Added
Responses to the Turkish
Daily News
By
Richard
Falk
Visiting Distinguished Professor, Global Studies,
University of California, Santa Barbara and Milbank
Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton
University
TFF
associate
Questions Posed
by the Turkish Daily News
August 26, 2003
Added responses to questions of the Turkish Daily
News (VIII/6/2003)
Question 16: What is your
view of the current conditions of Greek/Turkish
relations? Is the conflict likely to be resolved
peacefully?
My impression of the current Turkish/Greek conflict is
based on visits to both countries over the years. I was
particularly convinced after a visit to Greece a few
weeks ago to give some talks at two conferences that a
sea change in the Greek approach to its relationship with
Turkey had occurred. Previously Turkey had been a
preoccupation of Greeks and Greece. Only several years
earlier the sense of Greek grievance with respect to
Turkey was always present in serious discussions, during
which the participants often exhibited an obsessive
concern with the allegedly illegal Turkish occupation of
Northern Cyprus, but also were quite ready to discuss the
Greek their highly emotional understanding of the events
after World War I that led to the departure of most Greek
inhabitants from Turkish territory and an elaborate
arrangement for the transfer of population in both
directions. Now Greek intellectual and political figures
seem far less interested in the Cyprus conflict, and when
it emerges in conversation, their views about its
resolution are generally hopeful and balanced, being
especially positive about the recent opening of the
Cypriot borders leading to the surprisingly successful
moves of Cypriots in both directions without any the
violent incidents predicted by pessimists. On the Turkish
side there seems a comparable shift in outlook, but it is
less dramatic. The tensions with Greece were never as
important to Turkey as the other way around, as Turkey
had a range of other regional concerns, held most of the
cards in relation to the Greek conflict, and was in fact
a far bigger country with greater weight in international
relations
Of course, in the realm of diplomacy, especially if
over-laden with contradictory historical memories as is
the case for Greece and Turkey and perceptions of fair
solutions confused by intense nationalist pride on both
sides there is still much room for slippage in the
relationship. Diplomats in Turkey and Greece should not
assume that the present window of opportunity will remain
open forever. It is important to maintain the impression
of forward momentum by taking further positive steps. If
the Annan UN-backed plan for Cyprus seems too detailed
and inflexible, then the Turkish government should come
forward with specific responses or alternative ideas that
seem sensitive to the concerns of sensitive and
reasonable Greek officials. It needs to be appreciated
that there will always be extremists on both sides that
will never agree to a compromise, but for this reason it
is more important than ever not to allow such views to
shape the dynamics of diplomacy.
The secondary issues that have served as flashpoints
in past Turkish/Greek relations, such as those involving
security zones in the Aegean Sea, the territorial waters
of Greek islands, the authority over and width of the
continental shelf of the two countries in the Aegean, and
the status of unoccupied islets, are manageable or not
depending on the overall relationship between the two
countries. If the bilateral relations are generally good,
and the leadership in Ankara and Athens wants them to get
better, then these Aegean problems can be handled by
imaginative diplomacy to the satisfaction of both
countries, but if the political climate is negative then
any of these questions that seem technical and somewhat
peripheral could flare up in a crisis and even become a
casus belli between the two countries. Actually, Turkey
and Greece have much common ground, geographically,
culturally, and economically, and share an Eastern
Mediterranean relationship to the growing relevance of a
Greater Europe, a commonality that will become more
pronounced as Turkey moves closer to European Union
membership in the coming years. It is my further
impression that for a variety of reasons the Greek
mainstream political leadership believes it is more
beneficial at this point to have Turkey within the EU
than without. Of course, should Turkey find the European
door slammed closed for whatever reason, it could turn
toward its Central Asian hinterland, and embark on a
Greater Turkey project that would be received as an
unwelcome geopolitical turn by Turkey, but one that does
not seem likely at this point.
If one moves from the level of political relations to
that of human relations there is an impressive
confirmation of my sense that a favorable wind blows in
both countries at this time. In Greece with my Turkish
wife, Hilal Elver, accentuated this observation. As soon
as our Greek contacts discovered that Hilal was Turkish
their faces lit up, and an additional surge of warmth and
hospitality was exhibited. It was quite moving, and again
different from my experience in earlier years where
personal interactions among representatives of the two
peoples could often, although not invariably, be as
frosty as the diplomatic relations between the two
countries. Both countries will be prominent on the global
stage during 2003, Turkey with the Year of Turkey in
Europe being celebrated and Greece with the summer
Olympics. Would it not be a fine historical moment to
celebrate a resolution of the Cyprus conflict? And would
not such a resolution have an uplifting effect on future
prospects for both of these great peoples?
17. What about the future of
Turkey in relation to Europe? Will Turkey be welcomed
into the EU in the years ahead? What are the visible and
what are the invisible obstacles?
It is evident that the European pull on the Turkish
future is strong at present. I think several forces are
pulling Turkey in the same direction: the practical
economic advantages about being part of the European
market for goods, services, and labor; the important
political benefits of having a European alternative to
the sort of bilateral relationship with the United States
that has so shaped Turkish security policy for the past
several decades; and the enormous political and economic
gains for domestic life in Turkey by accepting European
guidelines on human rights, civil/military relations,
democratic governing procedures, environmental safety,
and fiscal and monetary policy. The self-disciplining
influence of this European framework can help Turkey
achieving its full potential as a sovereign state among
states, giving Turkey a clearer image of its own positive
future just as the recovery of the Ottoman heritage gives
Turkey a better appreciation of its own positive
past.
But there are obstacles to this optimistic picture,
both internal and external obstacles. It may be that
there exist strong internal pressures to resist the
European guidelines either based on traditional ideas of
the relevance of religion to the practice of politics,
arising from anxieties that distinctive elements of
Turkish cultural identity would be lost if Turkey becomes
part of Europe, associated with a feared further fraying
of relations with the United States, and arising from
vested interests in the present arrangements of wealth
and power, including even the operations of
hyper-inflation, and a laughably debased currency. There
may also be deep pockets of bureaucratic resistance to
the European scenario associated with the prison system,
the military establishment, parts of the civil
service.
But the external obstacles seem no less daunting.
Europe may impose such exacting requirements on Turkish
entry as to make it impossible to comply, or it may
interpret Turkish compliance as unsatisfactory in
response to unacknowledged racist and discriminatory
beliefs that exhibit discomfort at the prospect of having
a country of more than 70 million Muslims in its midst.
European identity is surely challenged by Turkey. Will
Europe remain overwhelmingly Christian, with large
non-Christian minorities, or will Europe become as
cosmopolitan in its practices as its overall worldview
claims to be? And how will European leaders and their
citizens interpret the economic gains and losses of
Turkish membership, increased labor and tourist mobility,
as well as an enlargement that implicates Europe more
directly in the future of the Middle East?
These are momentous issues whose resolution will
affect deeply both Europe and the Middle East, as well as
determine whether and to what extent Turkey pursues its
Asian option, modifies its American relationship, affirms
its Islamic identity, and shapes its domestic, regional,
and global policy priorities and grand strategy in the
coming years.
©
TFF & the author 2003
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