The
Korean Peninsula: Moving from
the DMZ to a Zone of Peace (ZOP)
By
Johan
Galtung, TFF Associate and Transcend
This is a speech given by Galtung at
the international Forum on Development and Peace in Seoul
June 23-24, 2005 entitled "21st Century Conflicts, the
Korean Peninsula, DMZ and Gangwon-do." (Subheadings
and italics added by TFF).
Your Excellencies, Ladies and
Gentlemen,
A very timely conference indeed,
and thanks for the invitation to place the Korean
peninsula in the context of key conflicts in the 21st
century.
The
six most important conflicts and problems facing
humankind - and the place of the two Koreas in
them
The most important problems, by
being global with frightening consequences and
protracted, are in my view the following six:
[1] The hyper-capitalist
formation with 125,000 dying daily from hunger and
preventable/curable diseases;
[2] The
killing/exploitation of women through selective abortion,
infanticide and general abuse with 100 million missing
1980-1990;
[3] The nation-state
contradiction, with 2,000 nations yearning for autonomy
within 200 states out of which only 20 are nation-states,
and with nations divided among states (like Chinese,
Kurds, Mayas, Basques), with the possibility that
regionalism will win;
[4] Christianity vs Islam,
with the possibility that secularism ala Western Europe
or China will win;
[5] The encirclement of
Russia/China/India (and Iran, Pakistan?) by USA/NATO and
Japan/AMPO with the possibility of World War III;
[6] The US Empire with 70
interventions and 12-16 million killed since World War II
(240 from the beginning under Jefferson).
What is known today as "9/11" with
the subsequent "war on terror" against an "Axis of Evil"+
is located in the conjunction between [1],
[4] and [6].
The pressure on the "Outposts of
Tyranny" to democratize is probably better understood in
terms of [1], and [6] and may end up
giving "democracy" a bad name as another word for a US
client state. It may also play against the USA, vide
Iran.
The Korean peninsula conflict, our
focus in this conference, is located at the crossroads
between [1], [3], [5] and
[6].
Korea has much less of [2]
than India, China and some Muslim countries, and is only
marginally related to [4] through the
participation of the Republic of Korea in the "Coalition
of the Willing" supporting the illegal US/UK attack on
Iraq, probably as a part of a bargain with the USA over
the North-South relation in the peninsula.
Korea is certainly also party to
older conflict formations. Thus, Japanese colonialism
made Korea divisible by the victorious superpowers as
part of a fallen empire. At the same time Korea, like
Viet Nam and Tibet, is located inside the perimeter of
Chinese interest defined, traditionally, by the Gobi
desert, the Tundra, the Eastern Sea, and the Himalayas.
An ambiguous position.
Towards
closer relations between ROK and DPRK - the larger
framework
This having been said, Korea is
densely embedded in the major 21st Century conflicts.
The capitalist formation enters at least in three complex
ways.
Whereas ROK has successfully
liberated itself from a periphery status both from the
Japanese and the US dominated systems, it has also
avoided making any particular country its own periphery,
in spite of its very powerful economy. Its economic power
is spread broadly and thinly.
There is little "Koreans go home"
anywhere in the world, and thre are many grateful
consumers.
The problem would be how to develop
a future tighter relation between the economies of ROK
and DPRK. Thus, bringing resources and labor from the
North closer to the capital and technology from the South
might create sharp economic class divisions inside North
instead of, or in addition to, the present gaps in the
autocratic, dynastic and Confucian DPRK
system.
Photo
Series by Jan Oberg from South Korea and the
DMZ
The system, like China, is not
"Communist"; it has as little to do with Communism as
Germany under the Christian Democratic Union had to do
with Christianity. After 10 years of Confucian respect
paid to the father who passed away in 1994 Kim
Jong-Il/DPRK seems now to move away from personality cult
and juche, and toward a Chinese style of state- steered
capitalism.
The country's small, but highly
educated, elite is probably now retraining itself in that
direction. A major problem is how to obtain capital and
technology and not become a periphery in a capitalism run
by Seoul and/or Beijing - after having fought both Japan
and the USA.
One possible answer is to invite
the less problematic No. 4 in the big power field
surrounding the Korean peninsula, Russia, to play more of
a role, particularly if Russian generosity in handing the
Northern territories back to Japan could be matched by
Japan handing much back to the Ainu.
And DPRK does not want fusion into
a unitary Korean state for the time being. While the
unification of the two states is ruled out at present the
unification of the nation with increasingly open borders
where goods, people and also ideas can flow is totally
realistic.
The leaders of ROK might do well to
see the problem from the DPRK point of view as a country
that does not want to be overrun, and is as scared by the
German scenario as is ROK although for different reasons.
The leaders of DPRK have other goals than merely
maintaining an autocracy doomed to loosen up
anyhow.
Korea
and the U.S. Empire - more problematic
Much more problematic, in my view,
is the relation of the Korean peninsula to Nos
[5] and [6] above. If the USA were only a
big protector anxious to see a peaceful peninsula this is
today within reach.
A confederation of North and South
connected by increasing communication and transport,
road, rail and air through and above the DMZ, and a
bilateral balanced and verifiable process of
demilitarization under international control could be on
the horizon. This would free up enormous resources on
both sides. A part of that, would, of course, be a
denuclearized Korean peninsula.
For that to happen strategic
decisions have to be taken both in Pyongyang and
Washington; in Pyongyang to dismantle any potential or
real nuclear capability, in Washington to withdraw any
deployed nuclear capability, under international
supervision. The two processes could be coordinated like
in a Charles Osgood GRIT process. Any such process would
augur very well for a century that easily might become as
troubled, or even more so, than the 20th.
The probability that DPRK would
accept this is probably about as high as the probability
that Washington would reject any such proposal. To
Washington any such formula is too egalitarian, looking
like the two countries can be equated, which of course
they cannot, and even making Washington look weak, which
indeed it is not, even yielding under
pressure.
And yet the anatomy of peace has
equality as a major component. Formulas like "what you
like your adversary to do you must be willing to do
yourself" are good guides to peace processes. The logic
of winning a war may be based on some kind of inequality,
like superiority in destructive power, or in staying
power. But the logic of building peace is equality - not
superiority-based. An imposed or dictated peace is not
worth that name. It is only a continuation of war logic
by other means.
However, there may be other
reasons why Washington would not like to
de-deploy.
The nuclear capability in ROK may
be a part of formations [5] and [6] more
than a deterrent against any DPRK attack, whether it has
worked that way in the past or not, and regardless of
whether we see the Korean violent conflict as dating back
to June 1950 or earlier, like the April 4 1946 Cheju
uprising.
The US outposts may also be seen in
the context of JCS 570/2 about permanent basing, and the
MacKinder type geopolitics of [5].
(More
about geopolitician MacKinder here)
This, however, does not mean that
progress cannot be made in the direction of unification
of the Korean nation, only that the process is
exceedingly difficult for the many reasons
mentioned.
A USA bent on world hegemony,
seeing the control of Central Asia as crucial, joined by
a Japan both as reliable client and with its own far from
peaceful agenda, puts their ally ROK in a very hard
place.
DPRK is a client neither of China
nor of Russia. Talking with high level officials in
Pyongyang there is no doubt that Pyongyang is talking on
its own; in Tokyo one always hears His Master's voice in
the background. That used also to be the case in ROK, but
decreasingly so. ROK commands the balance in the 2+4
talks.
Those talks may well lead to some
kind of agreement, but it would be surprising if it could
merit the appellation "peace agreement".
A new
approach in addition to the 2+4 talks: Parallel 2+3 talks
and pointing towards an East Asian Community,
EAC
And that begs the question: is
there some other approach, in addition to the 2+4 talks?
There is: initiating parallel 2+3 talks: the two Koreas
with the other three confucian-buddhist countries, China
(with Taiwan), Japan and Viet Nam; with the USA and
Russia as observers.
Such talks would point toward an
East Asian Community, an EAC bound to come sooner or
later anyhow, as one more regionalization process, like
the European Union, the African Union and incipient
movements like the OIC, Organiziation of the Islamic
Conference--with the "C" shifting via "Countries" to
"Community", starting with a common market--and what is
happening right now in Latin
America/Caribbean.
If the EU has been able to
accommodate former enemies, different sizes, and bridge
faultlines, so can the East Asians.
North Korea may not be ready as
East Germany was not; West Germany saw to it that they
were not excluded as for sure South Korea will. Korea and
Viet Nam might find cooperative security in this setting.
Like for the European process a broader but less deep
cooperative context serving as an umbrella would be
useful.
Europe has, in fact, had two of
them, the Council of Europe, CoE, today with 44 members,
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, OSCE, with 53 members + USA and Canada. For
Asia/Pacific an Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Asia/Pacific,OSCAP, would be very meaningful, covering
not only East but also South-east, Central, South and
West Asia, based on equality, one country one vote, and
probably often on consensus.
It is worth noting that like all
other regionalization processes an OSCAP would also be an
implicit rejection of the highly undemocratic faultline
between veto and non-veto powers so crippling for the
United Nations.
We are talking of highly likely but
also time consuming processes, with a time horizon of,
say, 10-20 years unless some special events would serve
as accelerators - like a major change in the foreign
policy of Japan.
Needless to say, the USA may
initially not welcome such processes, but like for the
EC/EU process come to accept that these are processes
other countries are as entitled to as were once the 13
colonies on the Atlantic Seaboard, and that equality
might increase, not decrease equitable, cooperative,
relations with the USA.
In fact, as an outside observer I
am sometimes amazed by how quickly the idea of EAC is now
catching on in the area, actually also beyond the 2+3
range.
Moving
from the DMZ (De-Militarised Zone) to a ZOP (Zone of
Peace) - From negative to positive peace
As mentioned, Korea is not alone in
being a divided nation, nor alone in being a divided
state. But it is alone in having a demilitarized
zone between the parts, 248 kms long, 4 kms broad,
1000km2, 0.5% of the Korean peninsula.
Our concern in this important
conference is to turn that bad thing, also dividing the
Gangwon province, into a good thing for us all, as the
Chinese say. How do we turn a demilitarized zone, a
DMZ, into a zone of peace, a ZoP?
A ZoP is something quite different
since it is supposed to be an enactment of positive
peace. The idea is not to keep parties apart and have
them abstain from something, but to bring them together
and have them cooperate on something. The smallest ZoP is
a person who has come to terms with him/herself, the
largest is the whole world.
The idea certainly includes the
absence of violence, but would add a number of other
items. Which ones and how many can then be
discussed.
"From DMZ to ZoP" is a
political program from negative to positive peace, by
gradually changing the character of a zone. The word
"gradual" is important here. And there is no assumption
that negative and positive peace exclude each
other.
A process could be envisaged
whereby fortifications gradually disappear or become
ritualistic only, and the borders become more
porous.
Some years ago (1995-1998) I had as
mediator the occasion to suggest a zone of peace as a
solution to a contested zone of 500 square kilometres
between Peru and Ecuador.
The proposal, briefly formulated as
a binational zone with a natural park, was
considered useful and became a part of the 1998 peace
treaty--57 years overdue - between the two
countries.
This is not so different from the
Korean case. Up in the Andes there was once one Inca
nation, with an overlayer of Spanish conquista. That
multiple nation-hood, Inca and colonial Spanish, was
divided by the struggle for independence, so we may
actually talk about two states dividing two
nations.
Let us look at some of the
reasoning put into the Ecuador-Peru case and then see to
what extent it could apply to the DMZ, focusing more on
similarities than on differences. One day this may also
apply to other places like the Chile-Peru-Bolivia
triangle.
By the classical logic of the state
system each piece of land, clearly demarcated by a
border, belongs to one and only one state. But what if
two or more states claim the same piece of land, for
instance because the border demarcation is not clear? The
classical answer was a war to arrive at a "military
solution", and this is what Ecuador and Peru did in 1941,
1942, 1981 and 1995. Another answer would be for somebody
stronger, a big state or a community of states, to be in
command.
But an answer much more in line
with our increasingly borderless world would be for the
two states to administer the disputed territory together,
as a condominium. If both parties have reasonable claims,
then rather than divide the territory define it as joint
territory, shared by the contestant parties. Rather than
fighting it out, the joint territory may be used for
cooperative ventures.
This
is what a Zone of Peace would mean
First, the two states could mark
the territory with both flags, together. There is
important symbolism in flag coexistence. They might add
to that a super-ordinate flag, like that of the UN, or a
subordinate flag of indigenous people also living on the
land.
Second, a major eco-park, with
Man serving Nature, with UNEP of course, and an NGO
like IUCN, the World Conservation Union with its
Programme on Protected Areas, making the zone a model of
Nature at its best, in the interest of both peace and
environment. The park would be jointly administered
whether a border between the two has been clearly marked
inside the park or not.
Third, ample camping facilities
for youth, and hostels for others, from both
countries would easily fit into a national park, like
they do in any national park, and in this case
facilitating some cooperation, not only cohabitation, on
a camping ground.
Fourth, they could establish an
economic zone for joint ventures, inviting companies
from both sides. Traditional polluting factories would be
banned to preserve the character as a natural park, but
most service industries would easily fit in. In today's
electronic world that presents no major problem;
moreover, the concept of factory is today changing in a
less polluting direction.
Fifth, the troops of the two
countries would not only disengage and withdraw, but
procedures would be established for joint security
patrolling, early warning of military movements, etc.
This could best be done by a genuine UN policing
entity.
Sixth, some work would have to be
done adjusting the legal codes to each other so as
to adjudicate crimes, and facilitate cooperation. The ZoP
would be an entity of its own kind. There would be people
in it, and human beings bring in human
problems.
In short, two countries with a
history of hostility could use conflict creatively to
grow together at the disputed point, at the speed
national sentiments would tolerate and
demand.
But, seventh, they could go
further and internationalize the zone, retaining
joint administration and sovereignty between the two of
them as a fall-back position. They could simply donate or
lease parts of the zone to such organizations as the
United Nations (and in Latin America the Organization of
American States), and run their flags alongside the
national flags. UN peacekeeping troops would
internationalize security, using contingents from the two
countries, and others.
They may also prefer to keep the
binational condominium character, depending on where they
are in any peace process. Or - they could put parts of
the zone at the disposal of an East Asian Community, also
as an industrial and free zone with easy access both to
China/Asia and to Russia/Europe.
Eighth, a compound for
negotiating border (and other) disputes could be
constructed for parties from anywhere in the world;
some conference facilities, with easy access like a small
airport or a helipad. This does not presuppose step 7,
and would in either case make very much sense for a
purpose developed below.
Ninth, the area would be
declared an international zone of peace, and a
register for such zones could be established at the
United Nations with emerging rules for a code of conduct.
Regional organizations elsewhere (like AU, OSCE) might be
interested in the same constructive approach to border
disputes--like Azerbaidjan- Armenia--and follow up, using
such zones as staging areas for peace- making,
peace-keeping operations, and peace-building.
Tenth, if intergovernmental
organizations cooperate, so could NGOs, international
people's organizations, in this case particularly from
East Asia, staging an international civil society in the
former DMZ, using the ZoP for their
headquarters.
In short, possibilities are
numerous if the courage is there. These are merely some
indications of how the two Koreas could gain experience
in deep cooperation on the way to the next stages toward
a possible unification, probably via confederation and
federation.
This is a list of ten components,
emphasized above, in the concept of a zone of peace.
There is nothing sacred about that number. The parties
may decide to add, and to subtract. The basic point, I
think, is the mutual agreement that the zone is not only
demilitarized (negative peace) but is used for
constructive, cooperative relations between the parties
(positive peace).
And in all of this Gangwon-do will
play a crucial role as the micro-arena for a macro- and
mega-problem.
No doubt, next time we meet the
northern part of Korea and Gangwon-do will also be among
us.
Many thanks!
Photo
Series by Jan Oberg from South Korea and the DMZ
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