, or its great powers, is wiser in handling the
new security challenges and conflicts. It has become
highly fashionable to speak about the so-called new
security agenda and about the new non-military aspects of
security. The events of September 11th proved that the
agenda had become reality. But it is not so self-evident
that the roots of the 'new agenda' had been embedded in
the 'old world order', i.e. in the world which evolved
around the philosophy of violence and domination,
arrogance of the powerful versus the powerless, weak, and
poor. Today's terrorism, however, has forms that threaten
to destroy the whole world. It is a public secret that
there is an illegal and very profitable business of
trafficking radioactive materials, biological weapons,
etc. Superiority has nothing to do with the military
power any more.
The world seems to be facing an imposed and rather
false dilemma: either opposition to terrorism or
opposition to state terror. The question is usually
simplified in several forms. Are we wholeheartedly for
the international alliance against terrorism or not? Do
we support civilised (Western?) values or not? Some go
further and raise the question if we back the axis of
good or evil. Of course, that is nothing but the old
moralistic trap of 'either-or' thinking. Few dare
explicitly say that there is no contradiction in being
against both terrorism and the militaristic response to
it. The democratic conscience of mankind calls for equal
opposition to non-state and global state terrorism.
The current war against terrorism, especially in its
US variant, resembles an unlimited war against undefined
enemy. US leadership has declared an endless state of war
in the country and also pressures its allies to follow
their example. Some analysts warn against the somewhat
Orwellian permanent war against a vaguely defined and
ever-changing enemy. The state of war itself nurtures
fear and justifies a regime's autocratic practices.
The ongoing 'war on terrorism', which obviously spills
over in terms of its geographic scope and its goals,
contributes to certain 'de-territorialising' of the
conflict and global 'securitisation'. It seems that
global security is what USA/NATO define as such, and for
the sake of security one should employ all necessary
means; while the threats should be met by all emergency
means (or as Colin Powell put it, regardless whether "it
is legally correct or not"). The US has defined
terrorists and the terrorist threat in absolute terms. .
This definition excludes any partial or compromise
solution in ending the 'war'. Thus, the victory will have
to be total, and 'peace and justice' only under US terms.
The imposed global motto reads: what is good for the USA
is good for everybody else in the world. In other words,
it is about the principle of 'universality' that does not
allow any other regional or national interests.
Consciously or not, USA is involved in what looks like a
mission impossible. They expect to defeat terrorism by
military means, and if necessary by the reduction of
democratic principles and human rights' standards, thus
contributing to the destruction of the very values it is
supposed to protect at all costs. Finally, nothing better
could have happened to Osama Bin Laden but the 'war on
terror,' whose military nature gives rise to further
terrorism.
2. Balkan
Contribution to Terrorism and to the War on
Terrorism
More than a decade prior to September 11th, the
Balkans, or the territory of former Yugoslavia, had been
trapped into its own reality, mainly shaped by the
conflict cycle and spiral of violence. The outer world
was interested in this region rather than other way
around. The former and post-Yugoslav societies have
invented every possible way of justify the use of
violence, from a perspective of its proponents,
proclaimed (just) goals, means, etc. The ubiquity and
diversity of 'terrorism' became a form of local folklore.
The definitional game-playing was supposed to blur rather
than to clarify the differences between terrorism and
other forms of political violence; between government
terrorism and resistance terrorism; between guerrilla
warfare, crime and terrorism. One way or another, the
central point was justification and legitimation of the
use of violence against the anti-state terrorist groups
or against the state terror proponents. For more than ten
years, the dominant dilemma was state integrity vs.
national self-determination, sovereignty vs. human
rights, and collective vs. individual human rights.
Going further back into history of the region, one may
point out that terrorism was an old phenomenon. The only
difficulty is that every national history easily
recognises others' terrorists, while at the same time
highly praising one's own freedom fighters and martyrs.
For example, in light of the current crisis in Macedonia,
majority ethnic Macedonians would easily identify UCK
fighters as terrorists, but very few would agree that a
large part of VMRO history was as a terrorist
organisation. Furthermore, the famous group of assassins
from the late 19th and early 20th century "Gemidzii," to
a certain extent resembles the modern Palestinian
suicide-bombers. Macedonian assassins opted for terrorist
actions and sacrificing their own lives in order to turn
European public attention to the subjugated population in
Macedonia. Since each nation's history contains similar
examples, the well-known saying "one's terrorist is
other's freedom fighter" illustrates the way terrorism
has been perceived in the region. The Balkans has always
had its own favourable conditions and causes for the rise
of terrorist groups, and that problem has never been
really tackled given the various perceptions and
definitions terrorism. The most recent global 'war on
terror', therefore, concerns the region in a very bizarre
way. It is highly relevant only in two points. Firstly,
the governments feel obliged to manifest their loyalty
with the US, although their contributions to the 'global
war' are mainly symbolic and sometimes ridiculous.
Obviously, it has nothing to do with the awareness of the
security threats and the need to respond to them, but is
merely inspired by the awareness about the ultimate role
of the US in the region. The second, more substantial
point, concerns the new possibility to compare our
terrorism with the global one, to take side with the
'good guys,' and to 'empirically' prove that our evil is
as big as the global one. Certainly, in the
post-September 11th period, state terrorism gets better
standing, unlike the prior period that favoured the
sub-state actors.
The global development image in the Balkans resembles
the reflection from a broken mirror. Each puzzle of the
post-Yugoslav reality gets a new arsenal for
interpretation of the just and unjust wars of the
previous decade, which would have practically no effect
on the global 'war' but may keep the potential of
reinforcing the future local debates on the local
terrorism. Theoretical discourse and the difficulties in
differentiation of terrorism from the other related
phenomena (freedom fighters, rebels, criminal and Mafia
gangs) have very down-to-earth repercussions for the
Balkan reality. The use of double standards and
double-speech by international factors, who are allegedly
assisting in handling the local conflicts, unfortunately
does not elevate the problems. The rather vague
definition of 'evil' gives a very practical alibi for all
those who have been overplaying the card of the struggle
against terrorists and the freedom fighters.
During the Bosnian war, given the international
perception of the Bosnians as the only victims, the
international community and particularly the USA turned a
blind eye to the concrete support of various Islamic
states, groups and organisations. Even in the post-war
reconstruction the Americans welcomed the donations and
grants coming from sometime shadowy sources. For example,
it is well known that the so-called "Train and Equip"
programme of military reconstruction of the Federation's
armed forces was financed by the generous donations of
Islamic countries. A private US military company (MPRI)
got an excellent business opportunity in implementing the
programme, while the US administration could pursue its
regional interests in providing 'just balance of military
power' in Dayton Bosnia without spending a single US
tax-payers' dollar. However, the post-September 11th
developments changed perceptions and all alleged Bosnian
connections with Al-Qaeda gained the highest importance.
For the sake of the global 'war on terrorism' (i.e. US
national security interests) the fragile rule of law
principle in Bosnia was diminished. The suspects from
Bosnia were transferred to Guantanamo with no respect for
the legal procedure or the sovereignty of the
internationally recognised state.
A more indicative example of state terror versus
sub-state terrorism in the Balkans is the Third
Yugoslavia case, the Serbia-Kosovo decade-long hostile
interplay. As in many other deeply protracted intra-state
conflicts, there was a blame-game between the state
(belonging to the majority ethnic group) and the
anti-state forces (i.e. minority group's opposition).
Both deeply violent structures, actually, had fed and
supported each other towards the 'final clash'. Harsher
repression from Belgrade would provoke more decisive
violent resistance and a wider recruitment base for UCK;
and vice versa - bloodier and more frequent attacks from
the UCK forces would provide solid legitimacy for state
security forces and their actions. The international
community's flirting with Milosevic did not help but
deepened the crisis. While putting out the fire in
Croatia and Bosnia, the internationals found Milosevic's
role both dangerous and useful. He was the main
negotiator and even signatory of the Dayton Accords in
1995, despite his horrendous records in Kosovo since
1989. Ibrahim Rugova was left in the lurch and with no
arguments for the peaceful resistance to Belgrade regime.
Milosevic's 'peace-maker' role in Dayton indirectly
de-legitimised the only real peaceful actor in the
region, Rugova. The armed resistance appeared to be the
only way, so UCK capitalised on Dayton's omission to
tackle the Kosovo conflict. The international community
had never come with a consistent policy regarding the
Kosovo conflict, and particularly, the armed resistance
by the Albanians. At the beginning the UCK was ignored or
downplayed, only to be later placed on the US list of
terrorist organisations in the world. Only in early 1998
did they become rebels. During the 1999 NATO campaign
they were promoted to freedom fighters, and thus became
eligible for being US proxies in an eventual ground war
against Yugoslavia. For that purpose, the former
terrorist organisation was overtly equipped and trained
by US and British special forces. In the Kosovo war
aftermath the western allies understood that they had
created a 'monster they were not able to control'. That
structure soon multiplied into several other similar
armed formations. It can be hardly said that the West had
not been aware of the deep Mafia origin and support for
the Kosovo struggle. Some facts reported in a US Congress
documents about Al-Qaeda presence in Kosovo were very
well-used by Milosevic for his defence in the Hague
Tribunal.
The Macedonian perspective on terrorism and the
ongoing global 'war' does not differ a lot from the
others in the region. In a divided, conflict-driven
society, there is no one perspective and evaluation. The
attitude towards terrorism, and particularly
identification of terrorists, depend on the actors that
are tasked and their political goals. The problem of
terrorism in the country is still interpreted through the
prism of last year's still ongoing crisis. Practically,
for a large part of the society, the story of terrorism
is the story of the conflict, and vice versa - the
conflict is about terrorism. The situation gained another
dimension with the inconsistent meddling of the
international community during the crisis (spring-summer
2001) and in the post-September 11th period. The dominant
impression is that the USA and the international
community (mainly identified with NATO) alter their
definitions of terrorism in accordance to their
geo-political and national security interests. Roughly
said, there is no social consensus over the struggle
against terrorism and the means for defeating it.
Moreover the international community makes that consensus
impossible. The Macedonian society experiences a deja vu
effect of the Kosovo crisis. The outburst of violence in
spring 2001 is seen partly as a result of the
international missions' impotence to control violence and
extremist groups among Kosovo Albanians, and to prevent
spill-over effects in Macedonia.
Caught in the vicious circle of the intra-state
conflict and the impact of the regional conflict,
Macedonia proved to be unable to find a peaceful way of
conflict resolution within the society and to cope with
terrorist tendencies. Instead, it had been living in a
kind of 'virtual reality' of the 'oasis of peace' in a
normal country of transition. In terms of security
policy, the country was trying to catch up with the
modern security agenda defined in the West but,
paradoxically enough, was never aware of the seeds of
those security threats within its own society. The
outbreak of violence in early 2001 came as a surprise to
the domestic and international public, while the rhetoric
and definition of the conflict parties changed greatly in
the course of the several months long crisis. At the
beginning of the crisis, NATO Gen-Sec. Robertson named
Albanian groups 'toughs' who preferred bullets to
ballots. With the escalation of the fights, the 'toughs'
became rebels, and now there is a high likelihood that
they will become part of governmental structures after
the September parliamentary elections in the country. As
in the Kosovo case, the US administration uses different
lists to classify terrorist movements with only local
ambitions from those forms of terrorism that affect the
interests of the US (as Colin Powell puts it).
3. On Expanding
Vicious Circle of Violence: Global and Balkan
Considerations
The post-September 11th reality illustrates very well
the old truth that security perceptions differ and also
lead towards different security responses. For a year,
terrorism has been defined as one of the most serious
security threats in the 21st century. However, the 'war
on terrorism' has not given satisfactory answers to the
questions: security for whom, at what costs, and through
what means? The very fact that the response to the
September attacks on the USA was immediately called 'war'
proves the main contradiction. Despite the enormous
number of human victims caused by the terrorist attacks,
it is important to avoid the temptation to cope with the
threat through military means. Even 'higher' or 'more
absolute' security for US citizens is grounded on more
violence (in forms of direct, structural, and cultural
forms) and fewer democratic rights and liberties.
Violence breeds violence even when performed with a 'just
cause'.
As the Third Yugoslavia case showed, deeply embedded
structural violence and a culture of violence (i.e.
public legitimation and justification of violent means)
can erupt into forms of direct violence. The direct
violence during the clash between the Serbian security
forces and UCK (with great participation of NATO as well)
produced new unjust forms of structural violence (in
which oppressors and the victims only changed the roles).
The old traumas and culture of violence have been
'enriched' with some fresh elements, which make the whole
picture on peace and stability more blurred and
uncertain.
The last decade also proved that terrorism and state
terror are phenomena that feed each other and propel the
spiral of violence. The tactics of the proponents of each
'strategy' is "the worse, the better". As Milosevic and
UCK made a perfect match as the best enemies, nowadays
the same is true for the tandem Bush-bin Laden (or Saddam
Hussein). Each side's political and security agenda is
perfectly well supported by the violence used by the
other side. It seems that state terror increases the
likeliness of emergence of terrorist groups, and vice
versa. Hence, adequate response to terrorism is not to
combat against it, which only intensifies and supports
it. In order to overcome it one should go through it - or
better, should address the real roots of the phenomenon.
Quick fixes are not only inappropriate but also sometimes
counter-productive. As terrorism was not born overnight,
it cannot be cured swiftly. Terrorism with high death
tolls makes state structures overreact, makes even the
public of democratic countries cry out for retaliation
and more blood as an only acceptable form of 'justice'
for their losses. The harsh retaliation then serves as a
self-evident 'justification' of the original violent
resistance.
The post-September 11th events generated a weird
'competition' in terms of human losses and destruction.
The US military response against bin Laden and Taliban
regime resulted in three times as many Afghan victims
than in the September attacks in New York and Washington.
The statement of a women's organisation from Afghanistan
on 11 September 2002 sadly testifies that the
international efforts to 'liberate' Afghanistan from the
regime that harboured bin Laden has ended as a
legitimation of another state terror. The war on terror
is far from being over, which is evidenced by everyday
warnings issued by the CIA and FBI about possible new
attacks on US targets, but also from the war drums
directed against Iraq. Terrorism is indeed one of the
most serious global concerns, but not in a
straightforward way. The black and white picture of the
world (the axis of good-doers versus the axis of
evil-doers) is sadly indicative of serious harm on
Western democracies: the fragility of democracy itself,
but also another heavy hit on the international law and
order. Since September 11th the world has become more
interdependent and more vulnerable, not only in the
traditional way, but unhappily also in terms of the
effect of war and conflict on universal values, human
rights, and democratic prospects. As Richard Falk put it
rightly, the American understanding of the challenge of
11 September is in "its essence a geopolitical opera
pitting good against evil".
Astonishingly enough, the post-September 11th Western
world proved to be very similar to the Balkan countries
it has been trying to pacify and democratise since 1991.
The Balkan war and post-war experiences may be extremely
useful for some Western countries faced with imagined
and/or real security threats, overloaded with hysterical
patriotism and collective paranoia. The Balkan experience
can provide insight into what makes even mature
democracies and their publics ready to give up democratic
practices and citizens' rights for increased security,
without calling for accountability and transparency in
political leadership. The 'rally around the flag' is
obviously not a Balkan phenomenon - it works well in the
Bush's presidency as well. State terror in the West and
in the Balkans differ to the degree that, in the West, it
is a global phenomenon through foreign policy; while in
the latter case, it is more regionally constrained and
acts as internal policy tool. Global and local terrorist
also resemble each other to a significant degree,
coinciding in the tactics they employ. Violence and
terror have maintained close affinities with traditional
political struggle - like conventional war, they
represent the conduct of politics 'by other means'. The
only big difference between them consists of the concrete
potential to harm and destroy.
The Balkan contribution to the global threat of
terrorism has to be two-dimensional. First, societies
have to address the roots of the phenomenon in their
political and societal spheres, and only then to echo the
US/NATO cries. The simple conclusion is that the 'karma'
we are sharing indeed resembles sailing or sinking in the
same boat.
©
TFF & the author 2002
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