Peacemaking
in Kosovo
Coming to an End
- for Predictable Reasons
With
a critique of the International Crisis
Group
PressInfo #
197
April
29, 2004
By
Jan
Oberg,
TFF director
See
PressInfo 195 as a background to this PressInfo
This PressInfo
in Swedish
This PressInfo in
Danish
There is a long-term background
and some root causes behind the emerging peace-keeping
failure in Kosovo. Media and politicians tend to forget
them because they were ignored during the 1990s and do
not fit the standardised image of the conflict. In this
analysis, TFF's director who has been engaged in Kosovo
since 1991 discusses some of the most important among
those causes.
In passing, he also points out
how an allegedly "prestigious" NGO such as the
International Crisis Group serves as a biased NEGO, a
NEar-Governmental Organisation, and continues to offer
perspectives and proposals that will make things worse in
the Balkans.
It's
the beginning of the end
Slowly but surely - and sadly - the
efforts of the international community to create peace in
Kosovo/a are coming to an end in spring 2004. The reasons
are simple: mediation and conflict-resolution in complex
conflicts can not be done the way it was between 1989 and
1999. And you won't succeed with peace-making the way it
was done by the bombings in 1999 and the efforts since
then.
Had anyone in the EU and the U.S.
had the intellectual will and the political courage to
draw conflict-management lessons from the Balkans, we
would hardly have experienced the succeeding quagmires
called Afghanistan and Iraq where the opportunities for
peace and reconciliation are also decaying by the day.
The community's self-appointed
conflict-managers and mediators probably now hope that
their "condemnations" of the most recent bout of ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo in March 2004 will do the trick,
prevent Albanian extremists from further attacks and keep
the Kosovo calamity away from the headlines. If so, there
is a high probability that they are in for nasty
surprises.
The truth is simple and wants to
get out: the international community hasn't got the
faintest idea about what to do with Kosovo. There are no
solutions anymore that will be fair in the eyes of the
parties. Any future status will create serious problems
in the region and possibly for the international
community. To put it crudely - if the international
conflict-managers are doctors, their patient is dying
because of a bad diagnosis and a seriously failed
surgery.
Embarrassing as they are, the
reasons are quite simple but remain virtually untold:
they would require an ounce of self-criticism in a series
of European ministries of foreign affairs, in Washington
and Brussels. For the decade 1989-1999 the international
community operated on a standardised, one-truth,
black-and-white explanation of what the conflict was
about. They blamed the Serbs in general and Slobodan
Milosevic in particular for the Kosovo conflict. They
ignored the complex framework in space and time of which
Kosovo was a part: the dissolution mechanisms of former
Yugoslavia, the wider context of the Balkans and the
restructuring of the world order as well as the
transition from the Cold War paradigm to something
different.
Like we see in today's Iraq, there
were no limits to the political hubris-cum-ignorance.
Both Albanian and Serb citizens were treated as pawns in
much larger games and they are realising it
now.
Below follows a list of some of the
conflict mismanagement and long-term root causes that
explain the unfolding dissolution of the peace-making
efforts in Kosovo that we are now witnessing. (Numbers do
not indicate priority or relative importance.)
Some
root causes of the failed peace-making effort in
Kosovo
1.
Not understanding that the former Yugoslavia fell apart -
also - because of a series of structural changes such as
the oil crisis of the 1970s, European immigration
policies and the end of the Cold War with lost neutrality
between two blocks. Furthermore, multinational
corporations' exploitation of low-wage labour in
South-East Asia which destroyed Yugoslavia's industrial
base and brought huge unemployment - followed by IMF
structural adjustment programmes that further devastated
the economy and welfare. The international community
itself was a co-producer of the Yugoslav crisis and
provided the outer conditions that made ethnic
scapegoating possible.
2.
Not understanding that the autonomy of Kosovo and
Voivodina presupposed the existence of Yugoslavia; Serbia
proper could be overruled by the two provinces in its own
parliament if and when the other Yugoslav republics had
left the balancing act. Thus, the Western policy of
advocating and promoting the partition of Yugoslavia
could not but create terrible problems, in Kosovo and
elsewhere.
3.
Turning a blind eye to the
strong Kosovo-Albanian nationalism and exclusivity; they
profited politically from having an arrogant strongman in
Belgrade who repressed their basic human rights - for
which reason they never supported the opposition in
Serbia. When the international community talked about
human rights, Kosovo-Albanian leaders meant independence.
Ask yourself why what happened in Kosovo did not happen
in Voivodina, the other autonomous province.
4.
The short-sightedness of
teasing Milosevic by supporting an independent Kosovo -
like supporting the independence of Montenegro - and
dropping that policy as soon as Milosevic left the stage.
Go to Podgorica today and you will be overwhelmed by the
disappointment with the EU and the Americans; the
Montenegrin too have realised how they were treated as
pawns.
5.
The policy of treating equally repressed minorities
differently depending on their nationality; the Serb
minority in Croatia never got any serious attention from
the West; politically the EU and militarily the U.S.
helped Tudjman drive a quarter of a million Croatian
Serbs out in 1995. With few exceptions, they are still
refugees in Serbia.
6.
Instead of providing real support to the pragmatic
non-violent policies of Dr. Rugova - the only one of its
kind in former Yugoslavia - Western countries, Germany
and the US in particular, armed Kosovo-Albanian
extremists from 1993 and created the Kosovo Liberation
Army, KLA, of about 20,000 well-equipped soldiers. This
was what, in 1998, turned the Kosovo situation into a
real war. For a short while the US had formally defined
KLA as a terror organisation but later used it as NATO's
ally on the ground during the bombing. Thus a conflict
that could have been mediated years before with
diplomatic means, became militarised.
7.
In spite of all warnings in
the 1990s, the international community never even
suggested a serious, comprehensive negotiation process
for Kosovo. The Rambouillet "negotiations" were a fraud;
the Serbs and Albanians never met face-to-face there. The
introduction of the military appendix that would have
allowed NATO free access to every corner of Serbia was a
Maffia-like "offer" any responsible European statesman
would have to refuse.
8.
The international community
got various missions into Kosovo. The latest, negotiated
between Milosevic and Richard Holbrooke, was the OSCE
'Verification' Mission of 2000 people. Unfortunately,
Western governments were neither able nor willing to get
enough qualified people on the ground in time, so 70% of
them mysteriously had military backgrounds and about 100
were allegedly CIA - not so surprising given that the
head of mission was William Walker. Since OSCE failed in
that mission, the usual fallback argument had to be used:
it was all Milosevic' fault. Truth is that he let them
into the province (at the same time as he was accused of
intending to drive out every Albanian) and kept his side
of the agreement.
9.
By the bombing and the
diplomacy surrounding it, the Albanians could not but get
the impression that the international community,
Washington in particular, were granting them their
independent state (without consulting Belgrade the
loser). Today five years later, they have very good
reasons to feel cheated. This of course does not explain
Albanian ethnic cleansing or make it acceptable - as
argued by the "prestigious" International
Crisis Group which
functions as an NEGO, NEar-Governmental
Organisation*.
The author met Americans and others in Kosovo right after
the de facto occupation who did not know (or no longer
perceived) Kosovo was a part of Serbia and repeatedly
called it "this county" with a wry smile.
10.
Completely ignoring the
human dimension of conflicts. Billions of dollars have
poured into Kosovo since 1999; hundreds of government and
non-governmental organisations have promoted courses in
media, human rights, empowerment and other civil society
measures. The only things nobody dared touch were
history, hatred, cultural differences, reconciliation,
forgiveness, truth commissions and that sort of thing.
The naive belief was that if the international community
simply put up history's largest international
peace-making mission in a tiny province, the locals will
greet them with flowers and those who didn't would soon
be convinced about the inherent goodness of the
international mission. They made the same mistake four
years later in Iraq.
11.
After the bombing the
international community monitored - but did nothing to
prevent - the reverse ethnic cleansing of non-Albanians,
some 200,000 who are still in Serbia and Macedonia,
including the always ignored Romas. They were not helped
to get back as were the Albanians fleeing the 13-months
of war in Kosovo and the NATO's bombs (the war and the
bombings were much more important as causes for fleeing
than was the manufactured nonsense about Milosevic
already implementing an so-called "Horseshoe Plan" aiming
to get rid of no less than all 1,5 million Albanians
living in Kosovo).
This happened under the very eyes
of 43,000 NATO soldiers and thousands of OSCE, UN and EU
staff as well as Western NGOs in Kosovo. The world was
told - also by the International Crisis Group - that it
should be seen as a psychological reaction to the earlier
repression of their side. So, Western endorsed ethnic
cleansing continued over the years; the latest but hardly
last round we saw in March 2004. This time it was
"explained" by two arguments; a story that went through
the world's media about Serbs chasing Albanian kids into
a river so they drowned; no retraction were printed when
the story turned out to be untrue. The other argument was
that the Albanian "criminals" and "mobs" (it wasn't
political!) were "frustrated" over the status issue and
the socio-economic situation in the province.
12.
The Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, was officially disarmed
and closed down, being replaced by the Kosovo Protection
Corps that would, we were told, have only civilian tasks.
It leader was Agim Ceku, an Albanian general central in
developing the KLA from 1993 while also serving under
Croatian president Tudjman and being instrumental in
driving out Serbs from Croatia in Operations Storm and
Flash. This was yet another fraud by factors in the
international community. The Serb forces did leave, but
the Kosovo-Albanian army was, for all practical purposes,
preserved. Only the naive could believe that the
Americans, who are able to bomb Afghanistan to rubble and
occupy Iraq, together with other NATO-KFOR forces were
unable to prevent KLA from ravaging the region?
Some should wonder today how it was
possible for KLA to destabilise and conduct war outside
Kosovo, first in Southern Serbia and then in Macedonia?
Isn't it strange also how a disarmed people had weapons
to kill Serbs and internationals as well as moderate
Albanians and cause very serious destruction of homes and
quite solid Orthodox churches throughout Kosovo in March
2004?
13.
Like in Iraq, the occupying
powers dismissed virtually every competent person who
knew how to operate and repair the infrastructure, water,
electricity, the health sector, schools, even if they had
not taken part in Milosevic' repressive policies. In
consequence, nothing worked at a time when the
Kosovo-Albanians had good reasons to believe that things
would finally begin to work properly in their republic
that had been liberated with a little help from their
friends.
14.
For about a decade
everybody thought that sanctions was a great tool to put
pressure on Milosevic but it only impoverished the people
and trading partners such as Macedonia and, worse,
created or boosted a Mafia economy everywhere. That Mafia
is very influential in today's Serbia and no less in
today's Kosovo. Sanctions and the black economy, combined
with imposed privatization policies, created a class
society with enormous poverty among ordinary citizens.
The International Crisis Group, of course, does not see
the absurdity of its own argument that we must - again -
understand that the Kosovo Albanians do bad things
because their economic situation is so poor. It never
justifies Serb politics in those terms and conveniently
leaves unmentioned the Albanian trafficking and
prostitution, the cigarette smuggling, Kosovo's several
hundred money-laundering petrol stations, the drug trade
from Afghanistan (where Western policies have brought
back opium production) and Kosovo's relation to the
European underworld. Lack of money would be about the
last thing that could explain why Albanian extremists
commit ethnic cleansing!
15.
The handover problem. The
international missions in Kosovo are in the same dilemma
as the US-led occupation in Baghdad. They want to hand
over everything as quickly as possible to the locals -
but also secure that they do what we want them to. The
buzz word in Iraq is "sovereignty," in Kosovo
"independence" before which we heard all the other hollow
marketing words: liberation, democracy, human rights -
hollow because the occupiers do not show even the
simplest respect for the locals or for their own Western
"standards." It is not far fetched, therefore, to predict
that there will soon be a resistance movement in Kosovo
too.
16.
Oil, gas and military
bases. Realpolitik is more about material matters and
strategic positioning. This is where the huge American
bases in Kosovo, Bulgaria and Romania as well as the 14
bases in Iraq enter the picture. See details in
PressInfo
195. This is where the
larger strategic game emerges: the triangle between the
Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia with its
resources, transport corridors, gas and oil pipelines -
and long-term strategic battle between the
over-militarised, but crumbling West and the rest of the
world. The Albanians are waking up to the reality that
the West, the US in particular, did not come to Kosovo
for the sake of their human rights or their independence
unless, that is, it suits larger strategic
plans.
17.
The counterproductive
treatment of Serbia. After Milosevic's delivery to the
Hague, the West never got its act together; conveniently,
therefore, it blames Serbia for not getting its act
together. If you put yourself into the situation in
Serbia, it's been one long political harassment ever
since. The list is indeed long if you want to see it:
totally inadequate assistance for reconstruction after
the devastating bombing and psycho-political humiliation;
extreme conditionality on aid and loans; broken promises
of aid if delivering Milosevic; only negative views on
one of the few political leaders with clean hands, Mr.
Kostunica; no willingness to help set up the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission proposed by him; continuously
harping on the co-operation with ICTY in the Hague in
ways not required of politicians in Sarajevo, Zagreb or
Pristina; ignoring the fact that Serbia has Europe's
largest refugee problem of about 500,000 to 600,000 Serbs
from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo; blatant interference in
the country's internal affairs; no understanding that
Serbia feels deprived of Kosovo and collectively punished
because of one leader's brutality and stupidity.
In addition, the country has all
the problems of the East European societies in transition
and is required to fulfil extremely demanding
requirements on the way to a EU membership that may
become true a decade or more into the future.
And then there are those who act
surprised that right-wing, populist parties such as
Seselj's Radical Party gains are gaining increased
support! The International Crisis Group of course
proposes more of this type of misguided policy in its
March 2004 report on Serbia. Thus, the West is missing a
great opportunity to achieve reconciliation and
co-operation with one of the most important countries in
that part of the world that wants to orient itself
towards the West but is constantly rebuffed and
humiliated.
Truth is that Serbia is losing
Kosovo and knows it. If the West misses the opportunity
to offer Serbia an attractive political and economic deal
concerning Kosovo and the future of Serbia proper, it
stands to lose both Serbia and Kosovo - and the people in
both places will lose even more. In the worst of cases it
could lead to renewed fighting and breakdown, also in
Bosnia.
18.
The naive belief that Kosovo-Albanians are seriously
interested in EU integration and in joining the
globalising market economy. They are not. They are
interested in an independent Kosova and in the fate of
Albanians in Montenegro, Macedonia and perhaps in
developing not a greater Albania but a greater Kosova.
And why not? Kosovo-Albanian leaders tend to see
themselves as the historical, philosophical and
intellectual centre of the Albanian nation. Anything less
than an independent Kosova is unacceptable; and let's not
forget that their leaders have told the young generation
the last fifteen years that Kosova was already
independent. The importance of the difference between de
jure and de facto was lost upon themselves in the heat of
the struggle and certainly among those between, say, 5
and 20 years of age.
Time is running out for the old
political elites, the new ones are impatient, and fifteen
years of self-deceptive policies by EU countries and the
US are, predictably, finally catching up. There are
limits to how many games you can play simultaneously, how
often you can change policies, how much unprincipled
politics you can amass in one place and how much you can
fool the locals in the world's conflicts, be it in Iraq
or Kosovo. There will be a boomerang effect one
day.
It may be painful to recognise the
conflict mismanagement and the peace-making failure given
all the prestige and resources devoted to Kosovo. But it
will be more painful to more people if it all breaks
down. Early warning does not apply to upcoming conflicts
only; it should also apply to failed peace-making. But
early warning and violence prevention remains a dream in
this world. What we see in Kosovo now could have been
avoided if dealt with in civil, political terms some
10-15 years ago by honest brokers. That, it seems to me,
is the ultimate tragedy of the Balkans in general and
Kosovo in particular.
*
Throught this PressInfo we are criticising ICG, the
International
Crisis Group.
It's simply time that the media
look into the background of organisations that, sailing
under the flag of convenience of prestigious independent
NGO, actually play a semi-governmental, Western/US-biased
role. Go to ICG's website and you will see who is behind
it. Among the
ICG board members we find:
Morton
Abramowitz
Abramowitz helped Zbigniew
Brzezinski open intelligence co-operation with China,
helped deliver Stinger missiles to the Afghan mujahedin,
became president of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and
helped formulate the new world order with the US as its
only superpower and was the eminence grise for Madeleine
Albright and acted as adviser to the Kosovo Albanians in
Rambouillet.
Various about him here:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6539-2004Mar18.html
http://www.tcf.org/4L/4LMain.asp?SubjectID=1&TopicID=0&ArticleID=469
http://www.roadtosurfdom.com/surfdomarchives/002125.php
http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/ch_essay.htm
Kenneth Adelman
Well-known security policy
hawk, affiliated with the Project for a New American
Century, PNAC, and believed that huge stores of WMD would
be found in Iraq. More about him here:
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/adelman_k/adelman_k.php
Richard Allen
Formerly associated with Nixon
and Reagan; a Hoover fellow since 1983, he is currently a
member of the U.S. Defense Policy Board Advisory
Committee. More:
http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/bios/allen.html
Louise Arbour
Former chief prosecutor of
ICTY, she indicted Milosevic, by no political
coincidence, while the bombing of Yugoslavia happened;
newly appointed head of the UNHCHR.
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p404-e.htm
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arbour/
Wesley Clark
Here is how he explains on his
website that he saved 1,5 million Kosovo-Albanians: "From
1997 through May of 2000, General Clark was NATO Supreme
Allied Commander and Commander in Chief of the United
States European Command. In this position, General Clark
commanded Operation Allied Force, NATO's first major
combat action, which saved 1,5 million Albanians from
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo." Tried to become the next
president of the United States
http://www.draftwesleyclark.com/Biography.htm
William
Shawcross
Writer and broadcaster, wrote "In all, some 200,000
people died in the Balkans on Europe's watch. It was
America that stopped that. In 2001, it was only America
that could have liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban.
The results in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are not
perfect. But all those areas are better off than they
were, and only the U.S. could have made those changes.
Tony Blair understands that; many other European leaders
do not." More here:
http://www.williamshawcross.com/first_page.html
Stephen Solarz
Former U.S. congressman,
hard-line views on how to solve the Balkan problems and
isolate Serbia further; like Adelman affiliated with
PNAC. More about him here:
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/cgi-bin/ri/article?arc=00033
http://www.newamericancentury.org/kosovomilosevicsep98.htm
http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/bios/solarz.cfm
Among other security hard-liners on
the ICG board could be mentioned Zbigniew
Brzezinski and
George
Soros.
And in all fairness there are
also non-hawks
such as Oscar Arias Sanchez, Emma Bonino, Marika Fahlen,
Mohamed Sahnoun, Salim A. Salim, Thorvald Stoltenberg,
Shirley Williams as well as Martti Ahtisaari (chairman)
and Gareth Evans, (President and CEO).
But they don't seem to have any balancing influence on
the reports of the ICG.
Finally, go here and
see
how ICG is funded - and
draw your own conclusions about its independence given
that 19 Western governments and their allies and some ten
major US foundations plus mainly US citizens fund its
work.
© TFF and the author 2004
Tell a friend about this article
Send to:
From:
Message and your name
You are welcome to
reprint, copy, archive, quote or re-post this item, but
please retain the source.
Would
you - or a friend - like to receive TFF PressInfo by
email?
 
|