After
the Turkish Cypriot Elections,
a Return to the Negotiating Table?
By
Ann-Sofi
Jakobsson Hatay
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala
University, Sweden
TFF
Associate
January 28, 2004
On 14 December 2003, the Turkish Cypriots went to the
polls to elect new deputies to the unicameral 50-seat
legislature of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
TRNC. Political developments, elections and the comings
and goings of governments in the non-recognised
mini-state (est. population 200,000) tend to go largely
unnoticed by the rest of the world, including its Greek
Cypriot neighbours (est. 650,000) for whom the overriding
concern remains the presence in the Turkish
Cypriot-controlled north of a large contingent (est.
35,000) of Turkish troops. The December 2003 elections
however took place under unprecedented international
attention. The outcome was seen as having the potential
to break the impasse of the intercommunal peace process
and to enable the accession of a reunited Cyprus to the
European Union on 1 May 2004.
The pre-election agenda was dominated by disagreements
between government and opposition parties pertaining to
the merits of a November 2002 U.N. draft proposal for the
island's reunification within the framework of a 'United
Cyprus Republic' ('the Annan Plan') and the island's
upcoming EU accession. In a separate protocol to the
Treaty of Accession (signed by the Greek Cypriot
government on 16 April 2003), the application of the
acquis in the northern part had been suspended pending a
settlement to the conflict. An agreement on political
reunification prior to 1 May 2004 would however enable
the two communities to accede jointly.
In early March 2003, the Turkish Cypriot chief
negotiator, having previously refused to put his
signature to a framework agreement containing the main
principles of the U.N. proposal, also rejected a personal
plea from the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to submit
the proposal to a referendum. Backed by the conservative
two-party coalition government, he subsequently ruled out
further negotiations on the plan's basis. The Greek
Cypriot side in the meantime, albeit unwilling to sign
the peace proposal as it stood, nevertheless pronounced
it acceptable as a point of departure for future
negotiations. Against this background, the December
elections to the TRNC's Legislative Assembly were
destined to become a Turkish Cypriot pre-referendum on
the way ahead.
In late 2002 and again in January and February 2003,
tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots had taken part in
mass rallies in protest of the rejectionist stance of
their leadership. The opposition anticipated the
elections as a culmination of a process of popular
mobilization for the twin targets of a solution to the
conflict and EU accession. They entered the elections
highly confident of their ability to oust what they
termed the 'statukocular' &endash; the allegedly
pro-status quo parties in government. In September 2003,
three parties of the self-styled pro-settlement, pro-EU
'peace forces' (CTP-BG, BDH, ÇASP) signed a
protocol in which they pledged to oust the chief
negotiator, and to resume peace negotiations with a view
to reaching an agreement on the basis of the Annan plan
by May 2004.
The conservative ruling two-party (UBP-DP) coalition
government for their part did not dispute the merits of
eventual EU accession. They did however object to what
they saw as an international plot to force the Turkish
Cypriots to make unacceptable concessions
vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots in order to achieve
this prized target. They furthermore shared the chief
negotiator's reservations about the U.N. proposal, a
position that also earlier in the year had been publicly
supported in mass rallies attended by as many, if not
more, people than the opposition rallies. Partly to let
off some steam ahead of the elections, the government had
in late April 2003 presided over a popular move easing
the restrictions of movement across the Green Line,
enabling thousands of Turkish Cypriots to take up
employment in the more affluent southern part of the
island and claim their legal rights as co-citizens of the
Republic of Cyprus ahead of EU accession (including
obtaining the Republic's passports).
The peoples' verdict delivered at the ballot boxes
showed however that neither side in the election contest
could lay sole claim to be the voice of the people. The
elections saw the electorate virtually split down the
middle. One of the opposition parties (CTP-BG) emerged as
the election's undisputed winner in terms of party
support (almost tripling its share of the votes). The
government parties lost considerable ground &endash; down
from 63 per cent in 1998 to 45.9 per cent in 2003
&endash; but nevertheless held sway. The failure of all
but the four main parties to pass the required five per
cent electoral threshold moreover resulted in a hung
parliament, with the parties of opposition (CTP-BG) and
government (UBP-DP) gaining an equal number of assembly
seats (25&endash;25).
Overall the opposition (CTP-BG, BDH, ÇABP)
attracted 50.3 per cent of the votes as against the
ruling UBP-DP coalition's 45.9 per cent. Given that the
remaining parties (MBP, KAP), had rallied behind the
government's stance, the opposition's lead was however
less than one percentage point: 50.3 per cent as against
49.7 per cent.
Having been given the mandate to seek to form a
government, the leader of the largest party CTP-BG had to
turn to the former government parties in order to secure
sufficient parliamentary support. On 11 January a
CTP-BG&endash;DP coalition (mustering 26 seats in between
them) for 'national reconciliation and settlement [of
the Cyprus problem]' was announced. The parties
agreed on a programme that included the resumption of
inter-communal peace talks on the basis of the Annan
Plan. The new government's programme was rapidly endorsed
by Ankara, followed by assurances of Turkey's own
commitment to contribute to a 'just and lasting' and
'rapid' settlement to the conflict.
***
Debates about the U.N. proposal dominated the heated
election campaign. If the elections indeed had been a
referendum 'yes' would have prevailed over 'no', albeit
with a very narrow margin: 50.3 per cent of the votes
went to 'pro-Annan' parties as against 49.7 per cent for
the 'antis'. The results indicate that the Turkish
Cypriot electorate is deeply divided on the merits of the
Annan plan.
A closer analysis of the results gives in a more
complex picture, however, one that should caution against
seeing the elections solely as the Turkish Cypriots'
verdict on the Annan Plan. The last years have inflicted
repeated hardships on the Turkish Cypriot community in
general, not the least economic. The Turkish Cypriot
economy is linked to the Turkish lira, a situation which
renders it vulnerable to fluctuations of its value. Shock
devaluations of the lira meant that about half of its
value was lost. Added to the loss suffered by devaluation
were a series of crashes in the private bank sector. The
vote for the opposition did also contain an element of
protest against the ruling coalition who has presided
over a situation that is becoming increasingly
intolerable. The Turkish Cypriot support for the Annan
Plan may thus be lower than indicated by the election
results.
Irrespective of that, however, one important message
that emerges from the December 2003 elections is that a
large section of the Turkish Cypriot community needs to
be persuaded of the merits of the Annan plan. From a
Turkish Cypriot point of view, one major issue that needs
to be addressed by third parties in the months ahead
concerns the consequences of provisions for territorial
adjustment and the reinstatement of property to Greek
Cypriot owners in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state
of the proposed United Cyprus Republic.
According to U.N. estimates, 47.000 Turkish Cypriots
would have to relocate as a result of transfer of
currently Turkish Cypriot controlled territory to the
Greek Cypriot constituent state and another 20.000 within
a fifteen-year period as a result of reinstatement
property. The total cost of the relocation and
rehabilitation of the affected Turkish Cypriot population
has been estimated to 2.055.009.440 USD.
The US, EU and others interested parties have pledged
to convene a donors' conference in support of a
reunification process but there are to date no guarantees
that this money will be forthcoming. Pre-peace agreement
pledges frequently turn out to yield considerably less
than promised. Failure to deliver may jeopardize the
peace in Cyprus as it has in the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.
Firmer commitments and some tangible action from
donors in the coming months will most likely be necessary
to secure a yes vote in a future referendum and to smooth
what will be a most difficult transition process for a
large section of the Turkish Cypriot community. In
addition, there are of course also Greek Cypriot concerns
that may jeopardize the prospect of public endorsement of
the U.N. proposal, and which may also require financial
support from third parties.
***
With the Turkish Cypriot change of government after
the December 2003 elections there now exists an expressed
willingness by both sides to re-engage in negotiations -
albeit not (yet) settlement - on the basis of the Annan
Plan. If they can provide U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan 'with a solid reason to believe that the political
will exists necessary for a successful outcome', as he
wrote in his 1 April 2004 report to the Security Council
on the mission of his good offices, an invitation to
reconvene will most likely be forthcoming.
But even if the parties would re-enter the
negotiations, this time with the Annan Plan as a common
point of departure, a number of hurdles need to be
overcome in order to secure an agreement. There is today
very little common ground between the parties regarding a
number of important issues. The Annan Plan, importantly,
was not a product that had emerged from negotiations
between the parties themselves. Although of course it
contains elements of a settlement that have been on the
table for some time and reflected an attempt to balance
the concerns and priorities of both sides, it was
nevertheless a third party proposal drafted by the U.N.
with input from other interested parties and
stakeholders.
The Greek Cypriots' reservations about the Turkish
Cypriot minority's influence in the proposed 'United
Cyprus Republic', couched in terms reminiscent of the
early 1960s as concerns for its 'functionality' and
'viability' are well known, as is their opposition to the
legalization of the status of Turkish immigrants on the
island and the reluctance to accept nothing but the
return to the north of all refugees. The Greek Cypriot
will also seek a speedy withdrawal of Turkish troops from
the island.
The Turkish Cypriot for their part will press for
recognition of their status as equal co-founders of 'the
new state of affairs' and commensurate influence. The
preservation of bi-zonality with its concomitant
restrictions on the right to return and Greek Cypriot
political influence in the Turkish Cypriot constituent
state are also key concerns. The Turkish Cypriots will
also want to secure Turkish guarantor rights for Cyprus
as a whole, including the presence of Turkish troops in
the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. Thus it is clear
that the two sides will seek to 'improve' the plan in
directions which are incompatible.
After the Turkish Cypriot change of government, there
is however nevertheless from both sides today an
expressed ambition, albeit qualified, to seek to achieve
a settlement prior to the critical date of 1 May 2004
when Cyprus formally accedes to the European Union. The
European Union for its part has expressed a willingness
to accommodate any settlement reached by their parties
but it is a generally agreed that it will be much more
difficult to do so post-1 May. This of course, is a
problem primarily for the Turkish Cypriots who hence has
an added motivation to achieve a 'rapid' settlement. It
is doubtful however whether the same can be said for the
Greek Cypriots who post-1 May will be in possession of
additional leverage vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriots
and, perhaps more importantly, Turkey.
Turkey may also be reluctant to finalize a deal before
her own accession course is on more secure ground. As the
next anticipated step is the determination of a date for
the initiation of accession negotiation, a settlement
prior to May might thus from a Turkish vantage point seem
premature. A review of Turkey's EU bid, on which Cyprus
as a new member will have a say, is due in December
2004.
The fact that both sides in the dispute have good
reasons to avoid having to shoulder any blame for failing
to bring the peace process forward for the time being
(for the Greek Cypriots until May and for the Turkish
Cypriots until October when the report to the EU
Commission ahead of the is December review is due) may
help to get the peace process moving again. But as always
in the case of Cyprus, where twenty-five years of peace
talks have yielded precious little result, one would do
well to leave open the question whether they this time
will be brought to a successful conclusion and secure a
mutually acceptable settlement to this longstanding
conflict. In the meantime, after the Turkish Cypriot
elections on 14 December 2003 and the subsequent adoption
of pro-settlement policies both by the new government in
Lefkosha and in Ankara, there is now at least a
rhetorical commitment to seek a swift settlement from all
parties in the conflict.
The Annan Plan is available at www.un-cyprus-plan.org
An abbreviated citizen's guide has been published and
is available at www.cyprusdecides.org
©
TFF & the author 2004
Tell a friend about this article
Send to:
From:
Message and your name
|