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The
people deliver their verdict on the Annan Plan for a
re-united Cyprus
By
Ann-Sofi
Jakobsson Hatay* -
TFF Board
Member
Peace and conflict research, Uppsala
University, Sweden
May 1, 2004
In simultaneous referenda on both
sides of the Green Line, Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriot last Saturday - 24th of April 2004 - delivered
their verdict on the Annan Plan ˆ a proposal for a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The
outcome of the twin referenda was a resounding oxi (no)
(75.8 per cent) from the Greek Cypriots and a clear evet
(yes) (64.9 per cent) from the Turkish Cypriots.
The
background
Drafted by the U.N. in close
consultation‚ with the parties, and first tabled in
November 2002, the Annan Plan envisages the political
reunification of the island along the lines of a federal
state under a power-sharing regime. The United Cyprus
Republic was to be composed of two equal constituent
states, each exercising extensive autonomy. Other
elements of the plan provide for the transfer of
territory currently under Turkish Cypriot administration
to the Greek Cypriot constituent state, reinstatement of
property lost as result of the conflict after 1963
(and/or financial compensation), return of displaced
persons (subjected to restrictions), demobilization of
local armed forces and the setting up of a reconciliation
commission.
The proposal also provide for a
considerable reduction of the international military
presence on the island (the many Turkish troops in
particular) with a view to almost complete
demilitarisation (leaving only 650 Turkish and 950 Greek
troops), and the transfer of parts of the island's
territory currently under British sovereignty (two
military bases) to the Cypriots.
The talks process had come to an
abrupt end a year ago after four years of deliberations.
Proximity talks were held from December 1999 to November
2000 and direct talks from January 2002 to February 2003.
During this period the international efforts to bring the
protracted conflict to an end had been unprecedented in
both scale and intensity, involving representatives from
the United States, the UK, the EU and the very active
participation of the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan.
In March 2003, Kofi Annan proposed
that the plan be submitted directly to referendum
although it had not proved possible to secure the
approval of the respective leaders. The proposal for a
referendum was, however, turned down by the Turkish
Cypriot chief negotiator, president Rauf Denktash.
Supported by the ruling rejectionist Turkish Cypriot
government, Denktash subsequently declared the Annan Plan
"dead and buried".
However, subsequent Turkish Cypriot
parliamentary elections held on 14 December 2003,
resulted in the coming to power of a pro-settlement
coalition. In early 2004 the Annan Plan was
resuscitated.
Agreement to resume peace
negotiation was secured in New York on 13th of February
2004. The parties - including Greece and Turkey - had
then convinced the Secretary-General that they possessed
the necessary political will to reach an agreement on the
basis of the Annan Plan before the crucial date of
Cyprus‚ EU accession (1st of May 2004) - a
precondition for U.N. reengagement.
The New York agreement put Kofi
Annan himself in a position as the final arbiter with a
mandate to use his discretion to fill in remaining blanks
in the event of the parties themselves failing to
complete the draft proposal. Annan also secured the
parties‚ commitment to submit the proposal to
popular referenda. After intercommunal talks in Nicosia
and four party deliberations in a remote location at
Bürgenstock, Switzerland, both ending
inconclusively, Kofi Annan presented the fifth (final?)
revised version of the plan on the 31st of March.
Simultaneous referenda on both
sides of the Green Line were subsequently announced for
the 24th of April. In the meantime, intensive work in
several technical committees, seeing substantial input
from international expertise, had produced a detailed
proposal of 9.000 pages. For the first time in the long
history of Cyprus peace negotiations, the formula for a
settlement along the principles of a bi-zonal,
bi-communal federation, agreed by the parties already in
1977, had been translated into a detailed blueprint for a
"new state of affairs": from the constitution and federal
laws for the United Cyprus Republic, to the constitutions
for the two constituent states, down to the new flag
(horizontal blue, yellow, and red fields separated by
thin white lines) and a national anthem.
Ever since the presentation of the
first draft proposal in November 2002, the plan had been
widely publicized in its entirety. A special webpage had
been created: www.annanplan.org.
The proposal was available in three languages: Greek,
Turkish and English. In October 2003, an abbreviated
Citizens' Guide to the Annan Plan was published (also
that in three languages) by local participants in a U.N.
sponsored information project.
So when the people on the 24th of
April 2004 finally were asked to deliver their verdict,
they had in front of them as clear a picture as can be of
what the future of a reunited Cyprus would look like. Do
you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its
Annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek
Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to
the law to be in force to bring into being a new state of
affairs in which Cyprus joins the European
united?
The irony of the
referendum results - and a new EU border
This was the question the
electorate faced on decision day, and to which they were
asked to say either yes or no. The ballot boxes on both
sides closed at 6 pm. Already the opening of the first
boxes pointed in the direction that the Annan Plan had
been overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots and
approved by a clear majority of Turkish Cypriots, a trend
that was confirmed by the final results. While nearly
two-thirds of the Turkish Cypriot electorate had voted
yes, the proposal had been rejected by three out of four
Greek Cypriot voters. Although opinion polls held in the
weeks ahead of the referenda had indeed pointed in this
direction, the results nevertheless went against
expectations fostered during four decades of separation.
That a proposal for reunification would be turned down,
not by the Turkish Cypriots, who backed by Turkey had
enforced the fait accompli of partition in 1974 and
declared their independence in 1983, but by the
ostensibly pro-reunification Greek Cypriot community
seemed ironic indeed.
The failure to secure the approval
of both communities means that the Annan Plan is "null
and void", and that also the submission to referenda
would have "no legal effect". The outcome of the
referenda also means that Cyprus will accede to the EU on
the 1st of May as a divided island. The decision to
accept the island as a member with or without a
settlement had been taken many years ago in what was at
the time described as a historic compromise but which in
hindsight turned out to have been a historic mistake.
When the Treaty of Accession was signed on 16th of April
2003, a separate protocol provided for the exclusion of
the Turkish Cypriot community from membership. The
exclusion was said to be temporary, pending a settlement
to the conflict. In the meantime, on the 1st of May, the
ceasefire line that separates the Greek Cypriot
controlled areas in the south from the Turkish Cypriot
areas in the north will become an EU border.
The decision to suspend the
application of the aquis for the Turkish Cypriot northern
part of the island (although de jure the whole of Cyprus
is admitted) had been premised on the assumption that the
Turkish Cypriots were the ones blocking reunification
attempts. Until last Saturday that was a reasonable
conclusion. After the outcome of the referenda, however,
where the Greek Cypriots were the ones to say no to
reunification, this is clearly no longer the
case.
Helping the
Turkish Cypriots
Predictably, after the referenda
the Turkish Cypriot government demanded that their
community should not be punished for the Greek Cypriot
no. The EU, for its part, declared a willingness to
discuss measures of ending the economic isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots. Financial support to aid in the process
of EU harmonization, which hitherto has been limited only
the Greek Cypriot controlled areas, and the establishment
of contacts with the Turkish Cypriot authorities were
pledged. The Turkish Cypriots, however, were adamant that
anything short of lifting the restrictions on direct
international air and sea transport - crucial for trade
and tourism - would fall short of their expectations
(export is negligible anyway) as to what they were
entitled to after having accepted the reunification
proposal.
Toward
interpreting the result and its
implications
The issue of political recognition
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was not in the
picture, however, at least not for the near future. The
results of the referenda will no doubt be subjected to
much scrutiny in the months ahead. The turnout was very
high in both communities (90 percent of the Greek Cypriot
and 86 percent of the Turkish Cypriot electorate). A
future thorough analysis of who voted yes or no and what
determined their choice, would yield invaluable formation
on people's motivations and preferences that should be
taking into account in future peace efforts. Together
with exit polls conducted on the day of the referenda,
recent opinion polls offer some indications as to what
such an analysis may reveal.
It is particularly noteworthy that
these polls have indicated that the rejection of the
reunification proposal was particularly strong among the
younger generation in the Greek Cypriot community. Greek
Cypriots of the older generations also overwhelmingly
rejected the proposal but not as strongly as the young
voters.
Moreover, the young Greek
Cypriots‚ rejection cannot be read as endorsement of
partition, or approval of the continuation of separate
co-existence with a community they have no personal
experience of living together with. Such an
interpretation is belied by the very active and vocal
participation of young voters (down to school children
below the voting age) in a very nationalistic
pre-referendum no-campaign.
Interestingly, the picture that
emerges from the Turkish Cypriot community is the
reverse. Here the polls indicate that the older
generation (45+), that is those who have personally
experienced living together with Greek Cypriots in a
united Cyprus, were considerably less supportive of the
Annan Plan (and thus more sceptic towards the prospect of
reunification) than the younger generations. According to
exit polls, 48 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot voters
above 45 years of age voted no in the referendum,
compared to 36 per cent of those aged between 35 and 44
and only 26.7 per cent of those aged between 18 and
34.
It is noteworthy not only that the
Turkish Cypriot community as a whole were more willing
than the Greek Cypriot community to accept the
compromises that the Annan Plan entail, but that the
younger generations on the island are so far from each
other in this respect. This is very troubling indeed for
future peace efforts, but also gives some indication as
to what reconciliation efforts ˆ with or without the
Annan Plan ˆ should concentrate on.
So while the possibility of a
second referenda on the Annan Plan featured in the
discussions in the immediate aftermath of the ones held
last Saturday - the hopes being that the second time
round would have provided time for reflection that would
enable rational considerations to prevail - the main
lesson is perhaps this: The issue of reconciliation
cannot be left for the future but needs urgent
consideration.
In its absence, the prospect of the
two communities re-entering into a political partnership
after forty years of separation, and under circumstances
that would entail further sacrifices for both (alongside
of course considerable gains), gives cause for serious
concern.
See also Jakobsson Hatay's article
in Turkish Daily News of May 4, 2004, Popular
Referenda and Peace Processes: The twin referenda on the
Annan plan for a reunited Cyprus put in
perspective.
* Ann-Sofi Jakobsson Hatay is a
peace and conflict researcher at Uppsala University,
Sweden, who specialises in conflict resolution and the
study of peace processes. She can be reached at the
following email address:
Ann-Sofi.Jakobsson
Hatay@pcr.uu.se
©
TFF & the author 2004
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