Questions
Posed by the Turkish
Daily News
By
Richard
Falk
Visiting Distinguished Professor, Global Studies,
University of California, Santa Barbara and Milbank
Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton
University
TFF
associate
August 26, 2003
Revised Responses by Richard Falk to questions
posed by the Turkish Daily News (VIII/1/2003)
l. Is there any basis in
international law for recourse to "preemptive
war"?
Most interpretations of international law deny states
the right to wage a preemptive war, although
international practice is more ambiguous, especially in
extenuating circumstances. There were few international
objections raised when Israel initiated The Six Day War
in 1967, convincingly claiming that it was confronted by
an imminent attack by its Arab neighbors, and that its
action was justified on the basis of defensive necessity
to ensure its survival as a state.
The invocation of an alleged right to wage preemptive
war by the US Government is particularly troubling from
the perspective of international law. First of all, the
United States has expressed this right in highly abstract
language rather than in a specific setting of the sort
that led Israel to act in 1967. Secondly, the application
of this doctrine of preemptive war was unconvincing to
most governments, including most US allies, and to world
public opinion, lacking the elements of an imminent
threat and defensive necessity. Thirdly, in the aftermath
of the Iraq War the failure to find weapons of mass
destruction that were the essence of the alleged
war-justifying threat has undermined American
credibility, leading to re-arguing the rationale for the
war on the basis of liberating the Iraqi people from an
oppressive ruler. And fourthly, the US Government,
despite the absence of urgency, insisted on its right to
wage and initiate a non-defensive war against Iraq
without receiving any authorization from the UN Security
Council.
The doctrine of preemptive war is not itself
destructive of international law, but its dubious
applications definitely are. It seems a matter of common
sense that if a foreign country had mobilized for war,
possessed the capabilities to launch missile attacks on
population centers, and was governed by extremists, it
would be rational to engage in a preemptive war, and most
of the UN would either endorse the response or ignore the
stretching of international law under such circumstances.
But recourse to preemptive war against Iraq cannot be
reconciled with the duty of respect for international law
and the UN Charter, and has contributed a dangerous
precedent.
2. Is it possible for any war
to be just?
There is an important difference between just war
thinking and international law. International law devotes
itself to issues of legality, while just war thinking
concentrates on matters of justice and morality,
especially as to recourse to war and the means by which
it is waged. The just war tradition derives from a
religious background, and its guidelines were developed
by the great Catholic theologians St. Augustine and St.
Thomas Acquinas. The principles of just war, involving
just cause and the proportionate and discriminate use of
force, have helped to shape the modern law of war, and
continue to be treated as valid.
When asking about whether it is possible for a
particular war to be deemed a just war there is no
definitive answer. It is a matter of interpretation and
judgment. From a strictly pacifist or Gandhian outlook no
war is just as political violence is never justified.
Many specialists on just war agree that World War II was
just as it was a defensive response to German and
Japanese aggression, and its outcome removed from power
fascist regimes that were guilty of mass atrocities, and
what has come to be known as crimes against humanity. But
even this war was waged in a manner deemed unjust with
respect to means, especially the strategic and
indiscriminate bombing of German and Japanese cities
causing massive civilian casualties, culminating in the
use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki under
conditions in which Japan was already a beaten country.
More recently, there have been debates about the wars in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and most significantly, Iraq.
Although each case is complex, and the facts can be
understood in different ways, I will briefly indicate my
assessments from a just war perspective. The Kosovo War
was a just war because it was undertaken to avoid a
likely instance of "ethnic cleansing" undertaken by the
Serb leadership of former Yugoslavia, and it succeeded in
giving the people of Kosovo an opportunity for a peaceful
and democratic future. It was a just war despite being
illegally undertaken without authorization by the United
Nations, and despite being waged in a manner that unduly
caused Kosovar and Serbian civilian casualties, while
minimizing the risk of death or injury on the NATO
side.
The Afghanistan War was again controversial in
relation to the just war tradition. It seems to qualify
as an instance of defensive necessity in view of the high
risks of harm associated with the heavy al Qaeda presence
in the country, and its demonstrated capacity and will
after September 11 to inflict severe harm on the United
States in the future. Again, as with Kosovo, the means
used and the ends raised serious doubts about the just
means and just ends of the war. The American failure to
assume the risks of ground warfare in order to carry out
the mission of destroying the al Qaeda presence, as well
as the failure to convert the battlefield outcomes into a
durable peace, raise doubts about the overall justice of
the war.
When it comes to the Iraq War there seems to be little
doubt that the war is generally regarded as an unjust
war, despite its effect of freeing the Iraqi people from
the oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein. The reasons for
viewing it as unjust in origin are the following: the
absence of defensive necessity, the refusal of the UNSC
to authorize war, the dangerous uncertainties associated
with recourse to war, the manipulation of evidence
relating to the alleged presence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, the reluctance in the aftermath of
the fighting to respect the aspirations of the Iraqi
people to achieve political independence and exercise
their rights of self-determination. For all of these
reasons it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
Iraq War is a clear example of an unjust war.
As this analysis suggests, it is possible to view a
particular war as a just war provided it satisfies the
standards of just cause, just means, and just ends. No
modern war entirely meets these standards, but those with
a just cause and just ends are widely treated as just
wars even if the victorious side relied to some extent on
unjust means. In this respect, World War II remains the
exemplary example of a just war.
3. Are today's terrorists
tomorrow's patriots if they win? Does the end justify the
means?
Often it is true that those who are treated as the
worst criminals if their violent challenge of the
established order fails, are celebrated as the greatest
patriots and heroes if their struggle ends in success.
Surely, the leaders of the American Revolution would have
been hung as traitors if their 18th century efforts to be
freed from Britain colonial rule had ended in defeat. As
victors, they are hailed without even the slightest doubt
as exhibiting the ideals of patriotic virtue. In our own
time, most spectacularly, we have witnessed the sudden
transformation of Nelson Mandela from being South
Africa's permanent political prisoner, held in jail for
27 years, to the man most admired and celebrated in South
Africa, and in the world as a whole.
Perhaps, the case of Yasir Arafat is most interesting
and revealing of arbitrary shifts of perception and
treatment. As founder of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization and leader of Fatah, Arafat was viewed for
years by Israel and the United States as the world's
leading terrorist, a criminal beyond redemption. Then
came the Oslo Peace Process in 1993, and Arafat arrives
in Washington and appears with Yitzak Rabin and Bill
Clinton on the White House lawn. Later on, Rabin is
assassinated, and Israeli politics moves sharply to the
right, Ariel Sharon becomes Prime Minister, an armed
intifada of Palestinian resistance commences, and Arafat
is once more condemned as a terrorist and discarded as a
representative of the Palestinian people, although
elected to be such. Sharon, reinforced by Clinton, and
even more so by his successor as American president,
George W. Bush, discredited Arafat, holding him
responsible for the suicide bombers that caused such harm
to Israeli civilian society, and shifting attention away
from Israel's prolonged illegal occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza.
And once again, Arafat was treated by the United
States as an illegitimate political leader. But now with
"the roadmap" relied upon as a basis for reaching a
peaceful solution between the two peoples Arafat
reemerges as political leader, although subordinated to
his subordinate, Mahmoud Abbas, who has been accepted
more readily in Washington and Tel Aviv (than in the West
Bank and Gaza) because he has more convincingly
repudiated violence as a path to self-determination and
statehood for the Palestinian people and seems ready to
play the Israeli/American game of one-sided diplomatic
negotiations. Arafat continues to be treated as a crucial
Palestinian leader in much of Europe and throughout the
non-Western world, and of course by the Palestinians
themselves.
In many respects, the treatment of Hitler bears some
resemblance to that of Arafat. Hitler emerged from
obscurity in the mists of German right wing politics
during the 1920s, being imprisoned for his association
with violent political tactics. But then, with help from
the economic depression of the 1930s that hit Germany
particularly hard and from the bitterness instilled in
the German people due to their defeat in World War I,
followed by the humiliating punitive peace imposed at
Versailles, Hitler and his Nazi Party, became the elected
government of Germany. Hitler solidified his dictatorial
rule, but this did not prevent him from hosting the 1936
Olympic Games in Berlin, a legitimating bonanza for Nazi
propaganda. Hitler became the ultra-national German
patriot while at the same time he preached a racist
message, persecuting Jews, Romas, and others, and
preparing Germany for an orgy of aggressive warfare. Of
course, Hitler personally did not survive World War II,
but had he done so, there is little doubt that he would
have been prosecuted as the star war criminal in the
course of the Nuremberg trials held in 1945 to impose
punishments on the surviving Nazi leadership. No doubt if
the war had ended differently, Hitler would have
continued to be treated as the legitimate leader
representing the German state by most other
governments.
There is an important issue of political language
present. The current way of branding the armed enemies of
the established order is to call them "terrorists,"
focusing on the violence directed at civilian targets.
For decades such enemies were more often treated in the
West as "Communists," or Communists were automatically
branded as "terrorists" even if they refrained in theory
and practice from violence. In South Africa advocacy of
racial equality was equated with Communism, and
criminalized, or being engaged in trying to promote
racial justice was punished as "terrorism." Also, these
days, when Palestinian resisters kill civilians it is
called "terrorism," but when Israeli Apache gunships kill
civilians it is called "security." Language is politics,
coloring our imagination, shaping our responses of
approval and condemnation.
What do learn from this chamelon-like experience of
political figures who lead revolutionary struggles and
initiate aggressive wars against particular arrangement
of political power in the world, seeking to liberate an
oppressed people or change the structure of world order?
Of course, we learn that outcomes matter, that history is
largely written by the winners, validating their results
and repudiating or ignoring the exploits of the losers.
We also learn that those who prevail in conflicts often
rely on highly dubious forms of political violence to
destroy their current enemies, denying them any respect
by calling them "evil." This process of exaggerating the
moral differences between the state and its enemies is
also part of the picture. It is not only the "terrorists"
that act often as if the end justifies the means, but the
legitimate political order, as embodied in the state, as
well. Are there limits to this disturbing insight into
world politics that seems to count only the result and
not whether it was achieved in morally and legally
acceptable ways? The only honest answer is, at this
point, "not many," and even these, are not consistently
respected despite several century of effort by
international law. It is true that admiration for Mandela
reflects an appreciation of the way he used his influence
to promote a politics of reconciliation in negotiating a
bloodless end to racist South Africa during the apartheid
era. And on the other side, whatever the Palestinian
future, it seems doubtful that Arafat's rehabilitation
can proceed very far, not because of the accusations of
terrorism, but because he is widely disavowed even by
Palestinians as corrupt, authoritarian, and
incompetent.
At the same time, we should not become altogether
cynical about efforts to impose limits on political
behavior. It is generally true that the price of entry to
the halls of diplomacy is a credible renunciation of
violence against civilians, just as it is true that a
violent challenge to the existing order will be denied
such access if it can be defeated at an acceptable cost.
This is how the IRA (Irish Revolutionary Army) finally
achieved a measure of acceptance even from its bitter
rivals in Northern Ireland, that is, both by avoiding
defeat and then by expressing a willingness to reach a
solution by peaceful means. It is also true that the UN
and world public opinion have gradually, although
inconsistently, relied on human rights standards and the
practice of democracy, to make judgments for and against
particular political outcomes. There are war crimes
trials going on in The Hague and Arusha that are
punishing certain types of behavior as international
crimes, and in 2002 a permanent International Criminal
Court was established by a widely ratified treaty. It
remains true that the more powerful governments,
including the United States and China, refuse to submit
their actions to the Rule of Law, but it is also true
that sovereignty no longer gives a blank check to
political rulers.
4. International law has been
developing since the time of Grotius in the 17th century,
and the International Court of Justice has declared on a
number of occasions that diplomatic relations among
sovereign states should be governed by adherence to
international law. But how can international law be
enforced in the absence of a world government?
There has been a tendency in
recent years to rely on sanctions as a means of
international enforcement, but their record is not
impressive. They do not seem to have achieved their
goals, and may be based on dubious premises of punishing
governments or leaders that are seen as threatening to
the geopolitical status quo.
There is no doubt that the absence of effective
procedures for enforcement are a major obstacle to the
achievement of a law-oriented world order. At the same
time all political systems, including well-governed
societies, struggle with enforcement. The United States,
proud of its constitutional order, has a huge prison
population, and has found it very difficult to achieve
effective enforcement in some critical areas of behavior,
including the use and distribution of hard drugs and the
actions of some of its leading corporations (for example,
the Enron scandal). And so the problems of enforcing
international law is one of degree, not of kind.
It is also important to recognize that many areas of
international life are based on legal regimes that are
consistently upheld and enforced. Tourism, diplomacy, and
trade all proceed on this basis, and the world would be
chaotic without this underpinning of international law
for many of the daily interactions that take place
throughout the world. The United States and Europe are
presently resolving their disputes over genetically
modified foods and steel subsidies by accepting the legal
procedures of the World Trade Organization. Most
enforcement difficulties arise either in relation to
challenged uses of international force or attempted
interferences with the internal affairs of sovereign
states.
Sanctions are sometimes seen a preferred alternative
to war in the event that an international dispute cannot
be resolved peacefully. Much attention has recently been
given to the role of sanctions in relation to Iraq over
the past decade or so. It is necessary to make some
distinctions when evaluating sanctions as a means of
enforcement. Sanctions were initially imposed on Iraq in
1990 after its conquest of Kuwait, and were seen as a way
of inducing Saddam Hussein's regime to withdraw from
Kuwait without a war. Such an approach to enforcement had
it succeeded would have been hailed as a political and
moral victory. The failure of sanctions to achieve this
goal in Iraq has been variously interpreted as indicating
the irrational stubbornness of the Baghdad leadership or
as a cover for an American-led insistence on "a
preventive war" so as to eliminate Iraq as a regional
threat for years to come. Diplomatic historians in future
work will undoubtedly help us to resolve this issue of
interpretation. The Gulf War in 1991 can be seen as
"enforcement," authorized by the Security Council,
including all of its Permanent Members, and effectively
restoring Kuwaiti sovereign rights.
Sanctions were then applied to a defeated Iraq for the
next twelve years, supposedly to coerce Baghdad to comply
with the terms of a ceasefire in 1991 that had been
embodied in Security Council Resolution 687. This
reliance on sanctions was much more controversial than
the pre-war sanctions. They were imposed on a devastated
defeated country, which almost certainly meant that the
Iraqi people would be particularly vicitimized. Iraq's
water purification system had been deliberately destroyed
during the Gulf War, exposing the entire population to
disease and death. Early respected studies by a Harvard
medical team and by UNESCO reported on the resulting
humanitarian catastrophe, producing hundreds of thousand
of deaths among children in Iraq. At the same time, the
political goals of the sanctions were not being achieved:
Saddam Hussein's regime was not weakened in relation to
opposition groups and UN resolutions were not being
respected. Sanctions increasingly became understood as
aspects of a punitive peace imposed on Iraq after the
Gulf War. As such, it seemed to be repeating the mistake
after World War I when the Versailles Treaty imposed
strong sanctions on a defeated Germany, contributing to a
subsequent rise of German political extremism. Sanctions
imposed on Iraq between 1991 and 2003 failed as
"enforcement" and were widely condemned, despite UN
backing, as tantamount to crimes against humanity because
of their destructive impact on the civilian population of
Iraq.
Sanctions as a means of enforcement are neither good
or bad, effective or futile. It all depends on context,
and effects. To the extent that sanctions have the
unified backing of the international community and avoid
wars, their role is beneficial. Sanctions seemed to have
played a constructive role in persuading the Afrikaaner
leadership of South Africa to abandon apartheid, and work
with Mandela to produce a peaceful transition to a
multi-racial constitutional order.
In the 1990s, and to some extent currently,
"humanitarian intervention" became an enforcement tool of
choice. The NATO Kosovo War can be understood in that
light, as can interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. The
present call for American intervention in Liberia, as
well as the UN role in the Congo, proceed on such
premises. Humanitarian intervention is generally viewed
with suspicion as a tool available only on behalf of the
strong to be used against the relatively weak. It is
unavailable to help the Chechens in their struggle with
the Russian government or to assist the Tibetans or
Uighers in their resistance efforts with regard to the
Chinese government.
And so enforcement is, at best, uneven, and needs to
take account of the realities of power. At the same time,
efforts to hold leaders accountable for their crimes of
state, patterns of humanitarian intervention, and some
instances of UN peacekeeping suggest that there is a
growing trend to take international standards more
seriously and to disregard the barriers of sovereignty in
efforts to produce compliance with such standards.
5. You opposed the Iraq War
of this spring by arguing that its justifications were
based on grounds that were legally and constitutionally
dubious. Would you discuss some of these grounds? Unlike
Iraq, in the debate about the Afghanistan War you found
yourself in disagreement with linguist Noam Chomsky and
other American left peace activists, why was
this?
As I indicated when discussing the preemptive war
doctrine, I remain convinced that there never existed an
adequate legal basis for recourse to war against Iraq.
The government of Iraq, weakened by sanctions and by the
UN inspection process, posed no threat except to its own
people. The UNSC alone possesses the legal authority to
mandate a war in circumstances other than self-defense.
The idea of liberating the Iraqi people from the brutal
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein does not provide a legal
foundation for war without UN authorization, and this
rationale has only been put forth as a sufficient
justification for war after the fact and as a result of a
failure to produce evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction that had previously been the overriding
justification given by Washington for the war. The
difficulties that the occupation forces have been
experiencing in Iraq and the opposition to a long-term
American presence is likely to compound these problems,
inducing either a prolonged occupation and a rising tide
of violent resistance or a forced withdrawal that leads
either to a sense of political defeat by bringing to
power anti-Western undemocratic forces or produces a
civil war among the divergent political, religious, and
ethnic constituencies in the country. In essence, the
Iraq War cannot be reconciled with the core rules of
international law governing the use of force to resolve
conflicts between sovereign states.
From the point of view of American constitutional law,
the war was also dubious. True, a bipartisan majority in
Congress authorized the war by resolution, but one passed
months before the start of the war, and before
indications of opposition at the UN, on the part of many
of America's closest allies around the world, at a
grassroots level, and even in the United States. The
quality of the Congressional authorization was thus
weakened by its failure to show "a decent respect" for
the opinion of others. Beyond this, Congress lacks the
authority to mandate an illegal war. The Constitution in
Article VI makes validly ratified international treaties
"the supreme law of the land." The UN Charter is such a
treaty. Recourse to war was a violation of the Charter,
and hence a violation of the Constitution.
On Afghanistan I differed with Chomsky and others who
opposed the war, and insisted that a reliance on criminal
law enforcement was adequate to address the terrorist
menace. I did not then believe that any government could
withstand the al Qaeda attacks without making a maximal
response on behalf of its national security. Relying on
law enforcement was not such a response, and indeed had
proved an utter failure in the past as a way of dealing
with large-scale terrorist activity, including earlier al
Qaeda strikes. I felt that given the severity of the harm
inflicted on September 11 and the continuing al Qaeda
presence in Afghanistan, a defensive necessity existed,
and that the Charter could be properly interpreted to
validate recourse to war by the United States. The
international community agreed. The opposition to the war
never provided a convincing account of how to uphold
American security in view of the threats posed by al
Qaeda. At the same time, in retrospect, it must be
acknowledged that America did not use the occasion of the
Afghanistan War to minimize the continuing risks posed by
al Qaeda. It allowed leaders and cadre to go free and
fight on another day because of its unwillingness to put
enough Americans on the ground to close off escape
routes. It has failed to invest resources and energies in
post-war Afghanistan to avoid its territory from again
becoming a potential haven for transnational terrorist
activity.
6. In light of the Iraq War
and prior sanctions policy has the UN been undermined in
relation to its role as an institution committed to war
prevention and the development of international
law?
To some extent earlier responses dealing with the Iraq
War and the enforcement of international law have covered
the issues raised by this question. I will limit my
response here to generalities about the future of the
United Nations.
First of all, attitudes toward the UN move quickly
from hope to despair, and back again. If the US/UK
occupation of Iraq is superseded by comprehensive
international administration of the country under UN
auspices, the UN will be upgraded as a dimension of world
order. Similarly, if the UN plays an increasing role in
dealing with African turbulence, then the importance of
the UN will be acknowledged anew, especially if its
missions are generally seen as helpful.
Contrariwise if the United States engages in
subsequent unilateral non-defensive wars against Syria or
Iran, or even North Korea, then the UN is likely to
decline still further with respect to the maintenance of
global peace and security.
The United Nations, is neither more nor less, than
what its principal members want it be. The Organization
when established in 1945 was intended to be an instrument
of statecraft, not a supranational alternative to it.
This was underscored by giving the lead victorious powers
in World War II a veto in the Security Council, which
meant that the organization acknowledged from the outset
that it would be unable to act if opposed by its most
powerful member states, and that world peace rested not
on law or collective security under the UN, but on the
ability of the Permanent Members to agree on the nature
of world order challenges, and to act accordingly.
The United States is where the UN headquarters are
located, as well as being the leading financial
contributor and the host country, and as a result plays a
decisive role in either facilitating a strong
organization or shaping global policy beyond the reach of
the UN. So far, during the Bush presidency, the UN has
not been entrusted with a major responsibilities, and the
White House signature attitude of unilateralism has been
partly expressed by acting outside the organization
whenever it feels like doing so. At the same time, the
magnetic pull exerted by the UN has brought President
Bush to the organization on several key occasions to seek
legitimizing support at crucial moments in American
foreign policy. This occurred immediately following the
September 11 attacks and again in the lead up to the Iraq
War.
The world needs a strong and confident United Nations
to cope with the various manifestations of globalization.
If the US fails to encourage such an evolution, then
other member countries should feel challenged to do
so.
7. The UN arose out of the
ashes of World War II, just as the League of Nations had
arisen after World War I. Both organizations reflected
the idea of "one-worlders," a unified arrangement for
global governance. Today such ideas are discussed as
"globalization." But why "predatory globalization"? Are
there not positive aspects of
globalization?
Yes, it is true that both world wars gave the impetus
for the establishment of global organizations supposedly
dedicated to war prevention. Both arose from the basic
horror of devastating wars leaving tens of millions dead
in their aftermath, and the conviction that states left
on their own would plunge the world into yet another war
of major proportions. At the same time, ideas of
sovereignty and nationalism remained too strong to
empower either the League or the UN with the capabilities
it would need to uphold the security of states confronted
by aggressive adversaries. The UN recognized this
unwillingness to overcome the centrality of sovereign
states by giving the leading members a veto power
assuring that the UN would never be used against the most
powerful states, but it is precisely these states that
are likely to enter into a rivalry that produces a third
world war. In this sense, the promise of world peace by
relying on the League or UN was an empty promise from the
start. At the same time the UN has done many useful
things, has become so indispensable that no state remains
by choice a non-member with the special exception of
Switzerland, emphasizes the role of international law in
relation to world peace, and continues to offer the
peoples of the world a beacon of hope for the future.
But these preliminary and very limited experiments
with global governance should not be confused with has
since the end of the cold war been called
"globalization." Although the term is ambiguous, it has
been most widely understood as the process by which time
and space have been compressed with respect to the
operation of the world economy. Globalization
incorporates the rise of market forces as sources of
policy guidance, as well as the significance of computers
and the Internet for more networked forms of economic
organization on a global scale. I have referred to this
capital-driven orientation of globalization as "predatory
globalization" to highlight its negative aspects:
widening disparities between rich and poor, disappointing
efforts to reduce world poverty, neglect of regions that
seem unpromising from the perspective of trade and
investment such as Africa, a failure to protect global
public goods such as environmental quality and pollution
prevention in the oceans. At the same time, I have argued
that these predatory effects are not intrinsic to
globalization, but are a byproduct of the neo-liberal
ideas of unregulated markets and the reliance on capital
efficiency to solve social problems, that is, of an
ideology of economic development that became a consensus
position after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and was
reflected in the approaches to development favored by the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Globalization
has made important positive contributions, including
giving some Asian countries excellent opportunities for
rapid economic growth that has benefited a large number
of people in some of the poorest countries.
The future and ideology of globalization is now in
doubt. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 shook the
confidence of those who were managing the world economy
as did the rise of the anti-globalization movement that
entered world consciousness in late 1999 with street
demonstrations in Seattle protesting IMF ministerial
meetings. Then came September 11, and a renewed
preoccupation with war/peace issues and global security.
Whether these concerns will subside in the years ahead is
not clear, and so it is not certain that globalization
will seem as descriptive of the world setting as it
seemed to be in the 1990s.
8. When you write about the
Middle East sometimes Turkey is included, sometimes not.
Is the Middle East best understood geographically or in
some other way? How do you explain your inconsistent
approach to Turkey's place in the region?
The contours of a region are always arbitrary, and can
be understood inconsistently depending on the purpose of
classification. Looking at a map suggests an uncertainty
as to whether to conceive of Turkey as belonging to the
Middle East or to Europe. Sometimes, the Middle East is
regarded as essentially "the Arab world," but more often
it is regarded as also including Israel, Turkey, Iran.
The idea of multiple identities has informed recent
discussions of changing patterns of individual
citizenship. Why not for countries, as well? Potential
membership in the European Union would certainly qualify
Turkey as "European," but it is difficult to conceive of
the future of "the Middle East" without taking account of
Turkey's role as a presence in relation to regional
security, the status of secularism and democracy, and the
overall interplay between Israel and the rest of the
region. Turkey's Islamic identity and rich cultural and
political traditions, including its Ottoman past, ensure
the prominence of its role in the Middle East for as far
ahead as we can see.
But let's not forget that the term "Middle East" is
itself a geopolitical curiosity reflecting a Eurocentric
image of the world. In India the region is generally
depicted as "West Asia." Perhaps, it is notable that of
all the regions in the world it is only this one that
bears such a signature of the colonial era, and most
endures the torments of unresolved struggles of
decolonization, whether in relation to Palestinian
self-determination or with respect to the overt military
presence of the dominant hegemonic power in the world.
The Middle East has replaced Europe as the fulcrum of
geopolitics, the zone wherein the shape and form of world
order is being forged.
9. Should Turkey have become
involved in the Iraq War in the ways that the US
Government requested? Now Turkey is considering sending
troops to Iraq as part of the post-war effort to bring
stability to that country. Do you think this is a wise
move on Turkey's part to get so involved?
First of all, I believe it is premature to speak of
the situation in Iraq as "post-war." The steady stream of
American and Iraqi casualties on a daily basis suggest to
me that the Iraq War continues, and that only its
conventional battlefield phase is over. Even the American
military commander in Iraq has recently referred to the
present situation as best understood as a classic
instance of "guerrilla warfare."
Looking back, I think Turkey made the right decision
by denying the use of its territory to mount an invasion
of northern Iraq by American ground forces. The Iraq War,
as suggested above, was a non-defensive war lacking UN
approval, and in violation of international law. It
seemed to many, as well, to be an imprudent war that was
not helpful in dealing with the genuine persisting
threats associated with the al Qaeda network. In such
circumstances, especially given the anti-war sentiments
of the Turkish people, the Turkish Parliament is to be
congratulated for reaching a decision that upheld Turkish
national interests, demonstrated its political
independence, and was consistent with the promotion of
world public order.
Looking forward, I would think Turkey should not
expose itself to the uncertainties of developments in
Iraq, or needlessly put itself on the side of what
appears to be an increasingly unpopular American/British
occupation that could go on for years. It is important
for Turkey to maintain positive relations with the United
States, but on the basis of mutual respect. It is not in
Turkey's interest to become engaged directly in the
peacekeeping operations going on in Iraq, at least not at
this stage. By staying on the sidelines, Turkey will
improve the prospects of entering into a positive
relationship with an independent and reconstructed
post-occupation Iraq, which in the long run is likely to
contribute most to the stability of the region.
10. How do you perceive the
Kurdish-Turkish debate within the wider context of the
Middle East?
Aside from the Palestine-Israel conflict, the
unresolved future of Kurdish-Turkish relations is the
greatest single challenge to the political leadership of
Turkey, and to the society as a whole. It is a matter of
supreme importance to avoid any serious renewal of the
sort of armed encounter that existed in prior years. A
humane approach to Kurdish aspirations will also help
decisively in advancing the case for Turkey's membership
in the EU. But what exactly does a humane approach
entail?
This is, of course, an ultra-sensitive matter of
internal Turkish politics. As an outsider I am hesitant
to comment on this most delicate question beyond offering
the most superficial idea that the cultural rights of the
large Kurdish minority needs to be fully acknowledged,
and that to the extent that Kurdish areas seem poorer
than the rest of the country, a major priority should be
accorded by Ankara to the economic development of Kurdish
regions (primarily Eastern Anatolia) and the rapid
reduction of Kurdish poverty. It should be also
recognized that there are significant numbers of
impoverished Turkish and non-Turkish individuals living
in Eastern Anatolia who would also benefit from the
recommended approach. The problem of minority rights cuts
in many different directions, and the Turkish government
has shown its own concerns about the treatment of the
Turkish minority in Bulgaria, as well as the somewhat
problematic future for the large Turkamen minority in
northern Iraq.
I find generally encouraging the degree to which there
is a growing intellectual and political interest
throughout Turkey in undertaking a positive reevaluation
of the Ottoman legacy and heritage. In relation to the
Kurdish challenge, this means a shift from a rigid
modernist view of Turkish national identity to pride and
tolerance in the multi-ethnic makeup of the Turkish
nation. Just as Kemal Ataturk in a different historical
moment freed Turkish destiny from negative aspects of the
Ottoman past, the challenge of the present generation of
Turkish leaders is to recover its positive aspects,
allowing Turkey to benefit more fully from its incredibly
rich cultural, spiritual, and political traditions.
11. Turkey has come under a
lot of fire over the years because of its treatment of
minorities. The Turkish government is now enacting
harmonization legislation as part of its larger effort to
qualify for full membership in the European Union. This
new legislation is likely to have a major impact on how
Turkey deals with its minorities. Would you give your
opinion on these developments?
My response to the prior question relating to the
Kurdish issue also applies to this question. The
pressures associated with preparing Turkey for the EU are
complementary to recovering the multi-ethnic spirit of
diversity associated with the Ottoman past. By
emphasizing minority rights, a secular path to tolerance
and group rights is cleared for a less rigid conception
of national identity than has prevailed during Turkey's
20th century nation- and state-building phases.
Minority rights and humane treatment of minorities is
one element in the wider setting of human rights, which
itself needs to be understood as fulfilling for all
citizens the promise of constitutional democracy. All
countries, including my own, need to be constantly
vigilant with respect to the protection of human rights,
particularly when the state claims a strong security
interest. In the United States since September 11, the
treatment of Muslim males, especially of Arab origins,
has been a matter of growing concern from a human rights
perspective. One instructive way to assess the commitment
of a country and its leadership is to examine carefully
the way it treats its most vulnerable members, which in
the case of both Turkey and the United States, means how
it deals with minorities, addressing their fears and
hopes and overcoming their insecurities.
12. Recently there have been
debates about the influence that television has had over
the way stories are handled in the print media. And
during the Iraq War we have seen journalists "embedded,"
or as some would say "in bed with" troops on the move in
a combat zone. The war was televised in an unprecedented
real time way. Was this a positive development? Did it
discourage or encourage a war mentality back home in the
United States? What do you think about the
media?
Overall, I think the American mainstream media has had
the effect during the Iraq War of bringing Americans
closer to the war, and allowing the citizens back home to
share in the victorious march through Iraq on the way to
Baghdad. Of course, if Iraqi resistance had been stiffer,
and bloody battles taken place that produced heavy
American casualties, reactions might have been very
different. It is worth remembering that many supporters
of the Vietnam War in the US blamed the media for
bringing the war into "the living rooms" of Middle
America, and thereby stimulating a robust anti-war
movement that led to an American defeat. The Iraq War was
special, at least in its battlefield phase, as it was
quick and successful, and produced very few body bags. In
the Vietnam case it was the media and the body bags that
eventually turned the country against the war that had
dragged on and on.
Learning from Vietnam, the Pentagon did its best to
keep the media from covering the Gulf War in 1991 too
closely. This adjustment produced its own line of
criticism, turning the war into an arcade video game by
its emphasis on the bombing raids directed at Baghdad. In
the Iraq War, probably anticipating an easy victory, a
different and novel approach was adopted, that of
"embedding." From a pacifist perspective the practice was
unfortunate, making the war into a kind of soap opera,
with each evening bringing a new installment, engaging
the citizenry in the excitement and tensions of the
battlefield. Again, this could have backfired had the
American military efforts been successfully resisted;
bloody battlefield scenes could easily have produced a
strong anti-war climate of opinion.
Evaluating the media approaches, requires an
understanding of the political context. In this regard,
it needs to be related to the media, especially TV,
approach to the American response to the September 11
attacks. TV has helped sustained a patriotic climate of
opinion in America that tends to avoid criticism of the
government and its leadership. In the months preceding
the Iraq War critics of the Bush Administration were not
invited to give their views on TV, conveying the false
impression to the public that there was no serious
disagreement in the society. And yet throughout the
country there was considerable opposition to waging a war
against Iraq for the purpose of regime change. In other
words, TV, and to a lesser extent, the print media, did
not reflect the divided sentiments of the country,
especially on the crucial issues of war and peace. Night
after night retired military officers appeared on network
TV to give their views as to why the war was necessary
and how it would be fought and won. In this sense,
embedding of journalists in combat units was a
continuation of this partisan TV role, not an objective
source of evaluation, but essentially part of the
cheerleading chorus.
The media plays an essential role in shaping the
democratic spirit. It needs to distance itself from
official views of the government, particularly at times
of controversy. America, as the most powerful state in
the world, especially needs public debate on critical
policy issues, both for its own sake and in relation to
its role as global leader.
13. Your analyses of world
issues are cogent and carefully thought out. But do you
ever proceed from analysis and criticism to propose
possible solutions to these world order
challenges?
Much of my academic work has been devoted to depicting
positive solutions for immediate problems and for longer
term responses. For instance, I have long advocated a
solution for the Palestine/Israel conflict by the
application of international law principles to the
respective rights of both peoples rather than rely on a
geopolitical bargaining process between the grossly
unequal sides mediated by the United States, no innocent
bystander. A geopolitical roadmap will not lead to a just
and stable solution, and represents a diversion from the
search for a genuine peace, although it may function as a
temporary truce. An international law roadmap, in
contrast, would produce a two-state solution based on
mutual recognition and equal sovereign rights, which
would mean a shared Jerusalem, the elimination of the
Israeli settlements, and some measured right of return
for Palestinian refugees.
On a different plane, I have written consistently,
including on several occasions in the International
Herald Tribune, on the case for a Global Peoples
Parliament as an essential step in the establishment of a
global democracy. Such a step would acknowledge the
increasing activism of transnational civil society, and
help give the peoples an arena to express their concerns
alongside the existing organs of the United Nations that
allow governments to represent the membership consisting
only of states.
On a still different plane, I have worked for many
years within the framework of the World Order Models
Project, a transnational group of scholars that has tried
to promote global reforms, and has worked together since
the late 1960s. The basic perspective has been a
realization that different regions have different
priorities and approaches in relation to global reform,
but that there is a shared commitment to achieving global
governance in forms that diminishes the role of war,
promotes the economic well being of all persons, supports
human rights and democracy, favors global extensions of
democracy, is committed to environmental protection and
ecological stability, and accepts human nature as
essentially spiritual.
14. What topics are you
working on now?
I am currently working on several projects with the
goal of producing three books. The first is concerned
with the American global role since September 11,
emphasizing the importance of avoiding the temptation on
the part of Washington to establish the first global
empire. The struggle between the United States and al
Qaeda represents the first post-modern war, as my earlier
book The Great Terror War argues, being waged between two
non-territorial adversaries: a global state that
overrides the sovereign rights of other states and a
concealed transnational network that relies on extreme
political violence directed against civilians. In
contrast, modern warfare involved conflicts between
territorial sovereign states. The new book will argue
that it is important, in my view, that the United States
not pursue an imperial approach to global security, but
rely on international cooperation and a show of respect
for international law and the procedures of the United
Nations, and work toward a system of democratically
organized global governance, a constructive
globalization.
My second project is to deal with the complicated and
confused American relationship to international law, at
once its principal champion and also currently its main
detractor. To some extent, this is not a new problem, but
goes back at least as far as Woodrow Wilson's vision of
collective security under the authority of the League of
Nations. Wilson sold his vision to the world but not to
the US Senate that refused to ratify the Versailles
Treaty setting up the League, and the US never became a
member. The story is somewhat more complicated in
relation to the United Nations, but essentially the same.
The United States has played the dominant role in shaping
the organization, but it has also tried to manipulate and
control its operations, and when it has been frustrated,
it has acted alone in defiance of UN authority. The Iraq
War is perhaps the most flagrant example, but it is only
one of many.
My third project is more personal and may never see
the light of day. It is to do a political memoir that
tries to combine narratives of my outer journeys with an
overview of my inner travels, combining the political
with the personal.
15. If you would like to add
anything, please feel free to do so.
I would only say that I feel privileged to have spent
so much time in Turkey over the course of the last decade
under the guidance of my Turkish wife. It is such a
vibrant country, exhibiting great cultural depth and such
warm hospitality, and its promise connects so profoundly
with the present historical moment. I see Turkey as
having the opportunity to create for the region and for
the Islamic world a new political model of reconciliation
between the enlightened secularism of the modern state
and the religious values and cultural attitudes of
traditional societies. Such an evolution presents a
formidable challenge that can only be met by drawing on
the resources of Turkey's Ottoman past while sustaining
and carrying forward the modernizing ideas of the Kemal
Ataturk. In doing so, Turkey would be carrying out a
creative experiment in combining its identity as a
European and Middle Eastern country, as well as having
the benefit of participating in regional arrangements
while retaining its separate identity as nation and
state. Such an inspirational possibility can only be
achieved, however, if the unresolved problems of minority
relations are dealt with by Turkey in a manner that
satisfies human rights commitments
©
TFF & the author 2003
See also Added
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