The
main preconditions
for a sustainable solution
of the Kosovo conflicts
Kosovo
Solution Series # 3
PressInfo #
211
March
21, 2005
By
Aleksandar
Mitic,
TFF Associate & Jan
Oberg,
TFF director
Relevant background links
for this series here.
In the first PressInfo of this
series, we outlined four
general criteria (a-d) for what it means to have solved a
conflict.
To arrive at a sustainable solution
in the concrete case of Kosovo, a minimum of professional
principles and considerations are necessary. This
PressInfo offers the following:
1. The solution has to be
acceptable, optimally satisfactory, for all parties
inside Kosovo and surrounding Kosovo. The idea that
anyone can get or should be given all it wants must be
given up at the outset.
2. No solution can be imposed,
it must be negotiated by all relevant parties. To
solve a conflict means that the parties voluntarily
accept to live with a new order of things. Thus, any talk
about deciding the final status outside a comprehensive
negotiation structure - something that will invariably
take time - should be avoided. Also, the process toward a
solution should neither be influenced by one side's
pressure or the other side's dragging its feet.
3. The same principles must be
applied to the parties. If the international
community respects the Albanian demand not to be ruled by
Serbs/Belgrade, it must also respect that Kosovo-Serbs
who do not wish to be ruled by Albanians/Pristina will
not be exposed to such rule. Or, if it is accepted that
Kosovo with its majority Albanian population can be
partitioned from Serbia, a part of Kosovo with a majority
Serb population can also be partitioned (this does not
mean that it is an ideal solution, only that that
solution cannot be a priori excluded, but must remain on
the table). Or, if it is accepted that Kosovo is part of
the historical Albanian state of Illyria and Albanian
claims are valid because of that, it must also be
accepted that it is the cradle of the Serb-Orthodox
civilisation and that historical, religious and other
important sites be protected and allowed to flourish.
Finally, if Kosovo is assisted in achieving European or
international standards, so must Serbia, and the
international community itself must behave according to
its own standards and not cut corners as it has done
quote often in the past in this conflict.
4. The solution must take
special care of the weakest parties - i.e. the
minorities in Kosovo as well as Serbia's and Montenegro's
interests as the weakest part and as loser of the war. A
solution to Kosovo that rewards the stronger side will be
nothing but a recipe for future historical grievances and
a wish for revenge.
5. The solution must not imply
collective punishment of civilians for what leaders have
done. No nationality and no individuals who have
committed no crimes must be victims of a solution because
that solution is based on historical grievances or a wish
for revenge by one or more parties or on third party
political or economic interests.
6. The solution must
indisputably be consistent with international law and
with the relevant Security Council Resolutions, 1244 in
particular. A settlement for Kosovo should not be
built on exceptionality and risk becoming a precedent for
other, similar secessionist projects around the
world.
7. The solution must address and
be compatible with psycho-social healing. No solution
will work if people continue to hate each other. Through
the establishment, for instance, of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, various confidence-building
and reconciliation measures, as well as peace and
tolerance education the solution should seek to guarantee
the prevention of future violence and offer possibilities
for day-to-day co-operation and thereby over time promote
a civil society concept in which ethnic identities play a
less and less significant rôle.
8. A solution can not be based
on - or forced through - with the argument that it is the
only solution. In the name of democracy and to secure
sustainability, the parties must be given choice. Thus,
independent and impartial experts from different cultures
should be invited to form a commission the task of which
is to provide, say, 5 generalised models for possible
solutions. Their work should present and build on
experiences and best practises from similar
conflict-resolution cases around the world. The point is
to increase the space for creative but realistic
conflict-resolution and stimulate broad debate in Kosovo,
Serbia-Montenegro, in the region and in international
organisations about viable models. Any solution called
the only one by any party will not be a solution simply
because it is never true - and not compatible with an
ethos of democracy - that there is only one way of
solving a problem.
9. Some kind of guarantor actor
mechanism must be developed. It will be necessary to
secure that the chosen model cannot be derailed by any
party at any point. One could of course imagine some kind
of continued (but different) UN, EU and OSCE presence but
also something like Serbia-Montenegro, Albania and the EU
as guarantor states in co-operation with Kosovo, somewhat
similar to the 1960 Agreements about Cyprus.
10. A viable solution will have
to rest on the principles that the final status of Kosovo
is secondary to the essence or substance of the Kosovo
society under development. The main issue is what
kind of actor Kosovo will be for its citizens and its
neighbours. The time of self-delusive policies such as
the one stating that independence - or just remaining
under Belgrade - will solve all essential problems
belongs to the past. Issues of substance and quality
ought to come before status in any negotiated solution.
In short, without solutions to matters of substance -
such as security, economic development, crime reduction,
the right to safe return, reform of the educational
system and the judiciary system, tolerant practising of
identities for all, democratisation and human rights
including gender rights and the right to work and express
oneself freely and without fear - no legal status
solution for Kosovo will be viable or happy for the
people there or in the region.
11. Any solution will require
that the international community lives up to its own
responsibilities, not least UNSC Res 1244. It will
have to be realistically prepared to remain seized of the
matter in many and different ways in years, if not
decades, to come.
The TFF Kosovo
Solution Series
# 1
Why
the solution in Kosovo matters to the
world
# 2
The
media - strategic considerations
# 3
The
main preconditions for a sustainable solution to the
Kosovo conflict
# 4
The
situation as seen from Serbia
# 5
The
arguments for quick and total independence are not
credible
# 6
What
must be Belgrade's minimum conditions and its media
strategy
# 7
Nations
and states, sovereignty and
self-determination
# 8
Positive
scenarios: Turn to the future, look at the broader
perspectives
# 9
Many
thinkable models for future Kosovo
# 10
Summary:
From "Only one solution" towards democracy and
peace
NOTE
Relevant
background links for this series.
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