An
active peace policy to create a new future
By
Dietrich
Fischer
Director of the European University Center for Peace
Studies (EPU) and Co-Director of TRANSCEND
TFF
associate
September 26, 2003
Published in the Journal of Future Studies
Vol 8, No 1, August 2003, pp. 107-110
Few people have the opportunity to make daily
decisions at the international level concerning war and
peace. But most of us are intimately familiar with
another environment prone to conflict: road traffic.
Comparing today's prevailing national security policies
with the measures we have taken to reduce collisions on
the road can help us devise more sensible strategies to
maintain international security in the future than the
outdated military concepts that are still applied
today.
Until about 1880, there were essentially no traffic
laws. Carriages passed each other on the left or right,
as pedestrians still do today on a sidewalk, and whoever
was more aggressive crossed an intersection first. But
with the invention of motor vehicles, collisions became
more frequent and more dangerous, sometimes fatal, and
something had to be done.
The solution adopted was to create traffic laws:
[1] We observe certain rules, such as
driving on the right (or left hand side in some
countries) and stopping at red lights, and wearing
safety belts.
[ 2] We drive more carefully than the law
requires, to avoid accidents even if others make
mistakes. If we arrive at an intersection on a bicycle
and have the right of way, but see a heavy truck
approaching without stopping, it is not a good idea to
insist on our right. There is a famous tombstone
inscription: "May he rest in peace. He had the right
of way."
[3] We take driving lessons and must pass a
test before obtaining a driver's license.
[4] We build safe roads, wide enough for
two vehicles to pass without a collision, with fences
along cliffs, etc.
All of these measures improve the common safety of
everyone, not only our own safety at the expense of
others. Though accidents do happen occasionally, because
these rules are not always followed and not perfectly
enforced, it is clear that without such rules we would be
much worse off.
Nuclear weapons have now made international anarchy
far more dangerous and obsolete than motor vehicles made
anarchy on the road obsolete. It is no longer adequate to
wait until war breaks out and then to react with military
force. This would be comparable to driving a car with
closed eyes, waiting until we hit an obstacle, and then
reacting by calling an ambulance. We need to pursue a
more future-oriented approach, an active peace policy
that seeks to foresee possible conflicts and avoid or
resolve them long before they lead to war. What would a
security policy based on principles analogous to traffic
rules look like?
[1] We would consistently adhere to
international law, and cooperate with other nations to
expand and strengthen it. The Reagan administration's
refusal to accept the decision of the World Court after
it mined Nicaragua's harbors in violation of
international law hurt the United States' own long term
interest, by making it more difficult for it to take
future international disputes before the World Court.
Even if others violate the law, it is not in our
interest to do the same. Even if we see someone else to
cross a red light, it does not help us to imitate that
folly.
Some argue that adhering to international law would
restrict a country's sovereignty and freedom. But only by
adhering to certain mutually beneficial norms can we gain
better control over our destiny. The Kyoto treaty
restricts countries' freedom to burn fossil fuels and
pollute the atmosphere with carbon dioxide, but saves us
all from potentially catastrophic climate change that may
disrupt agriculture, lead to famines, raise the ocean
levels, and flood costal areas, including many of the
world's largest cities. No country can control its
climate by itself, only through international cooperation
and the acceptance of rules that are binding for all can
we prevent such future disasters. Similarly, traffic laws
restrict our freedom to drive zigzag, if we prefer to do
so, but they give us the more important freedom to reach
our destination safely and on time.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is enforced by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, but its authority is
now too limited. It can only inspect nuclear sites of
member countries which they have officially declared.
Imagine if a suspected drug or weapons smuggler could
tell a border guard, "You may check the passenger
compartment, but don't open my trunk," such an
"inspection" would be meaningless. We need unannounced
random inspections of any suspected nuclear site. Most
governments today strongly oppose such inspections as a
violation of their national sovereignty. That was also
the reaction of many air passengers when airlines began
to inspect people's luggage after a series of fatal
hijackings. Many said, "You have no right to search my
bag, you are violating my privacy," or "Why do you
suspect me to be a terrorist?" But today most have come
to realize that they can only be safe if everyone's
luggage is inspected, including their own. Sooner or
later, national governments will reach the same
conclusion with regard to the inspection of nuclear
sites. The question is whether this will happen before or
only after the first incident of nuclear terrorism.
[2] It is in each country's interest to avoid
provocative behavior, even if it is not explicitly
prohibited by international law. Some Americans find it
difficult to understand why the Iranians were not more
grateful to the United States for having tried to
modernize Iran. After the CIA toppled Iran's
democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh
in 1953 and installed the Shah, the United States sent
over 100,000 advisors and technicians to help convert
Iran into a modern country like the United States. But
let us imagine that Ayatollah Khomeini had sent Iranian
agents to topple the US government, installed a
fundamentalist Islamic leader in the United States, and
then sent 100,000 mullahs to help convert the United
States into a god- fearing Islamic Republic like Iran.
Would most Americans have appreciated such "help"?
Hardly. Khomeini may have been a disaster for Iran, but
it is necessary to understand the feelings of resentment
against foreign influence that brought him to power.
[3] Before being allowed to drive a car,
anyone must take driving lessons and pass a test,
otherwise they could cause an accident and possibly kill
someone. But it is ironic that before the US President
takes office and control over the US nuclear arsenal,
which could kill millions, he or she is only required to
pledge to defend the US constitution. We would never
issue a driver's license to anyone based merely on a
pledge to drive safely! We want to be sure they can
actually drive.
One could argue that being elected is a kind of test,
but it is more a test of popularity than of actual
competence. Imagine a group of air travelers choosing the
most popular among them to be their pilot. This could be
a prescription for disaster. That does not mean that we
abolish elections. But we would limit our choice to those
who have undergone the necessary preparation to learn how
to defuse a tense crisis without sliding into war. Like
controlling an airplane, peaceful conflict transformation
(see e.g. Galtung 2000) is a skill that can be taught and
learnt. Similarly, if we need to undergo surgery, we do
not wish someone to be assigned to be our surgeon simply
because he or she did well on a medical exam. We wish to
interview several prospective surgeons, and ask others
about their experience with them. But we limit that
choice to those who have actually gone to medical school.
Good intentions alone are not sufficient. We would not
even allow our own mother to perform open heart surgery
on us, even though their is no doubt that she has the
best intentions.
[4] Finally, an active peace policy calls for
international cooperation in conflict transformation to
prevent war, peacekeeping to end violence in case
prevention should fail, and reconciliation to prevent a
recurrence of violence. It also seeks to improve human
security by avoiding ecological catastrophes, combatting
hunger and disease, and making education available to
all.
In contrast to military preparations which seek to
improve one country's security at the expense of
threatening the security of others, all of these four
components of an active peace policy improve the common
security of everyone.
Let us now compare such a comprehensive security
policy with the national security policies currently
applied or considered:
"Flexible response," which is still NATO's official
doctrine, threatens the first use of nuclear weapons
against a conventional attack. This is as if we sought to
avoid collisions by loading our car with dynamite, wired
to explode on impact, to kill anyone hitting us (and
ourselves too). This should certainly deter anyone from
hitting us intentionally, but the slightest accidental
collision would mean our end.
It may be argued that going to war is a deliberate
decision, not the result of an accident. But it is not
always obvious who is responsible for a war. One can
always find something the other side did first. In the
1967 Mideast War, Israel argues that when Egypt blocked
Israeli ships in the Bay of Aqaba, this was the first act
of war. Egypt on the other hand considered Israel's
subsequent air attack on Egyptian air fields as the first
act of war.
It is easy to imagine a scenario how "flexible
response" could have led to a nuclear war. During the
Cold War, NATO conducted daily helicopter patrols along
the border between East and West Germany to detect any
troop or tank concentrations as an early warning of a
possible attack. Suppose one of those helicopters
accidentally strayed into East Germany in dense fog and
was shot down, with the pilot still alive. The East
German government, supported by the Soviet Union, had
announced a public trial with a possible death penalty
for the pilot as a spy. NATO had sent a rescue mission to
extract the pilot alive. The Warsaw treaty members had
considered this incursion as an act of aggression and
responded with force, overwhelming the outnumbered NATO
troops. Both sides would have rushed in reinforcements,
and if NATO had lost the conventional battle, it had
escalated by using a nuclear weapon. The Soviet Union had
previously announced that it would never use nuclear
weapons first, but if attacked with nuclear weapons, it
would retaliate with all its nuclear weapons. Such a
sequence of events could have led to a nuclear holocaust
that nobody planned or wanted.
Proponents of the "nuclear war fighting" doctrine
advocate destroying the nuclear forces of an opponent
before he can use them, if war appears imminent. That
would be like mounting a machine gun on our car,
threatening to kill anyone who drove dangerously close to
us. That would of course tempt others to get an even
bigger gun and, if in doubt, kill us before we could kill
them.
The "Bush doctrine," applied in Iraq in the spring of
2003, goes even further by initiating a preventive war
before a danger is obvious and imminent. That is
comparable to blowing up other people's cars if we think
that somewhere, sometime in the future they might hit us.
But that only encourages others to do the same to us.
Star wars is not the answer either. Relying on defense
against nuclear weapons would be like driving over a
cliff wearing a safety belt. Even worse, it would entrust
the fate of the earth into an extremely complex technical
system, which could go wrong catastrophically. The
tragedies of Bhopal and Chernobyl and the recent loss of
a second space shuttle have warned us.
As Robert S. McNamara (1995, p. 342) wrote, "The point
I wish to emphasize is this: human beings are fallible.
We all make mistakes. In our daily lives they are costly,
but we try to learn from them. In conventional war, they
cost lives, sometimes thousands of lives. But if mistakes
were to affect decisions relating to the use of nuclear
forces, they would result in the destruction of whole
societies. Thus, the indefinite combination of human
fallibility and nuclear weapons carries a high risk of a
potential catastrophe. Is there a military justification
to accept that risk? The answer is no."
To guarantee human survival, we must abolish nuclear
weapons before they abolish us. Indeed, in the 21st
century it has become necessary to abolish war itself as
an accepted means of settling international disputes, in
the same way as we have abolished slavery in the 19th
century and colonialism in the 20th century. War is a
cruel, obsolete way of handling disputes that causes much
suffering, and any conventional war in the nuclear age
always carries with it the risk of escalating to nuclear
war.
Carnesale et al. (1983) have argued that we might be
better off if nuclear weapons had never been invented,
but now that we know how to make them, we cannot
disinvent them anymore, and therefore have to learn to
live with nuclear weapons as long as civilization exists.
It is true that we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons, but
nobody has disinvented cannibalism either. We simply have
learnt to abhor it. Can't we learn to abhor equally the
thought of incinerating our planet with nuclear
weapons?
References:
Carnesale, Albert, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel
Huntington, Joseph Nye and Scott Sagan (1983) Living
with Nuclear Weapons. New York: Bantam.
Galtung, Johan (2000) Conflict Transformation By
Peaceful Means: The TRANSCEND Method. Geneva: United
Nations.
McNamara, Robert S. (1995) In Retrospect: The
Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (with an Appendix: The
Nuclear Risks of the 1960s and Their Lessons for the
Twenty-first Century). New York: Times Books.
__________________________________________________________________
Dietrich Fischer'
books include "Preventing
War in the Nuclear Age" (1984), "Non-Military
Aspects of Security" (1993) and "Winning
Peace" (with Jan Øberg and Wilhelm Nolte,
1987).
©
TFF & the author 2003
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