The
arguments for quick and
total independence
are not credible
Kosovo
Solution Series # 5
PressInfo #
213
March
29, 2005
By
Aleksandar
Mitic,
TFF Associate & Jan
Oberg,
TFF director
Relevant background links
for this series here.
While the ICG, the International
Crisis Group, and other pro-Albanian lobby groups argue
that the independence of Kosovo is a means or necessity
in order to avoid another "March
2004" and general chaos,
the counterargument would be this: wouldn't the granting
of full independence to Kosovo be a reward for years of
policies of ethno-nationalism and ethnic cleansing led by
Albanian extremists? Would it not mean rewarding violent
struggle by the KLA and punishment of the largest
non-violent movement in ex-Yugoslavia - that of the
Kosovo-Albanians before KLA became the dominating force?
Would it not mean rewarding the two aggressions that to a
large extent was instigated by factors in Kosovo, namely
that in Southern Serbia and that in the 8 months war in
Macedonia?
When the Hague war crime indictee
and Kosovo's now former Prime minister Ramush Haradinaj
promises that "in an independent Kosovo the situation of
the Serbs will be better", did he simply send a warning
message: give us independence or the Serbs will continue
to face violence, intimidation and life in ghettos? The
Albanian political class should not be rewarded for a
stance like that. All the mechanisms that the majority
Albanian leadership needs to protect the minorities
already exist today. The Kosovo Albanians do not need
full independence to start respecting human dignity and
human rights.
Would the independence of Kosovo be
an implicit reward for its impoverished population or for
the powerful crime groups which need political support to
control the prostitution, arms, drugs and human
trafficking? With UN estimates of an unemployment rate of
60-70%, even 90% in some regions, with an energy crisis,
economic dependency and stagnation, with close to zero
minority security if it were not for 17.000 NATO troops -
what could one imagine would be the real top priorities
of all Kosovo's population beyond the elite mantra that
everything will be solved the day it becomes the
independent state of Kosova?
Would an independence of Kosovo
mean a true long-lasting and just solution, or just an
exit strategy for the international community that seems
to fear Albanian extremism and violence? Would it amount
to little but a recipe for new violence in a generation
or two ahead based on disillusions with the independence
on the Albanian side and traumas and humiliation on the
Serb (and other minorities') side? We are not saying that
it will be the case, we are saying that immediate and
complete independence is not half as unproblematic as
some would have us believe. And we are saying that it
cannot be a means to achieve all the qualities that
should have been achieved after six years under
protection and other uniquely positive
circumstances.
If someone cannot imagine Albanians
working in multi-ethnic public institutions with their
colleagues from central Serbia and Montenegro, how can
these same Albanians work together with the Serbs in a
multiethnic Kosovo? How can these Albanians work one day
in the future with other European colleagues? Let us take
a look in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbs, Muslims and
Croats work together in police, customs and embassies
abroad. It is possible that they do not like it, but the
international community made them work together, and
there is no reason why it should not do the same with the
Kosovo Albanians in Serbia-Montenegro.
If Kosovo Albanians are not ready
to talk about a compromise - but only insist on full
independence ("conditional" or not) now - where is the
negotiation process? What will Belgrade and Pristina be
negotiating about? What kinds of sentiments, tolerance
and promises would that hold for the future of the
region?
Are the Kosovo Albanians ready for
a dialogue on substantial, human-interest issues or just
status and borders? And what leverage is the UN and other
international actors able and prepared to exercise should
the Kosovo-Albanian leaders announce that full
independence now is the "only solution"? At the moment of
writing, there is not one Albanian politician in Kosovo
who can say that models containing less than full
independence deserve to be discussed.
If the Kosovo Albanian elites are
not ready to share sovereignty with Belgrade, how will
they be able to share sovereignty one day in the European
Union? Why do they need full sovereignty if they will
need to share it in a matter of years? Are they ready for
shared sovereignty and multilateralism or are their
stated wish to join the EU merely convenient
rhetoric?
Many media and the pro-Albanian
lobbyists usually convey the image of Belgrade leaders
being stubborn and inflexible or purposely dragging their
feet on the issue. Fact is, however, that various leaders
in Belgrade have clearly recognised in public that they
know Kosovo will not come back to the pre-1999 situation
and that there should be a solution between high autonomy
and full independence. In late March 2005, deputy prime
minister, Miroljub Labus, advocated a division of Kosovo
into two entities and added that "in such a case Serbia
could have full communication with the Serb entity." For
years former president and author Dobrica Cosic - often
designated patriot or nationalist by Westerners, have
advocated partition.
In short, the Albanians - the
winners of the war - have monotonously argued the same
thing for decades while the Serbs side - losers of the
war - have moved positions and views in accordance with
changes on the ground.
Pro-Albanian lobbyists like Richard
Holbrooke and other, primarily American, policymakers and
lobbyists are often using the argument of Serbia as "a
traditional Russian ally" to argue that the West must put
itself on the side of the Serb opponents. This "metaphor
of Russia " must be rejected. Serbia indeed respects
Russia due to historical, religious and Slavic ties, but
Serbia is far from Russia and punishing Serbia does not
mean punishing Russia.
Finally, attempts to give
independence to Muslim-dominated Kosovo in order to
balance the aggressive policy towards the Islamic world
in the Middle East should be rejected no matter how
convenient they appear to geo-strategic analysts in
Washington.
The TFF Kosovo
Solution Series
# 1
Why
the solution in Kosovo matters to the
world
# 2
The
media - strategic considerations
# 3
The
main preconditions for a sustainable solution to the
Kosovo conflict
# 4
The
situation as seen from Serbia
# 5
The
arguments for quick and total independence are not
credible
# 6
What
must be Belgrade's minimum conditions and its media
strategy
# 7
Nations
and states, sovereignty and
self-determination
# 8
Positive
scenarios: Turn to the future, look at the broader
perspectives
# 9
Many
thinkable models for future Kosovo
# 10
Summary:
From "Only one solution" towards democracy and
peace
NOTE
Relevant
background links for this series.
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