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Human
Needs, Humanitarian Intervention, Human Security and the
War in Iraq
By
Johan
Galtung
Director and Founder,
TRANSCEND
TFF
associate
February 25, 2004
Keynote, Sophia University/ICU, Tokyo, 14/12/2003;
and Regional Studies Association, Tokyo, 10/01/2004
1. Human needs and the life
expectancy of concepts and words
Concepts come and go; they do not stay around forever.
"Human security" is in, "humanitarian intervention" is on
its way out. This applies to science, to politics in
general, and to world politics and the UN community in
particular. The total human condition has many facets and
they all have a justified claim on our attention. A human
condition, like the plight of misery, stays on, but
"poverty elimination" may retire from the front stage
like "community development", "self-reliance", "new
economic world order" did, and even "women in
development" will do. Cruel, but such is the life cycle
of concepts. Why?
In science there is Thomas Kuhn's[1]
epistemological answer: because the paradigm underlying
the concept has been exhausted. The paradigm has been
squeezed for whatever it is worth, all permutations of
sub-concepts have been explored, What is left are
permutations, Kuhn's "puzzles", little new comes up. Time
for a "scientific revolution", new concepts, new
paradigms.
To this a sociological/political answer can be added:
the old paradigm has probably become the entry card to
power in the scientific establishment, with
apprenticeship, assistantship, and patient work in some
corner of the paradigm as stations on the way. And a
younger generation may have wanted more rapid access to
the top, identifying a quick bypass superior to the time
tested techniques of challenging the person on the top
through superior mastery of his own paradigm.[2]
And that bypass was, and is, of course, a new paradigm,
unknown to the top; a fresh paradigm with not only new
answers, but new problems.[3]
Thus, there is a Kuhnian epistemology of cognitive
fatigue leading to paradigm shifts. But there is also a
Khaldunian[4] politics of new generations--or
groups in general, like gender, classes,
nations--crushing the gates, evicting the exhausted
managers of exhausted paradigms, installing themselves,
basking in the glory of the new insights and practices
till their lights also gets dim and their claim to power
is reduced to flawless repetition of their favorite
deductions from old axioms, with old answers to old
problems, incapable of new answers, let alone new
problems. Outside the gates the rumblings of new concepts
are already audible to those not deafened by dementia
praecox.[5]
Thus, in the 1970s a highly successful paradigm under
the heading of basic human needs (BHN) made its round
through the members of the UN family. It came with basic
human rights; not only the Universal Declaration of 10
December 1948 but also the Social, Economic and Cultural
Covenant of 16 December 1966, yet to be ratified by the
USA and closer to such basic needs as for food, clothing,
housing, health and education. This author, as consultant
to about a dozen members of the UN family was, and still
is, dedicated to that paradigm and its efforts to
establish the sine qua non, the non-negotiable conditions
not only for a being, for life, but for a human
being.
Intellectually the paradigm challenged the researcher
to develop a theory of human needs,and a method to
identify them. The present author's answer was to ask
people of all kinds around the world, in a dialogue, what
they cannot live without, giving survival, wellness,
freedom and identity as answers.[6]
And politically the paradigm challenged politicians
(in democracies we all are) to implement basic needs for
all.
The basic needs paradigm has not been exhausted,
neither intellectually, nor politically. Politically it
placed the human being in the center of the
State-Capital-Civil Society triangle of modernity. The
State was often seen as a guarantor of survival,
"security" in the narrow sense, and freedom; Capital as
the supplier of goods, for wellness, for those who could
afford the price demanded; and the Civil Society network
of human associations and organizations, and local
authorities, for all four, including the informal economy
of non-monetized exchange and production for own
consumption. The division of labor of these three pillars
of modern society became, and still are, basic paradigm
problems to explore, or hard nuts to crack.
According to this model the state, and also capital,
had a strong competitor in civil society, the NGOs/NPOs,
and the local authorities, LAs, municipalities. If people
knew their basic needs and could have them satisfied
locally, and/or through networks spun by themselves in an
ever expanding and deepening global civil society, also
leaning on traditional or even more ancient wisdom, then
what happens to State and Capital?
Whether the state should be an actor in markets, let
alone have the ultimate power over economic transactions,
was a major 20th century controversy. The pendulum was
ultimately swinging toward private capitalist monopoly,
and away from public state-capitalist/socialist monopoly.
But extremes are no good resting points. The middle, in
media res, offers better pendular rest. But the basic
needs/civil society orientation was not much interested
in that ideology pendulum. Increasingly the demands on
State and Capital became less Do-this/Do-that, and much
more Don't-do-this/Don't do that. Do not stand in the
way. Get out.
They did not like it. Capital hit back with
globalization: borderless markets first for financial,
then for the productive economies, destroying local
markets and informal economies, even patenting old
wisdom; monetizing the goods and services also for basic
needs in a world with billions unable to pay the
price.
And the State hit back with humanitarian intervention
and human security, making the governments and the
military the indispensable sine qua non for the sine qua
non of security.
They had a very good argument, insufficiently explored
by the human needs paradigm: state, government violence
against its own citizens, protected by the doctrines of
state sovereignty, and of state security. There was no
need to use cases from the past. The 1990s witnessed
state violence, even of a genocidal nature, in East
Timor, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq. The
solution was formulated in terms of counter-violence from
the outside, in other words intervention, for
humanitarian ends, in other words humanitarian
intervention. And the problem was how to make
"humanitarian" and "intervention" compatible.
Human needs, including the need to survive, are felt
inside human beings, hence people-oriented. But human
security is also state-oriented as only states can
deliver that counter-violence. That state ultimate
violence monopoly, the ultima ratio regis has been
protected by consensus. Controversies have raged over how
much, and which, means of violence should be available to
the state, from the realist maximum to the pacifist
minimum positions; and over how much control civil
society must exercise over that state exercise of
violence, from the fascist 0% to the democratic 100%
positions. These two dimensions may well come to define
much of the political spectrum of the 21st century.
2. Humanitarian Intervention
= Humanitarianism + Intervention
There is a tradition of humanitarianism, expressed in
an article by Jon M. Ebersole who played a key role in
the "Mohonk Criteria for humanitarian assistance in
complex emergencies"[7]. The five criteria,
adapted by a broadly based conference[8], are
[1] Humanity: Human suffering should be
addressed wherever it is found. The dignity and rights of
all victims must be respected.
[2] Impartiality. Humanitarian assistance
should be provided without discriminating as to ethnic
origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or
religion. Relief of the suffering of individuals must be
guided solely by their needs, and priority must be given
to the most urgent cases of distress.
[3] Neutrality. Humanitarian assistance should
be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking
sides in controversies of a political, religious or
ideological nature.
[4] Independence. The independence of action
by humanitarian agencies should not be infringed on or
unduly influenced by political, military or other
interests.
[5] Empowerment. Humanitarian assistance
should strive to revitalize local institutions, enabling
them to provide for the needs of the affected community.
Humanitarian assistance should provide a solid first step
on the continuum of emergency relief, rehabilitation,
reconstruction and development.
This is the tradition of humanitarianism associated
with NGOs such as the Red Cross,[9] but also with
states, big and small, in nature-made and in man-made
disasters. The Mohonk criteria mark a new phase, as did
DMTP, the Disaster Management Training Programme of the
United Nations Development Programme.
But we sense a gendering of the issue: the Mohonk
criteria address suffering "wherever it is found". The
trigger for action is a basic human need insulted, the
need for physical well-being. According to Carol
Gilligan[10] this compassion is more frequently
found among women. Men tend to be steered by other and
more abstract principles, more removed from basic
needs.
An example: "one prominent American expert questioned
some of the basic, time-honored principles which form the
basis of humanitarian action", formulating a very male
view:[11] "Impartiality and neutrality, when
applied in cases such as Bosnia, can be
counterproductive. For example, while giving Serbs
humanitarian aid under the principle of neutrality, the
United Nations has essentially legitimized the Serbs'
claim that they, not the Bosnians, are victims.
Furthermore, by providing the humanitarian assistance,
they have freed the Serbs' resources, such as fuel and
food, to supply their troops in forward areas. In many
cases there are clear examples of right and wrong in
international conflicts and in those the questions of
impartiality and neutrality need to be examined much
harder."
The abstract principles in this text are well known.
"Serbs" enter as a general category, lumped together with
no distinction between perpetrators and innocent
victims-civilians-bystanders. From this position there is
but a small step to a distinction between worthy and
unworthy victims, internally displaced person (IDPs),
refugees. General human compassion is absent.
Then, the tradition of interventionism. It has a bad
name, reminiscent of the punitive expeditions by colonial
powers in general, and the UK in particular, to punish
the colonized and protect the settlers, and of numerous
US military interventions (Iraq is No. 69 after the
Second world war) to exercise control. Control=stopping
violence=ending suffering="humanitarian"? But:
If intervention causes more suffering than it
eliminates?
If intervention=war it is against UN charter 2(4), and
must be mandated by the UN Security Council to meet
internatinal law.
And, from the premise of "intervention to protect
people from the violence of its own government" it does
not follow that intervention has to be violent/military
in general, and by the USA in particular. A very
important variable in that connection is the military
culture.[12] Consider this:
"In essence, US forces are imbued with the spirit of
the offensive, characterized by an indomitable will to
win and an aggressive determination to carry the battle
to the enemy. The aim is to inflict on the enemy an early
and decisive defeat. This spirit, while likely to produce
battlefield success, is often at odds with instincts of
political leaders, who may prefer a more graduated force
application with diplomatic and other pressures."
"Peace monitoring, peacekeeping, disaster
relief--nation assistance, counterdrug support,
antiterrorism and noncombatant evacuation
operations--while perhaps politically essential or
morally desirable-often degrade combatant force readiness
to perform their prime mission-warfighting, preparing for
war."[13]
The contrast is clear[14]:
The European Approach: "[Peace Operations] are
operations amongst the people.. If you're in your
shirtsleeve and your weapon is down the side of your leg
and you're no looking aggressive, then you have a calming
effect...The more you seek to isolate yourself from the
people, be it in your helmet and flak jacket, be it in
your large four man vehicle patrol, the less you will be
able to find the person or people who matter to you,
among those people. (General Rupert Smith)
The U.S. Approach: "It's pretty simple. When you're
under arms, you wear your combat kit. We insist on
helmets in HUMVEES and trucks because it saves lives when
there's an accident. The U.S. Army's philosophy on this
is, 'Look, if you want us to go to the field and do peace
enforcement, under arms, you get an organization with
military discipline that's ready to respond to any kind
of lethal threat. If you don't like that, send for the
U.N'. (General Montgomery Meigs).[15]
This opens for the question of "what kind of military
intervention". But that does not exhaust the intervention
dimension. The TRANSCEND perspective, for instance,
identifies a number of other components in an
intervention:[16]
--operations could be improved by calling on expertise
not only in the means of violence and the military
mentality, but also in police skills, nonviolence skills
and mediation skills.
Since women would tend to relate more to people than
to hardware they could perhaps constitute 50% of the
units. Moreover, the numbers should be vastly
increased.
In short, a blue carpet of peace-keepers, not only
blue helmets, so dense that there is little space left
for fighting. And peacekeeping would then also include
the 3 Rs: reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution;
not waiting till the violence is "over".
If we eliminate military and police skills we come to
the nonviolent pole of the dimension, with the US
military ethos located at the other extreme. In spite of
the many successes of nonviolence from the 1940s
onwards[17] these are not skills governments are
likely to use for intervention. They have no monopoly on
them, and such skills can also be used against any
abusive government engaged in direct or structural
violence.
So we have a right-left spectrum of four modes of
intervention: hard military (like USA), soft military
(like Europe above), soft nonviolence (like TRANSCEND
above), hard nonviolence (like Gandhi).[18] The
best would be people's hard nonviolence from the inside.
Doing nothing is not an option.
But there is a different approach embedded in the
paradigm shift from security studies to peace studies.
Security studies tend to solve problems of violence with
counter-violence or the threat thereof. Nonviolence comes
close in solving problems of illegitimate power with
nonviolent counter-power. But peace studies tend to see
violence as the consequence of untransformed conflict and
dehumanization, and solutions in terms of conflict
transformation and depolarization before violence gets
started:
- by linking peace to conflict and its solution, like
in "peace and conflict studies", not only to the absence
of violence;
- by insisting on nonviolent and creative approaches
to conflict solution, like in "peace by peaceful
means";
- by applying this to conflicts at all levels, micro
(within and between persons), meso (within societies),
macro (between states and nations), and mega (between
regions and civilizations); and
- by being an applied
diagnosis/prognosis/therapy=peace practice science, using
all relevant knowledge from all disciplines.
Peace studies would examine the goals of the parties
in terms of their legitimacy, in the sense of
compatibility with basic needs/rights for all, and try to
bridge legitimate goals. With no priority to goals of the
state paying the studies.[19]
Chamberlain's "peace in our time" is often invoked
against peace movements etc. But Chamberlain in
München used Nazi-Germany against the worse danger
from a Tory point of view: the communist Soviet Union.
"Russia, Russia" was the cry heard in Parliament in
defense of his policy. Peace studies would have explored
the goals of all parties, bridging the legitimate goals,
resisting nonviolently the illegitimate. A not easy
challenge.
3. Human Security = Human +
Security
Thesis: Rwanda 1994 gave the option of doing nothing a
bad name. The (very) soft military approach in Bosnia
(Srebrenica) 1995 gave UN-led peace-keeping a bad name.
The hard military US-led NATO war 1999 against Serbia to
protect the Kosovars gave humanitarian assistance a bad
name. But the succesful hard nonviolent approach against
Milosevic fall 1999[20]--seen as illegitimate
regardless of the truth about those elections--did not
give nonviolence a good name, the approach being too
extra-paradigmatic in a US-led world seeking military
legitimacy.[21]
In short, time for a new concept. The UN Commission On
Human Security (CHS), launched in June 2001, was
co-chaired by the former UN High Commissioner for
Refugees Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, holder of the
Nobel prize in economic science[22]. The final
report was presented to the UN Secretary-General on May 1
2003.[23] Some highlights from the important
Report:
- The international community urgently needs a new
paradigm of security--(the state) often fails to fulfill
its security obligations-and at times has even become a
source of threats to its own people--attention must now
shift from the security of the state to the security of
the people--to human security.
- (the Report is) a response to the threats of
development reversed, to the threats of violence
inflicted--that response cannot be effective if it comes
fragmented-from those dealing with rights, those with
security, those with humanitarian concerns and those with
development;
- Human security complements state security, enhances
human rights and strengthens human development.
- The CHS definition: to protect the vital core of all
human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human
fulfillment.
- Human security complements "state security" in four
respects:
o Its concern is individual and community
rather than the state
o Menaces include /more than/ threats to state
security
o The range of actors is expanded beyond the state
alone
o Achieving human security includes--empowering
people
- Human security helps identify gaps in the
infrastructure of protection as well as ways to
strengthen or improve it.
The operational part translates such ideas into ten
points:
- Protecting people in violent conflict
- Protecting people from the proliferation of arms
- Supporting the human security of people on the
move
- Establishing human security transition funds for
post-conflict
- Encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the
poor
- Providing minimum living standards everywhere
- According high priority to universal access to basic
health care
- Develop an efficient and equitable global system for
patent rights
- Empowering all people with universal basic
education
- Clarifying the need for a global human identity
while respecting the freedom of individuals to have
diverse identities and affiliations
Very much of what has been mentioned is in the basic
human needs tradition, like the four needs-classes
presented in section [1] above:
There is a focus on survival in terms of protection
and security.
There is a focus on wellness in terms of basic health
care, basic education and minimum living standards.
Trade, market and patent rights are qualified by "fair",
to "benefit the poor" and "equitable".
There is a focus on diverse identity, including global
identity.
Freedom is missing from these points, but is all over
the report, very much based on one of the leading
intellectuals of our times, co-chair Amartya Sen, and his
seminal book Development as Freedom.[24]
And most importantly: "the range of actors is expanded
beyond the state alone", above all bringing in empowered
individuals all over.
No doubt "human security" is a formula giving "human"
to the basic needs approach, developing that approach
further. Does it also give "security" to the state, as
indicated in [1] above? And how?
The report legitimizes the word "security" by giving
it the connotation "human". What then happens is beyond
the pages of the report. We would expect the state system
with its monopoly on the violent means of security to use
this legitimation, justifying intervention inside other
states in the name of "human security". And we would also
expect some of them to use "security" in the broad sense
as a cover for other goals, in the national interest
tradition.
4. The War In
Iraq
Let us assume, however, that the only motive behind
the US/UK war on Iraq that started March 20 2003 (Baghdad
time) was human security, the protection of the Iraqi
people against the Hussein-Ba'ath-Sunni regime. By May 1
the secular, state-capitalist, Ba'ath regime had been
demolished and the power was in the hands of the
USA/CPA-Coalition Provisional Authority. Nine months
after the war started Saddam Hussein was a POW. Freedom?
A success story?
Within the simplistic logic of Hussein-in-power vs
Hussein-not-in-power, yes. But that logic hides two
important questions[25]:
A: What were the total cost-benefits of the regime
change? and,
B: Were there less costly alternative methods of regime
change?
The argument is not against regime change, nor against
regime change from the outside = intervention. The basic
assumption of humanitarian intervention for human
security logic is accepted. States are not sovereign.
Humans are. Not only states need security. Humans do.
There is a rider, however, that one day may become
significant. One day human security against violence by
one's own government might also be interpreted to include
the economic violence of shifting acquisitive power so
much upwards in society that the bottom X% of the
population is left with insufficient means to cover basic
needs, even to the point of excessive morbidity and
premature mortality.
This usually comes as structural violence due to
unintended action, sustained by acts of omission. But it
could also come as acts of commission, as direct
violence, as war on the poor rather than as war on
poverty, but by economic, not by military/secret police
means. One day, later than some hope but earlier than
some fear, economic violence may be included in the
definition of genocide and become a reason to intervene
to bring about regime change for human security.
The term "security" is often used in connection with
the war in Iraq, early 2004, still in its second
guerrilla phase. If "security" is defined, more
traditionally, as low/zero probability of becoming a
victim of violence, then Iraq certainly is a "security
problem". A violent attack tends to trigger violent
resistance, and battlefields, regardless of type of
violence or who attacked, tend to be a security problem
for all concerned, "them or us", military or
civilian.
Of the 28 countries that had sent troops to Iraq as of
December 8 2003, according to the Foreign Ministry of
Japan,[26] 10 were listed as engaged in
"security", under "main activities". The countries are
United States, Britain, Albania, Bulgaria, El Salvador,
Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Ukraine. Since the
security discourse tends to see the solution to violence
in terms of counter-violence, "security" is essentially a
euphemism for "combat". The outcome is uncertain, given
Iraqi deep culture with a very long time perspective and
courage, dignity and honor as or more important than
winning.[27]
To assess the "cost-benefits in Iraqi human terms",
since the humanitarian intervention was for their human
security, we shall use basic human needs, BHN, as a
benchmark. The possible justification of the intervention
would depend on the outcome of comparing
Benefits: BHN level with intervention-BHN level
without intervention
Costs: BHN costs of the intervention.
This comparison could then be carried out on an annual
basis after March 20 2003 as some BHN benefits might be
long term. However, in that case one might also have to
adjust upwards the benefits without intervention, with
the costs of deep UN inspection certifying the absence of
weapons of mass destruction, a human rights regime, and
the benefits of sanctions lifted. Most regime atrocities
were in the past.[28]
The following is only indicative of ways of thinking,
using the four BHN classews above. Data are very limited
indeed.
[1] Survival. With security in the narrow
sense of "risk of getting killed" reduced by the
intervention, it stands to reason that Pentagon refuses
to publish data about Iraqi, military or civilian,
casualties, killed or wounded. There is talk about
10-15,000[29] so far, high for an intervention
even in our era. The US casualties have passed 500, and
are also made invisible because media are not given
access to the body return if not in bags, in coffins; nor
to burials. The ratio is indicative of the strategy of
terrorism, state or privatized: keep the ratio of
victims/perpetrators high by making the perpetrators
unavailable for retaliation. Ratios in the 20-30 range
are low relative to 3,000-3,100:19=158-163[30]
for the 9/11 terrorist act, however.
If we expand the definition of the "war in Iraq" to
cover the US/UK air raids in the periods after the First
Iraq war in 1991 the number of victims, but not of the
perpetrators, would increasemaking for higher ratios. And
the war continues.
[2] Well-being. Destruction of housing and
infrastructure brought about by battle, of orchards and
farmland as reprisals against farmers suspected of
cooperation with the resistance, unemployment rates cited
as 70% in some regions and overcrowded hospitals are
indicative of serious declines in the supply of such
basic needs satisfiers as food, clothes, shelter, health
care and education. That decline, relative to the high
level of basic needs satisfaction in the oil-rich Ba'ath
welfare state, had a pre-history in the war with Iran
1980-88, the First Iraq war and the economic sanctions
and air raids thereafter. There are some benefits from
the lifting of sanctions, however.
[3] Freedom. Consider this:[31]
On September 19 2003, Bremer enacted the now infamous
Order 39. It announced that 200 Iraqi state companies
would be privatized; decreed that foreign firms can
retain 100% ownership of Iraqi banks, mines and
factories; and allowed these firms to move 100% of their
profits out of Iraq. The Economist declared the new rules
a "capitalist dream".
The removal of a public sector, however inefficient,
may have on the well-being, may benefit the top 30% but
not the bottom 70%. Contravening the Geneva conventions,
this is the kind of decision that can only be taken by
the Iraqis themselves, not be imposed. This is
well-prepared autocracy[32], not freedom. And the
same tendency is witnessed in the postponement of direct
elections, using the model (like the loya jirga in
Afghanistan) of handpicked delegates to an assembly., not
direct elections.
[4] Identity. Muslim Iraq was attacked by two
Protestant permanent Security Council members opposed by
the other three, one secular/Catholic, one
secular/Orthodox and one Confucian. The attack started on
one of the holiest sites of shia Islam, Karbala, even on
the day, spring solstice 2003, when Hussein ibn Ali,
Mohammed's grandson, was decapitated in the Sunni-Shia
battle and became shia Islam's martyr.[33] The US
command even referred to their attack as "decapitation",
based on a hint as to where Saddam Husein, the head of
Iraq, might be hiding.
In the wake of the US military came Christian
fundamentalist missionaries[34] to convert, and
political missionaries to impose a separation between
church and state, the sacred and the secular, contrary to
the Islamic faith that they are inseparable. There may be
a road to democracy via the mosque and the ulema, but
that was not the road traveled by the USA. Nor by Saddam
Hussein.
No identity benefit, only heavy identity costs imposed
by the intervention. General conclusion: neither
security, nor human.
5. An alternative: Solving
the conflicts in and around Iraq
Let us then look at Iraq from the angle of conflict,
seen as shocks between goals, not necessarily between
parties. The latter, violence, may follow when the
conflict is not transformed so that the parties can
handle it without violence. Confusing conflict with
violence opens for a limited and limiting security
discourse. From that point on there are four steps, as
indicated above:
- identify the parties in the conflict
- identify their goals
- divide goals into legitimate and illegitimate, with
BHN as guide
- try to bridge the legitimate goals.
Here is an eleven parties model of the conflict in and
around Iraq, with three parties inside and eight outside,
with the understanding that parties can be subdivided,
and more be added.
I. CONFLICT PARTIES INSIDE IRAQ:
Kurds, wanting
- independence, or at least very high level
autonomy
- and Turkmen, wanting security, maybe autonomy
from the Kurds
Sunni, wanting
- to rule Iraq from Baghdad
- with secular, socialist, welfare state features
(ba'athism)
Shia, wanting
- an Islamic Republic, for Iraq, at least for
themselves
II. CONFLICT PARTIES OUTSIDE IRAQ:
USA, wanting direct/indirect control of Iraq from
Baghdad for:
- geopolitical control of Gulf region also
for Eurasia control[35]
- corporate economic control of oil, also for
geopolitics[36]
- Judeo-Christian fundamentalism, also to protect
Israel[37]
UK, wanting
- to settle old imperial accounts with Iraq
- special relation, to be chosen by the country
chosen by God
Japan, wanting
- to "normalize Japan" by legitimizing
Japanese military (SDF)
- special relation, to be chosen by the world's No.
1.
Australia, Spain etc., wanting
- US anti-terrorist assistance in return for
participation
France, Germany, wanting
- EU as independent of the USA in foreign and
security affairs
Turkey, wanting
- no Kurdish autonomy as a precedent for
Kurds in Turkey
- protection for the Turkmen
Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Iran, wanting
- not to be attacked by the USA
- good relations with the next Iraq
Saudi Arabia, wanting
- to survive, squeezed between Wahhabism and
the USA[38]
11 parties, 19 goals is a simplification, but better
than "the world against Saddam Hussein". "Eliminating WMD
threat" and "Eliminating Al Qaeda bases" are pretexts
intelligence services must have known were trumped
up.[39] Saddam Hussein's autocracy was not
trumped up, but was brought in too be credible as a
genuine goal. Nonetheless, there is something genuine
about democravy zand human rights, but not as a goal
given the cooperation with Hussein. US strategy in Iraq
is compatible with the three goals stated, their problem
being that the control eludes them.[40]
The next problem is that of legitimacy: of the 18
goals, how many are legitimate using basic needs and
basic rights as guides?
The Kurdish and Turkmen legitimacies flow from the
right of self-determination, making the first Turkish
goal illegitimate.
Any Sunni claim to rule all of Iraq, in which they
form 21%, is illegitimate continuation of colonial rule.
The political goals might possibly obtain democratic
legitimacy in that part, however.
The Shia goal would also also require democratic
legitimacy and could not be imposed, by majority rule,
against human rights.
The US goals are illegitimate, unmandated by people in
Iraq, the Gulf and Eurasia; a US mandate of course being
insufficient.[41]
The UK goals reflect identity problems to be solved in
UK.
The Japan identity problems can also only be solved in
Japan.
The goals of Australia, Spain etc., like for UK and
Japan, cannot be met in Iraq at the expense of the BHN of
Iraqi people.
The French/German goals are legitimate if backed by
the people. The goals of the countries bordering on Iraq
are legitimate.
The Saudi goal reflects a social problem to be solved
in Saudi.
Behind this reasoning about legitimacy there is a
general moral injunction against satisfying own goals at
the expense of others.
We are left with the legitimate goals of Kurds,
Turkmen and the Shia, the French/German aspirations for
the EU, of all border countries to escape unmolested. UK,
Japan, Australia etc, and Saudi-Arabia have deep-rooted
problems, but not solvable at the expense of invading
and/or occupying Iraq. How do we bridge that?
By the European Union in general, and the leading
powers France and Germany in particular, taking the
initiative for a Conference on Security and Cooperation
in the Middle East, CSCME, modeled on the Helsinki
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE,
1972-75. One point on the agenda would be Iraq, another
the Kurds.
Before the war this could have been added to the
French/German proposal for continued UN inspection and
human rights in Iraq, presented in the UN Security
Council March 2003 as an alternative to Anglo-American
belligerence.
After the war the idea of a CSCME is as relevant as
ever. But economic boycott by individuals, and the
international civil society in general, may have to be
used to put pressure on the invading-occupying countries.
The obvious target would be companies that "win Iraq
contract" and share the "spoils of war" in this
classical, colonialist war. As Arundhati Roy expresses
it[42]:
"I suggest we choose by some means two of the major
corporations that are benefiting from the destruction of
Iraq. We could then list every project they are involved
in. We could locate their office in every city and every
country across the world. We could go after them. We
could shut them down."
Byt why only "two of the major", meaning also why only
USA?
To take Australia as an example this incclude Patrick
Corp. (Baghdad Airport), SAGRIC (agriculture), Snowy
Mountains Electricity Corp (electricity), GRM
International (regulatory systems), Australian Wheat
Board (oil for food) and the ANZ Bank (Iraq Trade Bank
Consortium.[43]t For Spain it would mean
Soluziona,[44] etc.
The solution for Iraq might be neither a unitary state
as imposed by colonialism, based on the Mosul, Baghdad
and the Basra parts of the Ottoman Empire, nor
fragmentation in 18 provinces[45], nor--indeed--a
division into three states.[46] The solution
might be a federation with high autonomy for the Kurdish,
Sunni and Shia parts, with a federal capital not in
Baghdad. Kuwait, the 19th province before it was detached
in 1899 as a protectorate under the British Empire, might
like to be an independent, associated member, with a
status similar to Liechtenstein relative to Switzerland.
In such a federation a 61% Shia majority dictatorship is
impossible.
The solution for the Kurds might be to stimulate
similar autonomies in Syria, Turkey and Iran, and create
a Kurdistan out of the four autonomies, without changing
borders, and with a passport with the name Kurdistan, and
then one of the four countries on it.
And the solution for the problem of Iraqi security
might be for USA to withdraw like in Viêt
Nam[47], stop threatening,[48] and for
the Iraqis to invite an appropriate international
protection force.
Realistic? Considerably more so than the current US
exercise. With enormous basic needs costs, with the
Mohonk criteria insulted, the USA is now giving "human
security", the hard military option, and the fall-back
doctrine of pre-emption a bad name. There was no clear
and present danger of a mushroom cloud over
Manhattan[49], no WMD, no Iraq-Al Qaeda link. But
a dark cloud of responsibility is hovering over a the
USA, allies, intelligence services and media quadrangle.
The Hutton "inquiry" put the blame on the
media/BBC.[50] The next inquiry focuses on
CIA-FBI/MI6-MI5. But the project has already given the
USA Empire itself, and those allies stupid enough to toe
the US line, a bad, very bad name.
Alternatives? Basic needs+soft intervention+conflict
resolution.
________________________________
Notes:
[1]. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edition, Chicago IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1996.
[2]. For a sociological theory of
epistemology, invoking isomorphism between social
structure and science (establishment) structure, and of
both with theory structure, see Johan Galtung, "Social
structure and science structure", in Methodology and
Ideology, Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1977, Ch. 1, pp. 13-40.
[3]. There is also another approach for a
younger generation on its way up: attack the dominant
paradigm with no alternative paradigm in mind. And the
vulgar version of this approach: attack the established
holders of the old paradigm, with themselves in mind as
alternatives. Where these approaches prevail academic
life becomes as boring as negative politicking.
[4]. For one presentation of Ibn Khaldun's
cyclical theory of macro-historical change, see Galtung,
J and Inayatuallah, S eds., Macrohistory and
Macrohistorians, New York: Praeger, 1997.
[5]. There is a broader interpretation of
this. The West in general, white Anglo-saxons in
particular and US elites even more in particular have now
been repeating their twin mantras of electionism and
neo-liberalism for the better part of two centuries. They
are basking in the sun like the feudal lords in the high
castles Ibn Khaldun has in mind. Who are knocking at the
gates? The working class, told that whoever wants access
to the club have to look like the members of the club,
inside the Burg, the Bürger, the burghers, became
bourgeois. The women are knocking, and are told those who
will never look like men have to think, talk and act even
more like them. Colored people are told the same. Even
African Americans can rise to the very top as Secretary
of State, as key advisor to the President in foreign
affairs, as Supreme Court Justice, if they are only
sufficiently conservative. The game has to be played
according to the rules. Greens, environmentalists are
more problematic: they reject the club paradigms.
Was 9/11 2001 a khaldunian knock on the gates of the
US power elite? That depends on to what extent the
"Bedouins at the gates" have an alternative paradigm. In
general the new paradigm has to produce not only new
questions and new answers, but also reproduce acceptable
old and new answers to old questions. A hard task for
young fundamentalist wahhabs to take on.
[6]. See the author's "Meeting Basic Needs:
Peace and Development", The Royal Society Discussion
Meeting on "The science of well-being - integrating
neurobiology, psychology and social science", 19-20
November 2003, to be published in the proceedings.
Two approaches are indicated to identify needs:
- human physiology, particularly the openings of the
body and what goes in and out, including impressions
entering through eyes and ears, being processed, exiting
as expressions through the mouth, body language,
including writing (hence needs for impressions and
expression); not only air, water, food entering through
nose and mouth, then being digested and excreted (hence
needs for air, water and food, and toilets; and for
digestion (like the processing above).
- by asking people, in dialogues as the author did in
about 50 countries what they cannot do without.
The four categories of needs summarize the
findings.
[7]. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3
1995, pp. 14-24.
[8]. The meeting at Mohonk, NY, was the fourth
in a series organized autumn 1993 by the Task Force on
Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance
formed by the Programme on Humanitarian Assistance at the
World Conference on Religion and Peace, an NGO. Broadly
based in participation the criteria have often served as
a point of reference, as is also done here.
[9]. That symbol, however, is ambiguous,
associated with assistance to civilian victims, but also
with military units assisting the perpetrators, the
military themselves. To argue two different symbols in no
way is to argue that military personnel should not also
be relieved of their suffering.
[10]. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice:
Psychological Theory and Women's Development(Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982)
[11]. Human Rights Quarterly, p. 15. Whether
the view is predominantly male or predominantly American
is a moot point; the two categories obviously do not
exclude each other, but may reinforce each other.
[12]. I am indebted to Patrick Rechner of the
Ministry of Defense in Ottawa for sensitizing me to this
dimension.
[13]. Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, "The
Evolution of American Military Ideals", Military Review,
January-February 1998, pp. 56-61.
[14]. From "A Force for Peace and Security: US
and Allied Commanders' Views of the Military's Role in
Peace Operations", Peace Through Law Education Fund,
2002.
[15]. This goes with the famous thesis of a
Pentagon planner:
"The de facto role of the US armed forces will be to
keep the world safe four our economy and open to our
cultural assault. To those ends, we will do a fair amount
of killing", quoted by Major Ralph Peters, Parameters,
Summer 1997, pp. 4-14, US Army War College.
As George Bush says in Bob Woodward's Bush at War, "We
will export death and violence to the four corners of the
Earth in defense of our great nation".
[16]. See Conflict Transformation By Peaceful
Means, Geneva: United Nations Development Programme,
Disaster Management Training Programme, 1998.
[17]. For ten important cases, see Peace By
Peaceful Means London: SAGE, 1996, Second printing 1998,
chapter II.5 on nonviolence.
[18]. An alternative terminology:
hard military = peace enforcement
soft military = peacekeeping
soft noviolence = peace by peaceful means
hard noviolence = nonviolence
[19]. Governments have been generous in
financing security studies, assuming that the conclusions
will by and large be compatible with their own national
interests. Peace studies were globalized before
globalization came around as a concept, taking into
account the world interest, the human interest (basic
needs/rights), the nature interest - and national
interests, in plural. Governmental funding has of course
been stingy or absent, and more so the more the
government wants military options, including intervention
and war.
[20]. The problem with the student Otpor
nonviolence is, of course, to what extent it is a
genuine, spontaneous reaction of a part of the
population, and to what extent it could be a deliberate
effort by outside powers, like the US Embassy, to use
nonviolence when their military effort to dislodge the
Milosevic regime had failed. The Soros foundation
financed an invitation to Otpor activists to Tbilisi,
"teaching more than 1,000 Georgian students how to stage
a bloodless revolution" (Daily Georgian Times, January 8,
2004). Obviously Shevardnadze was a "goner" who could no
longer be used by the USA, a liability like the Shah and
Marcos, and Mikhail Saakashvili, a US-trained lawyer, was
in reality the only candidate.
[21]. If legitimacy for hard military
intervention, also for other than humanitarian reasons,
was the basic motivation, then the competitors to that
approach would have to be eliminated. The hypothesis that
there was no intervention in Rwanda (in spite of the
intelligence available) precisely to give
non-intervention a bad name, and no harder intervention
in Srebrenica (in spite of the intelligence available) to
give UN peacekeeping a bad name may sound conspiratorial.
But if a major structure, like the US (and UK, and
increasingly NATO) offensive war machine, very "hard
military", is fighting to survive such strategies wold be
expected.
[22]. Actually the prize of the centenary fund
of the Swedish national bank, wrongly termed "Nobel
prize" as it was not among Alfred Nobel's prizes.
[23]. The day the US president declared that
the combat in Iraq was essentially over.
[24]. Also see the interview with Amartya Sen
in SGI Quarterly, July 2003, pp. 3-5. He draws the
attention to the "inescapable downturns" and
"unanticipated declines", in any development or political
process, that "the old idea of growth with equity does
not provide an adequate guarantee security". To this one
may of course comment that any process sets forces into
motion which in turn will trigger counter-forces that may
be stronger, making some downturns perhaps more
inescapable than unanticipated, and less inescapable had
they been anticipated.
[25]. Not to mention the rather obvious: with
Saddam Hussein gone we would expect much more resistance,
not necessarily violent, from the Kurds and the Shia
according to the "USA has done its job, USA can leave"
logic, as William Pfaff (The Japan Times, December 19
2003) and Paul Krugman (IHT, December 20-21) agree.
[26]. Japan Times, 10 January 2004.
[27]. This is where "regional studies,
focusing on Iraq, more particularly on Arab culture (as
different from, for instance, Kurdish culture) and even
more particularly Bedouin culture is important in
comparing cultures an other aspects of the region. The
world is no longer cut out only for comparative studies.
The regions interact, indeed, the world is relational,
not only relative. In this particular case we are talking
about the relation between Iraq and the USA, bringing in
also US deep culture. And with so much of the killing
being from long distance (missiles) or high up (bombs)
the courage is reduced, and so are dignity and honor. In
addition the time perspective is limited to what it takes
for a war machine to manage military victory, after that
the impatience becomes palpable and any other form of
resistance is defined away as "terrorism". Hypothesis:
the party with the longer time perspective, accumulating
honor in the process, will win.
For that type of conclusion a regional perspective
focusing on Iraq/Arab world/Islam only is misleading. At
least two regional perspectives would be needed, and a
study of their relation.
[28]. There is, of course, ambiguity
surrounding the major recent atrocities. To the extent
the Halabja massacre in connection with the war against
Iran--a war instigated by the USA--had many Iraqi Kurds
predictably fighting Baghdad, and to the extent the
massacres of Kurds and Shia in connection with the 1991
war was encouraged by the USA to revolt against the
regime but not effectively supported, the responsibility
has to be shared. In no way justifying the atrocities,
the explanation includes, but also goes beyond the Saddam
Hussein regime. The Guardian (29 January 2004) "Saddam's
worst atrocities when he was backed by the West".
[29]. Other estimates are as high as
30-35,000.
[30]. The figures for the Twin Tower/Pentagon
atrocity tend to vary between 3,000 and 3,100.
[31]. Naomi Klein, The Guardian, November 7
2003.
[32]. Thus, the idea frequently heard in the
US election debate that the occupation forces were
insufficiently prepared for the aftermath of the war
rings false. This is well thought through, is a big
operation, and was implemented quickly.
[33]. I am indebted to Professor Hamid Mowlana
for this point.
[34]. To understand better what this
disrespect for Islam might mean the theological profile
of the USA in general is useful.
In polls conducted September 2003 on the beliefs of
the US people, 42% said "the Bible as the actual word of
God", 69% felt "religion plays too small a role in most
people's lives today", 92% believe in God, 85% in Heaven,
82% in Miracles, 78% in Angels, 74% in Hell, 71% in The
Devil, 34% in UFOs, 34% in Ghosts, 29% in Astrology, 25%
in Reincarnation and 24% in Witches (Chicago Tribune in
cooperation with The Yomiuri Shimbun, January 3 2004).
The profile of a premodern country, not yet seriously
touched by the Enlightenment?
[35]. The geopolitics behind this is
Mackinder's theory (1904) about the strengths and
weaknesses of regions of the world, concluding that the
Russian core and areas to the east contained the
potential to become a world power. In 1919 this was
revised to include Eastern Europe, and became known as
Mackinder's Heartland Theory: "Who rules East Europe
commamnds the heartland, who rules the heartland commands
the World Island (Eurasia and Africa); and who rules the
World Island commands the World". This theory has then
been picked up by Zbigniew Brzezinski in "a modernized
Mackinder heartland vision of a grand U.S. led
anti-Russian coalition of Europe, Turkey, Iran and China
as well as Central Asia" (Andre Gunder Frank, in "The
'Great Game' for Caspian Sea Oil", CENTRAL ASIA Online
#109, November 25-December 1, 2000).
[36]. See Geoffrey Heard, Melbourne, "It's not
about oil or Iraq; it's about the US and Europe going
head-to-head on world economic dominance",
<journey@mbox.kyoto-inet.or.jp>. As to the central
control, "the Kurds got word from Paul Bremer 3rd, the
U.S administrator in Iraq, that the United States wanted
them to give up their powers over security, oil resources
an other matters and accede to the authority of the new
Iraqi state that is about to be born", IHT, 10-11 January
2004.
[37]. We have not listed Israel and Palestine
as parties, but the Israeli goal of security, like
Palestine's, is of course legitimate. Israel-Palestine
would obviously be the third major point on a CSCME
agenda. For a vision of a six-country Middle East
Community modeled on the European Community of the Treaty
of Rome 1958, see www.transcend.org.
The US goal in this connection, however, is not only
neo-con geopolitics for the Gulf region as defined in the
famous PNAC document. There is also the fundamentalist
position, "to ensure that Muslims and Islam are defeated
so that the Biblical prophecy of a triumphant Israel"
will herald the "return of the Messiah". Of course, when
that happens, according to the evangelists' erroneous
reading of the Bible, the Jews will also be converted to
Christianity. What this means is that there is messianic
zeal that drives a section of Christian evangelism as it
forges an opportunistic link with a segment of right-wing
political Zionism", Chandra Muzaffar, "Demonising the
enemy", JUST, vol. 3 no. 11, November 2003, p. 4.
[38]. Saudi Arabia is ambiguous. Wahhabism, a
fundamentalism, ascetic and nationalist, would set them
on a collision course with economism, consumerist and
globalist. The treaty of 1945 between the USA and Saudi
Arabia was with the Royal House and also stipulated the
duty of the USA to assist the Royal House in conflicts
with its own people.
However, the Royal House is now divided against
itself, as pointed out by Michael Scott Doran, :"Saudi
Arabia, America's ally and enemy" (IHT, December 23,
2003):
"On the one hand, some Westernizers in the ruling
class look to Europe and the United States as models of
political development; on the other, a Wahhabi religious
establishment holds up its interpretation of Islam's
golden age and considers giving any voice to non-Wahhabis
as idolatry. Saudi Arabia's most powerful figures have
taken opposite sides in this debate: Crown Prince
Abduallah tilts toward the liberal reformers, whereas his
half-brother Prince Nayef, the interior minister, sides
with the clerics.
[39]. See, for instance, "British officers
knew on eve of war that Iraq had no WMDs", The Scotsman,
4 February 2004; "Iraqi who gave MI6 45-minute claim says
it was untrue", The Guardian, 27 January 2004 and the
very thoughtful article Kenneth Pollack, "How did we get
it so wrong", The Guardian, 04 February 2004. Had there
been WMD they knew about they would of course not have
launched a massive ground attack across the Kuwait-Iraq
border. A much better hypothesis is that they relied on
the UNSCOM job and the testimony August 1995 of Hussein
Kamal, Saddam's son-in-laW and head of Iraq's WMD
programs (see Pollack, op.cit).
[40]. As is to be expected in a region with
centuries of experience in fighting the Ottoman empire,
40 years in fighting the British (1918-58), and a very
long time perspective.
[41]. The whole idea of the President of the
USA having a "mandate" from the US people in foreign
policies when millions of people, and dozens of peoples,
are affected but have no say in the matter, e.g. no right
to vote in US presidential elections, is pathetic, and a
good indicator of how much democracy education is still
needed. With all its shortcomings the UN Security Council
is an effort to correct for that. A UN Peoples' Assembly
of elected representatives for all over the world would
be even better.
The same applies to the pre-Enlightenment, pre-modern
idea of a divine mandate. For an analysis of how far Bush
is on that line see Joan Didion, "Mr. Bush & the
Divine", Thre New York Review of Books, November 6, 2003,
pp. 81-86.
[42]. "The New American Century" at the World
Social Forum in Mumbai January 2004,
www.thenation.com/doc.mthml.
[43]. The Australian, March 19 2004, "Worley
wins Iraq contract; Spoils of war".
[44]. Der Spiegel, 4/2004, p. 97.
[45]. The current US policy, it seems, based
on geography rather than culture, see the New York Times
editorial in IHT 10-11 January 2004.
[46]. As proposed by Leslie Gelb, see the
editorial in New York Times, November 25, 2003.
[47]. For analyses of similarities and
differences, see Robert G. Kaiser, "Iraq isn't Vietnam,
but they rhyme", The Japan Times, January 1 2004 (from
Washington Post), and William Pfaff, "Bush is ignoring
the political lesson of Vietnam", IHT, January 3-4 2004.
For a report on US in Vietnam, see "Ex-G.I.'s tell of
Vietnam brutality", IHT, December 30 2003.
[48]. To the extent neo-conservative political
thinking serves a guide to US foreign policy, there may
ge more to come. In their book An End to Evil: How to Win
the War on Terror by Richard Perle and David Frum, the
geopolitics of the Project for a New American Century,
PNAC, seems to have been updated: - Tough action against
France, "we should force European governments to choose
between Paris and Washington";
- Britain's independence from Europe should be
preserved, perhaps with open access for British arms to
American defense markets;
- "tell the truth about Saudi Arabia, they fund
al-Qa'eda and back terror-tainted Islamic
organizations;
- the authoritarian rule of Syria's leader, Bashar
Assad, should be ended by shutting oil supplies from Iraq
and raids into Syria to hunt terrorists.
[49]. Condoleeza Rice.
[50]. "If it was happening in, say, Uzbekistan
or Malaysia, it would be clearly seen for what it is - a
sinister abrogation of press freedom by an authoritarian
government intent on suprressing an important story" -
Jake M. Lynch in a private communication.
©
TFF & the author 2004
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